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ABSTRACT 
 
FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): 
the Making of a Violent Islamist Movement  
in the New Democracy of Indonesia. (May 2012) 
Munajat, B.A., State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Indonesia; 
M.S. Leiden University, The Netherlands 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William Alex McIntosh 
 
The current study is aimed at investigating the puzzle of why FPI (Islamic 
Defenders’ Front) has chosen to adopt violent strategies within the democratic context of 
Indonesia. Much of literature on social movements suggests that democracy is inherently 
nonviolent because it allows social movements to use a number of reasonable tactics to 
pursue their goals. On the contrary, authoritarianism is considered to be the cause of the 
emergence of violent movements. However, a violent movement is not necessarily 
absent in the context of democracy. Using the language of Islam, justice and democracy, 
FPI (Islamic Defender’s Front) conspicuously committed at least 64 cases of violent 
collective actions from 1998 to 2010.   
Three levels of analysis are used in order to investigate this social puzzle, namely 
the level of organization, individual characters and FPI’s violent actions. Combining 
these three levels of analysis, this study found that the making of the violent Islamist 
movement (FPI) is complex and interconnected. First, there are at least four social 
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environments that have led FPI to the adoption of violent means. They are the historical 
context of Islamist movements in Indonesia (1945-1998), the timing of violence by FPI, 
social support for FPI’s violent actions and low state capacity. Second, there are at least 
four factors that relate to individuals and organization of FPI. They are FPI’s encounter 
with so-called justified violence, FPI’s engagement in violence-prone activities, 
fundamentalism and FPI’s framing of its violent actions. Combining these factors has 
made FPI’s violence become more persistent in the new democratic context of 
Indonesia. 
Consequently, despite the fact that democracy inhibits political violence, 
democracy may also allow the use of violent means by social movements. In doing so, 
democracy opens an opportunity for people, especially elites, to support the cause of 
violence. Therefore, this can undermine the government’s will to fully suppress the 
violent movement. In addition, there are other significant factors, other than state 
repression, that also facilitate violence, such as a movement’s choice to engage in 
violence-prone activities, low state capacity, a good timing of violence (cultural 
resources) and a good framing of violence.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 There is a pressing need to study a violent movement in the context of a new 
democratic state. Current theories of political violence in the social movement studies 
are mostly built on the non-democratic setting, while the studies of political violence in 
the democratic setting are still rare. In fact, violent movements are not necessarily absent 
in the context of democracy, such as FPI (Islamic Defenders’ Front), a violent movement 
that emerged in the setting of Indonesian democracy. Therefore, there is a need to 
develop more comprehensive approach to look at the political violence in the context of 
democracy. For this reason, this study is aimed at investigating the Islamist violent 
movement, namely FPI that has adopted and continued to use violent strategies in the 
context of Indonesian new democracy. Thus, this current chapter tries to provide the 
background and how this study approaches this problem. 
In Indonesia, the economic crises, the division of military elites, and the mass 
uprising of the middle class in 1998, brought about the breakdown of the Indonesian 
military authoritarian regime (the New Order regime) that had ruled for almost three 
decades. This era marked the birth of democracy and the emergence of the civil society 
of Indonesia. Since then, the state’s control over public space has decreased, while the 
roles of civil society have become stronger.  
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of American Sociological Review. 
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Since this time, not only has a number of political parties emerged in Indonesia, 
but also NGOs and social movements. Many of these groups, including those that had 
been previously suppressed by the authoritarian regime, emerged or reemerged as either 
political parties or social movements (Al-Zastrouw 2006). Benefitting from this 
opportunity, they used conventional and nonconventional means, which are mostly 
nonviolent, to pursue their goals.  This is because democracy is inherently nonviolent, 
which allows social movements to use a number of reasonable tactics (Wiktorowicz 
2004). Until this point, the collapse of the Indonesian military authoritarian regime and 
the emergence of nonviolent social movements aptly fit the political process theory 
(McAdam 1999; Almeida 2003; Tilly 2008). However, this was not the end of the story 
of the new Indonesian democracy.   
Ironically, during the process of Indonesian democracy, an Islamist movement, 
FPI (Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders’ Front) has adopted disruptive and 
violent strategies to pursue their goals. Since its establishment in August 1998, or three 
months after the collapse of the military authoritarian regime until the end of data 
collection for this study in 2010, FPI has committed at least 64 cases of violent actions. 
These activities have become the routine of FPI activities, even after some of FPI leaders 
were imprisoned by the government. Surprisingly, during its violent activities, FPI never 
hid its identity. In almost all its violent collective actions, FPI members always wore a 
white uniform with the green letter of “FPI (Front Pembela Islam)” and its emblem, so 
that they can be easily identified. Using the language of Islamic values, democracy and 
justice, FPI has conspicuously performed violence in the new democratic stage of 
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Indonesia.  Therefore, many Indonesian figures from state and non-state institutions 
often consider FPI as the most visible organization that commits violent actions in 
Indonesia.   
For example, at the end of December 2008, the Indonesian National Commission 
of Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and the Union of Advocacy and Human Rights (the 
PBHI) released a report on human right violations in Indonesia. This commission 
reported that during 2008, it received 4,800 cases of human right violations. Then, the 
union reported that the five top cases that are often  violated are the freedom of 
association (141 cases), the freedom of religion (138 cases), the right of peace (127 
cases), the right to get proper protection (130 cases), and the right to be protected from 
hatred (68 cases). They agree that FPI (Islam Defenders’ Front) is among the top 
perpetrators of those human rights violations.  Similarly, in August 2010, the National 
Police Chief, General Bambang Hendarso Danuri reported that FPI and FBR (the 
Association of Betawi Community) have dominated the collective violent cases since 
2007 (“Terjadi 4.800 Kasus” 2008; “Kapolri: FPI” 2010). Because of this intensive 
engagement in collective violence, FPI is considered to be the Indonesian hardliner 
Islamist movement.  
These violent actions by FPI are similar to what Tilly (2003) calls “collective 
violence as contentious politics;” this is the type of violence, which this study refers to. 
First, it is collective violence because those actions immediately inflict physical damage 
on persons and/or objects, involve at least two perpetrators of damage, and result, at least 
in part, from coordination among people who perform the damage. Second, it is 
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contentious because both FPI and the government always make claims in relation to FPI 
violent actions that affect each other’s interest. Third, it is politics because the relations 
between FPI and the government are always at stake. 
In short, the overall goal of this study is to investigate the puzzle of why FPI has 
chosen to adopt violent strategies under the democratic context of Indonesia, while other 
movements, including some radical Islamist groups (such as, Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia1 and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia2), have avoided using violent tactics. In order to 
get a more comprehensive understanding of this problem, this study will look at three 
different aspects of FPI as a social movement, namely: its organization, activists and 
violent activities. Each of these aspects is addressed in the following different research 
questions: 
1. What are FPI’s organizational contexts that are associated with violence and how 
do they explain FPI’s adoption of violent means?  
2. What are the individual characteristics of FPI activists that might facilitate FPI’s 
adoption of violent means?  
                                                 
1 Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) was established on August 7, 2000.  Two of its important leaders 
are Abu Bakar Ba`asyir and Irfan S. Awas. The former is the amir  (the head of consultative committee) 
and the latter is the top leader (executive committee) of MMI. The goal for MMI establishment is to 
struggle for the application of Islamic law, shari`ah  in the real life of the Indonesian society.  This group 
is often associated with the Jemaah Islamiyyah (Indonesia), a Al-Qaeda’s network in Southeast Asia 
(Nashir 2007:392).   
2 Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is part of the Hizbut Tahrir transnational movement, which was 
established in 1953 and is aimed at establishing a single Islamic rule or Islamic caliphate (khilafah 
Islamiyyah) and applying shari`ah in the world. Even though HTI publicly appeared in Indonesia after the 
collapse of the Suharto authoritarian regime, Nashir argues that it might be established a long time before 
that time. He suspects that its embryo had been developed since the visit of Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, the 
founder of Hizbut Tahrir, in Muslim countries in 1970s. Fealy assumes that Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia have 
the most followers among Hizbut Tahrir in other countries, then followed by Hizbut Tahrir Uzbekistan 
(Nashir 2007; Fealy 2007).  
  
5 
5 
 
3. What are the patterns of FPI’s violent actions and how these actions and their 
social contexts explain its adoption of violent means? 
The first and the third research questions will be addressed with a qualitative approach, 
and the second research question will be addressed with a quantitative approach. Thus, 
combining qualitative and quantitative methods to examine the aspects of organization, 
individual and activities, the proposed study is expected to theorize the conditions under 
which social movements, especially religious movements, will become radicalized and 
adopt violent strategies in the context of democracy. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE RIVIEW 
 
The current chapter tries to provide a literature review that sheds light on the 
topics of collective violence, or political violence, or, what Charles Tilly (2008) calls, 
collective violence as contentious politics. There are various perspectives of looking at 
political violence, and there is no single answer to the question of why this violence 
occurs. Therefore, based on the above research questions, this chapter focuses on the 
studies of political violence that look at the aspects of political environment, 
organization and actors to explain political violence. In doing so, it is expected that this 
chapter gives an overview of what has been done and needs to be done in the study of 
political violence. More importantly this study can benefit from the previous studies to 
guide the analysis of FPI’s adoption of violent means and locate it in the wider study of 
political violence.  
 
Political Environment: State-Centered Perspective 
Several studies look at violence by focusing on the political environments. 
According to this perspective, social movements are both limited and empowered by 
exogenous factors, namely the socio-political environment, regardless of level of 
grievances, availability of resources and other internal factors. Therefore, social 
movement is understood to be a product of social forces and is not reducible to the 
preexisting psychological states of the individuals or the actors. 
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 Some studies suggest that the characteristics of regimes or states are considered 
to be more determining of social movement’s outcomes than other environmental 
factors, or more over the characteristics of the actors. In this light, authoritarianism or 
state repression is often considered to be the cause of the emergence of violent 
movements. This argument is embodied in the so-called theory of blocked opportunity. 
This theory contends that a group resorts to violence because the way and the process 
toward normal pacific competition have been blocked (Conteh-Morgan 2004).  Harsh 
repression blocks moderate tactics and subsequently tends to radicalize the movement 
and pushes tactics toward violence (Shortell 2001; Wiktorowicz 2004; Steinhoff and 
Zwerman 2008; Almeida 2008). 
 For example, in the case of the massacre by the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria 
(GIA), the political environments were characterized by three conditions: first, state 
repression that created a political environment of bifurcation and brutality; second, 
insurgents that created exclusive organizations to shield themselves from the repression; 
and third, rebels that promoted anti-system frames to motivate collective action to 
overthrow agents of repression. Similarly, in the case of the Gama`a Islamiyya of Egypt, 
the repression produced violent responses when the movement was excluded from 
institutional politics and suffered from indiscriminate, reactive state repression 
(Wiktorowicz 2004). In short, Wiktorowicz argues that the pattern of violence can be 
best explained in terms of regime responses to challenger initiatives. Harsh regime 
responses that limited moderate tactics tended to radicalize the rebellion and make 
violence more legitimate.  
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 Similarly, in his studies of revolutionary movements from 1945 to 1991 across 
countries in Southeast Asia, Central America and Eastern Europe, Goodwin (2001) 
argues that political violence is not simply a response to economic exploitation or 
inequality, but also a more direct response to political oppression and violence, typically 
brutal and indiscriminate. He also argues that the success of revolution will depend on 
incapacitation of states. This incapacitation, however, should be distinguished from 
expanding political opportunities which are necessary for the mobilization of 
movements. Goodwin concludes that political context is not the only factor that explains 
the revolutionary movements, but it is the most important factor (Goodwin 2001:31).  
Similarly Tilly and Della Porta came to the same conclusion. Tilly (2008) argues 
that political environments are important factors that can explain the movements’ 
adoption of violence. In his study, he classified six types of violence, namely: rituals, 
coordinated destruction, opportunism, brawls, scattered attacks and broken negations. 
Each type has different combination of recurrent causal mechanism. Nevertheless he 
argues that there are two important factors that are always prevalent in explaining those 
different types of violence, namely: democracy and the capacity of state.  
Democracy is the extent to which the citizens maintain broad and equal relations 
with the government or state, exercise control over the government and enjoy protection 
from arbitrary action by the government. Capacity is the extent to which the government 
of the state controls resources, activities and citizens.  In short, democratic states with 
high capacity tend to inhibit violence and vice versa (Tilly 2008:41).  
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Della Porta also argues that organized violence and the groups that specialize in 
violence develop gradually. The development of violent groups is often affected by state 
repression. State repression often creates martyrs and myths. For example, an individual 
activist who is hit or killed by the state can become a hero or holy person for his or her 
group. Then, this repression can motivate secondary deviance; the supporters or the 
people who are in the same group with this victim may also become radicalized by the 
state repression (Della Porta 2008). 
In a slightly different way, some argue that state repression is not enough for the 
movement to launch the violent strategies. It depends also on the capability or strength 
of the movements. Therefore, Almeida (2003) argues that there is a connection between 
open opportunity and state repression (threats).  A period of expanded political 
opportunity in authoritarian contexts also permits the survival of organizational 
infrastructure, which then enables the movement to become more independent and 
stable. However, when the transition from political opportunity to threat occurs, the 
movement will adopt new organizational forms and practices, like becoming radical and 
disruptive (Almeida 2003).  
 In short, the above studies suggest that state repression is the most important 
factor that explains the adoption of violent strategies by social movements. Repression 
provides necessary conditions for the movement to be violent, for example by blocking 
opportunities, creating sense of injustice and making a call to arms logical. These studies 
seem to adopt a state-centered approach, in terms of putting state at the center of the 
analysis. They do not ignore other significant factors that may facilitate political 
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violence, but they consider that state characteristics are the determinant factors that 
explain movement’s outcome. Therefore, these studies do not take into account other 
factors that also predict political violence. In fact, political or collective violence is not 
necessarily absent from the context of democratic settings. Indeed, Tilly (2008) has 
already stated that democracy reduces the likelihood of violent movements, but this also 
means that the violent movements still can emerge in the democratic context. The 
question, then, is what can account for the violent movement, like FPI (Islamic 
Defenders’ Front), in the context of democracy? In addition to that, the political process 
approach, which emphasizes on state, discounts many significant aspects that are close 
to violence, such as the actors and organizations of the movements. 
 
Framing Aspect       
Unlike the above studies that focus on exogenous factors to explain violent 
movements, several studies look at internal or endogenous factors of the movements, 
such as culture, meaning construction, ideology and other factors that relate to minds and 
emotions of the movement or actors. For example, many social movement scholars 
argue that political violence is mainly symbolic. Therefore, in analyzing violence, 
cultural and emotional effects are more important than the material damage caused by 
violence (Della Porta 2008).  
Juergensmeyer (2003) explores the relationship between religion and violence 
through culture. He argues that violence is a form of public performance symbolizing 
ability to terrorize the community. Religion plays role in legitimizing the violence and 
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provides the cosmic war that makes the perpetrators believe that they are conducting a 
holy mission. Even though religion does not always provides moral justification for 
violence, this kind of alliance between religion and violence can be found in almost 
every major religious traditions, such as Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hindu, Sikh and 
Buddhism. 
Juergensmeyer (2003) focuses on the role of culture that leads to violent action 
and justification. For him, culture includes the idea of episteme and habitus. Episteme is 
a world view or paradigm of thinking that defines the conditions of all knowledge. 
Habitus is a socially constituted system of cognitive and motivating structure. These are 
all what Geertz refers to as a cultural system (Juergensmeyer 2003).  
Other studies look at ideology to predict political violence. In this case, ideology 
is treated just like the political environments that are able to limit as well as empower the 
movements. For example, Sewell (1994) argues that in the case of the French revolution, 
ideology is relatively autonomous, impersonal and cultural. Thus, it should be 
understood in structural terms. As a part of social structures, ideology possesses dual 
characters: constraint and enablement.  It produces and reproduces actions, and at the 
same time it also blocks certain actions.  Ideological structure also is also anonymous, or 
beyond the consciousness of any single actor (Sewell 1994). 
Other studies prefer to look at political violence as part of the discourse in 
society. This is because political violence exists within the discourse. For example, in 
the case of radicalization of the religious movements in El Salvador, Shortell (2001) 
looks at the process of radicalization through the sermon of Romero. He looks at the 
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techniques of describing and explaining the rhetorical strategies by which meaning is 
deployed in the struggle against the state. Therefore, religious ideology or discourse in 
this case is not merely theological but it also represents the process of radicalization of 
movements in El Salvador (Shortell 2001). 
In short, challenging the political process (political environments) approach, 
these studies suggest that, in addition to state repression, there are factors embedded in 
the movements that are also determinant to predict the movement’s outcome.  These 
factors can be ideological, cultural and organizational. In the studies of social 
movements, these factors may be close to framing analysis because most of them are 
about construction of meaning that make violence become more logical and feasible, and 
finally motivate the movements’ members to participate in the political violence. 
However, these studies still ignore the socio-environmental aspects (exogenous factors) 
and the characteristics of individuals who perpetrate violence.  
 
Characteristics of Individual 
Several studies prefer to look at the characteristics of individuals to explain 
political violence. Some of the most challenging as well as convincing arguments are 
that generally the way people (movement activists) perceive their religions and their 
states or governments affect the movement’s outcomes. More specifically, they are 
fundamentalism, political trust and political efficacy, which are explained as follows.   
First, fundamentalism may be the most conspicuous factor that is often accused 
as the source of religious violence; even if the violence does not appear to be religious. 
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Even though some scholars disagree with this idea (Jahroni 2008; Al-Zastrouw 2006), 
many others still believe that the relationship between fundamentalism and religious 
violence is real (Altmeyer and Hunsberger 1992 and 2004; Moaddel and Karanbenich 
2008; Rothschild, Abdollahi, and Pyszczynski 2009).  For example, the study of  
Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) indicates that fundamentalism strongly associated 
with  hostility towards homosexuality.  Moaddel and Karanbenich (2008) found that the 
more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they are to be fatalistic and feel 
insecure. Similarly, Rothschild (2009) found that among Americans, fundamentalism is 
associated with greater support for significant military interventions. 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) may be the first scholars that develop a 
measurement scale of fundamentalism.  Initially, they created 20 indicators or items of 
fundamentalism. However, in their later study they revised and shortened those 
indicators into 16 items, which they consider as having more internal consistency and 
the same reliability as in the 20-item scale. For example, “God has given humanity a 
complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed” 
and “No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths 
about life.”  
 In addition, these scales of fundamentalism were replicated and further 
developed by Moaddel and Karabenich (in the context of young Muslims in Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia), and Rothschild et al. (in the context of Americans and Iranian Shiite 
Muslims). Rothschild et al. (2009) use the old-version scale of fundamentalism by 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992). Moaddel and Karabenich (2008) use the revised 
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scale of fundamentalism by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) with some adjustment of 
the question so as to be more appropriate to the Muslim context. For example, Moaddel 
and Karabenich (2008) add the following items: 
1. Islam is the only religion on this earth that teaches, without error, God’s truth. 
2. Islam should be the only religion taught in our public schools. 
3. Only good Muslims will go to heaven; people of other religions will not, no 
matter how good they are. 
4. Non-Muslim religions have a lot of weird beliefs and pagan ways. 
In the two studies of Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992 and 2004), both the old-version 
scale model and the revised scale model of fundamentalism produced high values of 
Cronbach’s α from .87 to .98. Similarly, the study by Rothschild et al. (2009) also 
produced high values of Cronbach’s α= .90 and .92. However, the study of Moaddel and 
Karanbenich (2008) produced the lowest Cronbach’s α= .80 and .79. 
Despite those high values of Cronbach’s α in the above studies, there are two 
concerns that can be addressed to the above scales of fundamentalism, in terms of 
suffering from social desirability bias and theoretical dimensionality of fundamentalism.  
First, most of those above questions consist of something that is supposed to be followed 
by adherents of a religion.  For example, answering the questions: “Islam is the only 
religion on this earth that teaches, without error, God’s truth,” Muslims will potentially 
answer according to the expectation of the professed creed, rather than their actual 
belief. Similarly in other religions, adherent of a religion is supposed to believe that 
his/her religion the real truth. Therefore, people will tend to present themselves in a 
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favorable light.  Second, the above scales of fundamentalism focus only on aspects of 
beliefs. In fact, current studies of fundamentalism suggest that fundamentalism should 
not be viewed merely from aspects of beliefs, but also aspect of cognition or belief’s 
manifestation (Marty and Appleby 1997; Almound, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Frey 
2007). Therefore, if fundamentalism entails both dimensions of belief and its 
manifestation, the above items of fundamentalism suffer from theoretical dimensions of 
fundamentalism. 
However, even though the above scales of fundamentalism appear to be 
problematic, there are strong tendencies that fundamentalism (or a certain type of 
religiosity) is closely associated with violence. For example, Ginges and Atran (2009) do 
not discuss fundamentalism, but they acknowledge a certain type of religiosity (strong 
commitment) can affect violence. They argue that participation in violence is more a 
function of parochial altruism or collective commitment than selective incentives 
(economic gain).  They collected data on seven hundred and twenty Palestinian adults 
from 14 university campuses across the West Bank and Gaza. The result shows that 
when people are considering between duty to go to war or to family, they are not making 
instrumental decisions but rather decisions based on moral commitment to collective 
sacred values. In short, the analysis shows no relationship between self-enhancement 
scores and willingness to attack Palestinians or Israelis, but shows a positive relationship 
between conservatism scores and willingness to participate in acts of political violence.  
Similar patterns were also found by Ginges and Atran (2009) in the context of 
Indonesia. The respondents were 102 students attending four different Indonesian 
  
16 
16 
 
madrasah (Muslim boarding schools) that are associated with social movements. The 
findings of this research confirm the relationship between religious violence and certain 
type of religiosity, and challenge the prevailing view that the choices of actors in 
political disputes are instrumentally rational, driven by a strict cost-benefit calculus. 
In short, these arguments about fundamentalism imply that there is a need to 
revisit the relationship between fundamentalism and violence, to develop the scale of 
fundamentalism and finally to test whether this relationship can be used to explain FPI’s 
adoption of violent means.   
Second, in addition to fundamentalism, a number of earlier studies indicate that 
political discontent or trust in government and political efficacy are associated with 
violence and radicalization (Gamson 1968; Paige 1971; Craig et al. 1981, 1985, 1990; 
Zimmermann 1983). Miller (1967) and Zimmermann (1983) argue that the readiness to 
engage in violence will depend on the degree of trust in political authority. Similarly, 
Gamson (1968) distinguishes three types of political activities which are used to 
influence the state; persuasion, inducement and constraint (physical violence). All of 
these types relate to the level of trust in government. People who have a high trust in 
government would be likely to use persuasion; those who have a neutral position 
towards the government, would be likely to use inducement; and those who have a low 
trust, would be likely to use constraint or violence. However, he adds that those who use 
constraint should also have a high degree of efficacy. 
Other scholars argue that the adoption of violent means will depend on the 
interactions between those above factors. They have different opinions on the type of 
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interactions that lead to the use of violent tactics. Some argue that people with low trust 
in government and low level of political efficacy are susceptible to radical or 
revolutionary appeals (Kornhauser 1959; Bell 1964; Ransford 1968).  On the contrary, 
similar to Gamson (1968), others argue that people with high scores of political efficacy 
but low scores of trust tend to resort to violent political actions (Paige 1971). However, 
the latter argument seems to be more parallel to the current social movement theory.  
People who have low political efficacy will not likely join the social movements, let 
alone to engage in political violence. Nevertheless these two arguments can be tested at 
the same time by creating an interaction variable between the trust and political efficacy 
and then looking at the results of those interaction in relations to the dependent variable 
of violence. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the relationship between violence 
and political attitudes (trust in the government and political efficacy).  
In summary, a number of studies have been done to investigate why movements 
engage in violent activities. Various approaches have been employed to look at this 
topic, such as political environments, organizational aspects and individual 
characteristics.  However, much of the previous research needs to be further developed 
and tested. First, the studies that focus on political environments are still dominated by 
the state-centered approach to predict violence. Therefore, there is a need to investigate 
political environments, other than state repression, that may also lead to political 
violence. This is because political violence or violent movements also exist in the 
democratic settings. Therefore, this need can only be met by investigating violence in the 
context of non-repression or democracy.   
  
18 
18 
 
Second, the studies focusing on aspects of organization show that ideology and 
culture of the organization give a valuable aspect in explaining violence because 
political violence is mostly symbolic, logical and legitimate to the actors involved and 
some part of the society. Lastly, in regards to the characteristics of individuals, there is a 
need to revisit the relationships between political violence (violent attitudes) and 
people’s levels of fundamentalism, trust in government and political efficacy.  
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The theoretical framework for the current study can be divided into two sections: 
qualitative and quantitative. First, the qualitative theoretical framework is used to 
address the first and third research questions, which are about FPI organizational context 
and its violent actions respectively. Second, the quantitative theoretical framework is 
used to address the second research question, which is about testing the relationships 
among the latent variables of fundamentalism, trust in government, efficacy, violent 
attitudes and the dichotomous variable of type of group.  
 
Qualitative Theoretical Framework 
 
Political Process Theory  
Political process theory may be the most dominant model in the study of social 
movements. This theory focuses on the political environment surrounding the group in 
order to predict the emergence and outcomes of social movements, including why a 
social movement adopts violent means (McAdam 1986, 1999; Tarrow 1998). The 
political environment can be widely interpreted as opportunity and/or threats (Almeida 
2003).  Opportunity is a condition that is beneficial for movements, such as political 
realignments, decline of state capacity to repress and opening new access. Threat 
pertains to conditions that intimidate movements, such as economic problems, 
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unfavorable laws and state repression.   In short, this perspective looks at social 
movements as a political process, not a psychological process. 
Based on this, collective violence is often understood as a result of blocked 
opportunity. One of the common types of blocked opportunity is state repression of any 
institutions that challenge the state’s authority. State repressions limit reasonable tactics 
that the movements use to achieve their goals. This condition leads social movements to 
adopt violent tactics (Shortell 2001; Wiktorowicz 2004; Steinhoff and Zwerman 2008).  
However, repression does not necessarily radicalize a movement. The ability of 
the movement to engage in violent actions will depend on the readiness and strength of 
the movement. Therefore, opportunity and threat can sometimes be interconnected. For 
example, in the case of El Salvador, the radicalization of some movements resulted from 
the temporal sequencing of political opportunity and threat environments (Almeida 
2003). The process of this radicalization is described by Almeida in the following Figure 
3.1: 
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Source: Almeida 2003:355 
Figure 3.1 Pathways to Protest Wave Outbreak in Authoritarian Settings  
 
 
Therefore, this figure implies that repression (threat → radicalization in T2) alone 
is not enough to explain the radicalization of the movement. There is a need to look back 
at the political environments (T1), prior to repression (T2) that bring about the readiness 
of the movement to engage in violent actions.   
In short, the current study tries to use the political process theory as a framework 
to look at how socio-political environments –around FPI organizational context and its 
violent actions– shed light on FPI’s adoption of violent means. However, this theory 
emphasizes socio-political process and regards violence as a result of social force. It 
ignores other aspects, such as ideological components, organizational bylaws, moral 
organization and actors. Therefore, complementing this approach, this study also uses 
the framing process theory to explain FPI’s adoption of violence, as explained below.  
 
Threat 
(State-Attributed Economic 
Problems, Erosion of 
Rights, State Repression) 
T2  
T1  
Political Opportunity 
(Institutional Access, 
Competitive Election) 
Organizational 
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Protest Wave 
Political Opportunity 
“Holdovers” 
Radicalized Organizational 
Infrastructure 
(Access to Political Opportunity 
Holdovers and Radicalization of 
Organization) 
T1 = Time One 
T2 = Time Two 
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Framing Process Theory  
 In addition to political process theory, framing process theory represents another 
important perspective that can be used to examine political violence. This is because 
violence by itself is risky, unpopular and usually avoided. Therefore, in the context of 
social movements, leaders or activists must construct norm violations, grievances, 
religious reasoning and social justification so that the violence becomes meaningful, 
which in turn also motivates movements’ members to participate in the actions.  Without 
framing, or meaning construction, collective violence will not likely occur.  
 Benford and Snow (2000) argue that there are four types of framing processes, 
namely frame bridging, amplification, extension and transformation. First, frame 
bridging is linking two or more similar ideologies that are, however, structurally 
unconnected regarding a particular issue. Second, frame amplification is the clarification 
or invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on particular issue, problem or set of 
events. Third, frame extension is an attempt to enlarge its adherent pool of participants 
by portraying its objective and activities as attending to or being congruent with the 
values or interest of potential adherents. Fourth, frame transformation involves changing 
old understandings and meanings (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000).   Even 
though this perspective is general, it is insightful to look at how FPI gains support from 
either its members or other groups, and how FPI deal with its continuous adoption of 
violent means.  
Another interesting framing concept, with which to look at FPI’s violence, is the 
framing task. There are three key framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational 
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framing. Diagnostic framing includes identification of problem and the attribution of 
blame or causality. Prognostic framing includes suggestion of solutions to the problem 
and identification of strategies, tactics, and targets. Lastly, motivational framing includes 
calling for engagement in corrective action or movements. The success of the movement 
often depends on to which of these three framing tasks are fulfilled (Snow and Benford 
1988).  
   In short, this study tries to combine political process and framing process 
theories into a single framework to examine how the socio-political environment around 
FPI’s organizational contexts and its violent actions shed light on FPI’s adoption of 
violent means. However, these two major theories ignore the psychological or individual 
characteristics of the movements’ actors or activists. Therefore, in this study will also 
examine the individual actors to explain FPI’s adoption of violent means. 
 
Quantitative Theoretical Framework 
As described in the literature review chapter, the characteristics of individuals 
that may explain political violence or collective violence are fundamentalism, trust in 
government, political efficacy, and the interaction term between trust and political 
efficacy. Therefore, the following discussion is about the theoretical framework of the 
theories to constructs items measuring those variables. Additionally, this study also adds 
the variable of violent attitudes in order to test the relationships between those variables 
and violence. 
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Fundamentalism 
Originally the term fundamentalism referred to a group of conservative American 
Protestants in the early 1900s. They were fundamentalists in the sense that they 
considered themselves to be the people selected to preserve and protect the fundamentals 
of Christian faith from the liberal ideas, such as Darwinism and modernism (Numrich 
2007:9). More recently, the term fundamentalism has been used to identify a type of 
religiosity that emphasizes a return to traditional values or a glorious past and an 
accompanying sense of restoration of religious traditions. 
Therefore, the term fundamentalism is no longer confined to Christianity. It has 
been expanded into other religions, not only the Abrahamic religions but also Hinduism 
and Buddhism. Even though fundamentalists associated with every religion have 
different visions of the cosmos and of a just social order, they adopt similar attitude 
towards the processes of secularization, anthropocentric notions of progress and 
development (Marty and Appleby 1997). 
Scholars have slightly different opinions on the definitions of fundamentalism, or 
what may constitute fundamentalism. That is may be the source of why scholars have 
different opinions about the relationship between violence and fundamentalism.  Some 
emphasize their concepts on people’s religious beliefs, like the truth of one’s religion, 
the relationship with God, and treating religious texts; while others emphasize on the 
manifestations of people’s attitude towards religion, such as how people look at the 
relationship between state and religion, the status of women, and modernity. These 
differences can be seen in how both groups define “fundamentalism” as follows.   
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First, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992, 2004) focus their concept on religious 
beliefs. They define fundamentalism as follows:  
One set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, 
intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential 
truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously 
fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, 
unchangeable practices of the past; and those who believe and follow these 
fundamental teaching have a special relationship with deity” (1992:118). 
   
Second, other scholars define fundamentalism in a broader way, not merely based on the 
religious beliefs. As Peter L. Berger argues, fundamentalism should be defined by its 
cognitive style. Both non fundamentalist and fundamentalist adherents share the same 
beliefs, but they affirm these beliefs in different ways; the former shows a flexible and 
moderate manner, and the latter exhibits an uptight and militant manner (Frey 2007:vi ).  
Similarly, other scholars define fundamentalism as follows: 
An identifiable pattern of religious militancy in which self-styled true believers 
attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity by outsiders, fortify the borders 
of religious community and create viable alternatives to secular structures and 
processes (Marty and Appleby 1997; Almound et al. 2003:17). 
 
As discussed in Chapter II, the first definition of fundamentalism, which only considers 
“belief” factor, is problematic. This study, therefore, uses the second definition of 
fundamentalism in order to develop a scale of fundamentalism. In addition, the second 
definition of fundamentalism does not ignore the aspect of belief, as can be seen in the 
following traits of fundamentalist.  
 Based on the above concept of fundamentalism, scholars identify the traits of 
fundamentalist as follows: 
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1. Reactivity means reactive attitudes towards something that is considered as 
degeneration of a tradition, or protective and defensive attitudes towards religion 
beliefs. Fundamentalists, therefore, perceive threat of their religion from other 
religions, ethnic groups, the state, or more liberal groups of the same religion. 
This defensive attitude often produces hostility and violence towards other 
(religious) groups. 
2. Dualistic thinking means a black-white approach to life. Everything is considered 
as good or otherwise evil, or pure and contaminated. For example, political 
murders by fundamentalist groups in Islamic countries from eight century 
onward usually targeted Muslim rulers because fundamentalists did consider the 
rulers as not true Muslims, and thus evil.  
3. Absolutist interpretation of scripture means strict reading of the holy books, or in 
some cases, accepted traditions. However, Frey (2007) argues the 
fundamentalists are not always “literalist” in interpreting the holy texts, but they 
consistently reject modern interpretations of their holy books.    
4. An apocalyptic view means a belief that the sacred texts contain hidden 
mysteries, including historical secrets, such as the concept of the Messiah and 
Dajjal (the big impostor). For example, Muslim Fundamentalists view that the 
people of `Ad (the community that rejected God, and then destroyed by God) in 
the Quran as referring to the US, and Dajjal as referring to the US president.  
5. Belief in chosenness means that Fundamentalists believe in their own specialness 
as the defenders of the religion. Despite the fact that most fundamentalist groups 
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consist of only a small number of people compared to the mainstream groups, 
they tirelessly pursue their goals, opposing what they believe to be the prevailing 
madness within the religion and within the world today.    
6. Selective emphasis means that fundamentalists focus only certain parts of their 
religion traditions, and certain aspects of modernity as their target of attacks. For 
example, once Dwight L Moody, the founder of the Moody Bible Institute,  
argued  that there are “four great temptations that threaten us to-day: attending 
the theater, failing to keep the Sabbath holy…, reading the Sunday newspaper, 
and teaching atheistic doctrines, including evolution.” 
7. Separation from the World, charismatic style of leadership, and strict behavior of 
controls are other Fundamentalist characteristic at the group level (Frey 2007). 
In short, the concept of fundamentalism that is used in this study emphasizes not 
only the aspect of belief but also the manifestation of belief in social and political lives. 
In doing so, it is expected that the items used here describe a more meaningful concept 
of fundamentalism enabling classification of the types of religiosity among Muslims, 
particularly the Muslim leaders and activists. More importantly, these items also do not 
suffer from the social desirability bias. The following Table 3.1 shows the items used to 
measure the level of fundamentalism and their theoretical bases. 
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Table 3.1 Indicators (Observed Variables) of Fundamentalism and Theoretical Bases  
Coding Items Theoretical bases 
Q6a We do not need to re-interpret what is clearly and literally 
stated in the al-Quran because it is flawless, for example the 
verses of the unequal proportion of inheritance between male 
and female (2:1). 
Absolutism 
Q6b Whenever knowledge/science and al-Quran conflict, science 
must be wrong; and we do not need to compromise between 
them. 
Absolutism 
Q6c Currently the activities of Christianization targeting Muslim in 
Indonesia have become a serious threat to our Muslim 
community. 
Reactivity 
Q6d The Islamic liberal groups, like JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal) 
have gone too far from the real tenets of Islam and potentially 
harm the true beliefs of Muslim community of Indonesia. 
Reactivity 
Q6e Muslims of Indonesia is in a state of serious danger because of 
the widespread of corruptions, pornography, prostitutions, 
drugs and other immoralities 
Reactivity 
Q6f Currently, I feel that I am obliged to do something to protect 
Islam/Muslim society from such immorality because many 
Muslims tend to ignore such problems. 
Feeling being Chosen 
Q6g To deal with these problems, the government should prioritize 
to solve moral problems rather than other problems because 
immorality (the moral problem) is the source of all problems. 
Selective emphasis 
Q6h According to Islam, a woman cannot be a leader, such as 
president, governor and mayor. 
Absolutism, Selective 
emphasis 
Q6i According to Islam, a woman cannot be a judge. Absolutism, Selective 
emphasis 
Q6j A Muslim must not vote for female candidates for president or 
governor. 
Absolutism, Selective 
emphasis 
Q6k The chronic problems of corruption, pornography and other 
widespread of immoralities as well as the continuous natural 
disasters in Indonesia are signs about the closeness of the end 
of the world. 
Apocalyptical Views 
Q6l The Quran and the Hadith have already predicted the 
appearance of Dajjal (the imposter and damage carrier). I 
believe that the president of the USA and the prime minister 
Israel are the Dajjal. 
Apocalyptical Views 
Q6m Indonesia is a secular state because its constitution is not based 
on a religion (Islam or the Quran and Hadith). 
Dualistic thinking 
Q6n Muslims make up the majority of the Indonesian population. 
Therefore, state constitutions should be based on Islamic 
shari`ah (al-Quran and al-Sunnah). 
Dualistic thinking 
Note: The answers for these statements use 7 points of the Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7= strongly 
agree); and 7 indicate highest level of fundamentalism.  
The coding number system (Q6a to Q6n) was adjusted to the question number in the questionnaire. For 
example, Q6a means “question” number “6” item “a.”  
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Trust in Government 
Trust in government is about citizens’ effective orientation toward and evaluation 
of the government.   The scale of trust runs from high trust to low trust (high distrust or 
cynicism). High trust indicates that the government or public servants meet the 
expectation of the citizens, while low trust indicates that the government’s functions and 
outputs do not meet the citizens’ expectations or norms (Gamson1968 and Miller 1974). 
There are at least two approaches used to measure trust in government. The first 
approach emphasizes people’s self-identification of their trust in the government’s work 
or in how the government functions. The second approach emphasizes people’s self-
identification on their trust in the government’s institutions. For example, the question is 
“how much of the time can you trust the police institution” (Torney-Purta and 
Richardson 2004; Paige 1971).  
In order to get a comprehensive dimension of trust, this study will apply both 
approaches. Therefore, the items of trust in government will contain people’s self-
identification of their trust in both the government’s work and institutions. However, the 
questions or the statements and the scales of answers, especially from Miller (1974) and 
Torney-Purta and Richardson (2004), will be adjusted and added so that they will be 
more appropriate to the context of Indonesia, such as the questions about typical 
problems faced by the government. Based on all of these, the questions about trust can 
be seen in the following Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.2 Indicators (Observed Variables) of Trust in Government’s Work 
Coding Items (Indicators) 
Q7a The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that 
it is run for the benefit of all the people.* 
Q7b People in the government waste a lot of the money.*  
Q7c Almost all of the people running the government don't seem to know what they are doing.* 
Q7d Many people running the government are a little crooked.* 
Q7e The government can deal with the problem of morality, like pornography, abortion and 
prostitution 
Q7f The government has effectively combated the problem of corruptions. 
Q7g The government/court will be successful in dealing with the case of Bibit-Chandra-versus 
Anggodo ( or Gayus). 
Note: The answers for these statements use 7 points of the Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7= strongly 
agree); and 7 indicate highest level of Trust in government’s work. 
The coding number system (Q7a to Q7g) was adjusted to the question number in the questionnaire.  
The statements with * are scored in reverse, so that the higher score indicate higher trust. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Indicators (Observed Variables) of Trust in Government’s Institutions 
Coding Items (Indicators) 
Q8a How much of the time can you trust the SBY Administration? 
Q8b How much of the time can you trust the Provincial/Local Government? 
Q8c How much of the time can you trust the Police? 
Q8d How much of the time can you trust the Courts (Pengadilan)? 
Q8e How much of the time can you trust the Prosecutor General (Kejaksaan)? 
Q8f How much of the time can you trust the People of Congress/Parliament (MPR/DPR)? 
Note: The answer for these questions will be 1 = never 2 = only some of the time 3 = most of the time 4 = 
always 0 = don’t know. The score of 1 indicates low trust in government and 4 indicates high trust in 
government. The score of zero (0) is treated as a missing value and coded -9. 
The coding number system (Q8a to Q8f) was adjusted to the question number in the questionnaire.  
 
Political Efficacy 
Political efficacy is often defined as the feeling that people can have an impact 
upon the political process. Thus, efficacious individuals will feel that they can influence 
the political process or how the government functions (Paige 1971). Currently, in the 
literature of political science, the dimension of political efficacy developed by a 
sociologist, William A. Gamson, has been expanded.   Efficacy is, therefore, not only a 
measure of beliefs about one’s competence to participate or influence the political 
process, which is called “internal efficacy,” but also beliefs about a government’s 
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responsiveness to citizens’ demands, which is called “external efficacy” (Craig and 
Maggiotto 1990). 
For the purpose of this study, I will use the concept of efficacy proposed by 
Gamson based on two reasons. First, the later definition of political efficacy (internal 
and external) is developed in order to explain voting behavior or conventional political 
participation rather than more general socio-political participation. Second, the 
operational definition of external efficacy to some extent overlaps with the indicators of 
political trust used in this study. For example, one item of external efficacy is “under our 
form of government, the people have the final say about how the country is run, no 
matter who is in office;” this statement may overlap with the above indicators of trust. In 
addition to that, it is the Gamson’s concept of political efficacy that more closely 
discusses the relationship between political efficacy, trust and violence.  
The following Table 3.4 shows the items that are used to measure political 
efficacy (internal) adopted from the previous studies by Gamson (1968:42) and Craig 
and Maggiotto (1990). 
 
Table 3.4 Indicators (Observed Variables) of Political Efficacy (Efficacy) 
Coding Items (Indicators)  
Q9a I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics (Even though now you are not 
interested in).  
Q9b I think that I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people.  
Q9c I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our 
country right now 
Q9d Other people seem to have an easier time understanding complicated issues than I do.*  
Q9e I feel that I could do as good a job as people in the government of parliament.  
Q9f I often don't feel sure of myself when talking with other people about politics and 
government.*  
Note: The answers for these statements use 7 points of the Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7= strongly 
agree); and 7 indicate highest level of Efficacy (political efficacy). 
The coding number system (Q9a to Q9g) was adjusted to the question number in the questionnaire.  
The statement with * are scored in reverse, so that the higher score indicates higher efficacy. 
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Violent Attitudes 
The violence used in this study refers to the violent actions done by FPI. As 
discussed above, FPI’s violence can be categorized under collective violence as 
contentious politics (Tilly 2008:26). Some also call this kind of violence simply political 
violence. Unlike violence in general, which is mostly random if not criminal, political 
violence is deployed for purposes like overthrowing a tyrannical regime and redefining 
social justice and equity (Apter 1997). Therefore, most of the time, the violence is 
justified by the perpetrators’ group, such as in the case of FPI’s violence. 
Since it is not feasible to measure a violent behavior, such as asking people about 
their involvement in political violence, the present study will only measure violent 
attitudes. The scale of measuring violent attitudes is developed from FPI’s violent 
actions. It measures how the Muslim activists (FPI, Muhammadiyah3, MMI and Nahlatul 
Ulama4) justify the use of violent means for the socio-political or religious ends.  Based 
on FPI’s violent collective actions, there are several concerns that are associated with the 
use of violent actions, namely, immorality, blasphemy and illegal worship places. 
Therefore, the respondents will be asked about their opinions on using violent means 
against those places, as can be seen in the following Table 3.5.  
                                                 
3 Muhammadiyah is an Islamic moderate organization. It was established in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in 
Yogyakarta. It is often considered to be the second largest Islamic organization after Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU). According to its bylaw, the goal of Muhammadiyah is to enforce Islamic values in the life of 
Muslim community. In practice, most of its concerns are in educational and social activities. It owned 
about 7600 schools (including Islamic boarding schools), 176 universities, 457 hospitals and clinics and 
many other educational and social institutions (see www.muhammadiyah.or.id).  
4 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is an Islamic moderate organization. It was established in 1926. It is often 
considered to be the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia or maybe all over the world with more than 
40 million members. Its goal is to enforce the application of Islamic values, which accords to the teaching 
of ahlussunnah wal jama`ah in the Muslim community of the Republic of Indonesia. NU owned about  
5500 schools and 67 universities and colleagues (see www.nu.or.id). 
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Table 3.5 Indicators (Observed Variables) of Violent Attitudes (Violence) 
Coding Items (Indicators) 
Q10a The Gay and Lesbian groups have publicly tried to conduct some activities like seminars and 
beauty contest for gay people. Therefore, it is normal for society to use force or any violent 
means in order to stop their activities. 
Q10b Any Muslims who bluntly declare that there is a prophet after Muhammad are considered to be 
infidels/apostates and the enemy of Islam; their blood is allowed to be shed. 
Q10c There have been some churches built without legal consent. Therefore, it is okay if some 
people force those churches to close, including with some necessary violent means. 
Q10d Prostitution has been legalized and localized in many cities. We have no other way out to stop 
prostitutions, but to stop them with the use of force, including some necessary violent actions. 
Q10e The problems of gambling and drinking have been growing in Indonesian society. We have no 
other way out to stop them except with the use of force, including some necessary violent 
actions 
Note: The answers for these statements use 7 points of the Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7= strongly 
agree); and 7 indicate highest level of violent attitudes (Violence). 
The coding number system (109a to Q10g) was adjusted to the question number in the questionnaire. For 
example, Q10a  means “question” number “10” item “a.”  
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Hypotheses  
Based on the above theoretical framework of the quantitative part used in this study, the 
hypothesized model and its hypothesized paths can be seen in the following Figure 3.2. 
 
 
Note: Rectangle = observed variable, oval = latent variable and circle = error terms 
The dashed lines are the interaction between two variables; Fungroup is the interaction between 
Fundamentalism and Group, and Efftrust is the latent interaction between Efficacy and Trust 
 
Figure 3.2 Hypothesized Model 
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The hypothesized paths are: 
H1a: The more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they will justify violence. If 
this is true, then go to H1b and H1c. 
H1b: FPI will be more likely to be fundamentalist than the moderate groups. 
H1c: The relationships between fundamentalism and violence justification will be 
stronger for FPI than moderate Muslim groups. 
H2a: People who have a lower trust in government will be more likely to justify 
violence. If this is true, then go to H2c. 
H2b: People who have a low trust in government but high political efficacy will be likely 
to justify violence. If this is true then go to H2c and H2d. 
H2c: FPI will be likely to have a lower trust in government than that of the moderate 
groups. 
H2d: FPI will be likely to have a higher political efficacy than that of the moderate 
groups. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology for the current study is divided into two sections: qualitative 
and quantitative. First, the qualitative methodology is used to address the first and third 
research questions, which are about FPI organizational context and its violent actions 
respectively. Second, the quantitative methodology is used to address the second 
research question, which is about testing the relationships among the latent variables of 
fundamentalism, trust in government, efficacy, violent attitude and the dichotomous 
variable of group, as described in Figure 3.2.   
 
Qualitative Methodology 
 
Data 
The data used in this study can be divided into three groups: FPI organizational 
documents, previous research or documents that relate to the historical contexts of FPI 
and Islamism in Indonesia, and newspapers. They are explained as follows. 
1. The organizational documents include FPI bylaws, the results and reports of the 
official meetings, flyers and so forth. Fortunately, most of these data have been 
collected and published by Habib Rizieq Syihab, FPI top leader, and most of 
them also have been published in the official FPI homepage.  This data is 
primarily used to answer the first research question, or about the organizational 
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context of FPI. 
2. The previous research and general documents include all general documents that 
do not relate directly to FPI’s adoption of violence, but rather relate to the 
context of FPI historically and ideologically, such as research about the 
emergence of  radical Islam in Indonesia by Martin van Bruinessen and Haidar 
Naser. These data are primarily used to investigate the historical context of the 
emergence of FPI and to examine how this context relates to FPI’s adoption of 
violent means. 
3. The newspapers include all news of FPI collective activities, violent or not, 
reported in Antara (national news agency), Kompas (leading national newspaper 
and the most widely read newspaper), Republika (Islamic national newspaper), 
Tempo (widely spread around the capital city of Jakarta), Sindo (spread around 
the capital city of Jakarta), Solopos (circulated around Central Java) and other 
local newspapers. However, most of the data are primarily collected from Antara 
(approximately 520 articles), Kompas (412 articles) and Republika (123 articles). 
Additionally, approximately 150 articles were collected online from various 
homepages of local newspapers. The articles from Antara and Kompas were 
bought from their database office. The Republika was collected from its office or 
library for free of charge. The form of the data from these newspapers is in a 
digital format. Therefore, the data collection from newspapers took relatively a 
short period of time.  
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Analysis 
All of the data were analyzed using standard qualitative data analysis techniques, 
such as by marking or coding, commenting and categorizing the information in the texts. 
Coding and categorizing the data were based on theoretical frameworks and what the 
suggested beyond the scope of these frameworks. The coded texts were then shorted and 
categorized into bigger theme. The common method of finding differences and 
similarities or communalities of the data was used to categorize and draw inferences 
from the data.       
I used two different strategies to analyze the data based on the type of the data 
(printed or digital). For the printed data, such as FPI documents, the analysis was done 
manually. For example, the data were highlighted, typed into the computer (Microsoft 
Word) and categorized. For the digital data (newspaper articles), the analysis was done 
by Atlas.ti qualitative software. The process of analysis followed the standard process of 
qualitative analysis. The software provides a more convenient means of coding and 
categorizing the data. For example, each FPI collective action was coded by its date, 
such as “19981103” (occurred on 11/03/1998), and then it also coded “violence” if it 
involved violence and “nonviolence” if it did not. In doing so, it would be easily 
detected if there was overlap or similar information from other articles, or there was 
information that could complement existing information. Therefore, the software makes 
it easier for the researcher to find similarities and differences among the coded 
information from the text. In addition, the software works best in handling data that are 
not structured, as in the cases of newspaper articles or unstructured interviews. 
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Therefore, this study used the qualitative software to analyze approximately 1,200 
articles from different newspapers. 
 
Quantitative Methodology 
 
Data 
The data for this study was collected from December 2010 to July 2011from 
activists in the Islamic movements in Indonesia. The reason for choosing the activists, 
rather than ordinary members of a movement, is that activists are the dynamic elements 
in movements. They are the agents that have accesses to a movement’s resources and 
take a control over movement activities. Ordinary members may be powerless and have 
no ability to mobilize resources unless the elites, or the activists, support them (McAdam 
1999). In short, by targeting the activists, the data is aimed at representing not only the 
people in the movements but also the inner dynamics of those movements, which then 
can be used to explain the movements’ actions, as to whether they are violent or 
nonviolent.  
FPI activists are the primary target of the study, and the other activists will be 
used as control groups. Initially the control variable consists of two groups. The first 
group represents the moderate groups, namely Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU). The second group represents the so-called the “nonviolent” Islamist movements, 
namely Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indoneisa (HTI). The 
attribute of “nonviolent” of these latter groups means that they officially do not adopt 
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violent strategies, but they often advocate the use of violent means by other Islamist 
movements outside Indonesia. However, these two groups declined to participate in the 
study. In short, there is only one group that is compared to FPI in this study, namely the 
group representing the moderate movements (Muhammadiyah and NU). 
 The desired sample size for this study was about 300 respondents. In general, in 
SEM (Structural Equation Modeling), a sample of N < 100 is considered small; an N 
between 100 and 200 is considered medium; an N > 200 is considered large. However, a 
Montecarlo simulation in Mplus software shows that a sample size of 200 is not 
sufficiently large for the hypothesized model (not including the interaction) in this study. 
Some of the hypotheses paths have power of < .80. Therefore, this current study targeted 
a total sample size > 300 in order to achieve statistical power of > .80 in each of the 
hypotheses path.     
The activists were selected from two different sampling methods. In the first 
method, the activists in the first two groups (Muhammadiyah and NU) were selected 
using a random stratified sampling method. In general, these two organizations are more 
open and are well-administrative systems; they possess lists of organizational 
committees and office addresses at both the local and national levels. Therefore, the 
sampling frame was taken from their official lists of the organizational office addresses. 
By default, the lists of these activists’ addresses have been stratified into 4 sections: 
national (Pusat), provincial (Provinsi), city (Kabupaten/Kota) and district (Kecamatan). 
Based on this, initially, I randomly selected 160 members (80 from Muhammadiyah and 
80 from NU); about 20 percent are from the national and provincial lists, and 80 percent 
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are from the city and district lists. In the first round, 50 questionnaires were sent via 
mail, most of them, addressed to the top leaders of the groups. However, after two 
weeks, only three to five of them returned back.  
Considering this low response rate, the lists of activists of Muhammadiyah and 
NU, were then edited. For example, some of the unclear addresses were deleted. In short, 
about 400 addresses were selected from the lists. It was 230 questionnaires were sent to 
the respondent addresses via mail. The rests were delivered in person to the respondents. 
In this second attempt to collect data, most of the questionnaires were addressed to the 
second tier of the leaders, like the secretary, treasurer or head of a department instead of 
the top leaders. In addition, I also sent about 15 questionnaires to the activists of foreign 
branches of Muhammadiyah and NU via electronic mail. This resulted in 206 valid 
responses. Using this sampling method, the respondents are expected to represent the 
targeted population, the activists in the moderate groups (Muhammadiyah and NU). 
 Turning to the second method, the other activists, namely from HTI, MMI and 
FPI were selected by using a non-probability sampling method. The nature of these 
organizations, which are closed and stigmatized, made it impossible to select the sample 
through probability sampling methods.  These organizations possess organizational 
structures, such as the vision, mission and programs that are well described, but the list 
of their activists’ names are not clear (Al-Zastrouw 2006 and Nashir 2007). In addition, 
pressures by the government on these groups have made it impossible for them to openly 
declare the identity of their members. For example, HTI and MMI are accused of having 
connections with terrorist organizations, Jemaah Islamiyyah and Al-Qaeda. Many top 
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leaders of MMI and FPI have been jailed by the government because of their Islamic 
activism (Nashir 2007).  
 Therefore, the most likely way to get the respondents of these activists is by 
using the snowball technique. At the initial stage, there are two methods to reach the 
respondents. In the first method, the respondents are selected from a few prominent 
figures or activists of these three groups that are known (based the media coverage and 
previous studies). Using the second method, the interviewers come to the offices of these 
organizations, especially after Friday prayers and congregations, the time when usually 
Muslim activists meet.   
Using either of these initial methods, the interviewers ask these known activists 
to refer other activists in their groups after they complete the questionnaire. Therefore, 
the only way to reach the respondents is by delivering the questionnaire in person to 
them. As a result, 135 valid responses from FPI, 3 valid responses from HTI and 27 
responses from MMI were obtained. However, in the middle of this data collection, HTI 
and MMI declined to participate in the study. As a result, the interviewers stopped 
collecting data from these two groups and the 30 responses were dropped from the 
analysis.  
 In addition, as described in the previous chapter, this study consists of items 
regarding trust in government, political efficacy and violence. All of these questions are 
sensitive and prone to social desirability bias; for example, the questions about trust in 
the police and justification of violence. In dealing with this, all the questionnaires are 
designed to be completed by the respondents (self-administered questionnaires). No 
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questions about personal backgrounds were asked. Therefore, it was expected that the 
respondent could freely and accurately answer the questions.     
 
Analysis: SEM (Structural Equation Modeling) 
In order to test the hypothesized model and hypothesized paths (see Figure 3.2), 
this study employs the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. SEM is a 
statistical technique that can incorporate regression analysis, confirmatory factor 
analysis and path analysis.   
Compared to the regression analysis, SEM is relatively young. It started to 
appear in the 1960s. However, the origin of the SEM can be traced back to the history of 
factor analysis and path analysis, which developed in the early 1900s. In the 1970s,  
three scholars: K. G. Joreskog, J. W. Keesling and D. E. Wiley integrated factor analysis 
(measurement model) and path analysis (structural model) into a single framework, so-
called JKW (Joreskog-Keesling-Wiley) model (now called SEM). Then, Joreskog and D. 
Sorbom developed statistical software package for this model and named it LISREL 
(Kline 2005). Currently, number of software packages has been developed to deal with 
SEM, such as AMOS (SPSS), STATA and Mplus.  
According to Kline (2005), there are, at least, seven characteristic of the SEM: 
1. SEM is a priori. Researchers need to formulate the model before analysis, such as 
the directionality of the variables. However, it does not mean that SEM is merely 
confirmatory.  
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2. SEM consists of the explicit representation of the distinction between observed 
and latent variables. 
3. The basic statistic in SEM is the covariance. 
4. SEM can be applied to non-experimental and experimental data. 
5. SEM includes many standard statistical procedures. Statistical procedures, such 
as Anova, Manova and multiple regressions, are special instances of SEM.  
Therefore, Kline (2005) argues that SEM is “one of the most inclusive statistical 
procedures used within the behavioral sciences.” 
6. SEM requires a large sample size. In general, a sample size > 200 could be 
considered large.  
7. In SEM, it is possible to estimate statistical tests, but the role of statistical tests in 
the overall analysis is often less important compared with more traditional 
techniques.   
In summary, because the model in this study consists of both the measurement 
model (confirmatory factor analysis) and the structural model (path analysis), including 
group comparison within the measurement model, this study used the SEM technique to 
estimate the model. In doing so, there are, at least, four steps to perform SEM before 
interpreting the results of estimations, namely: model specification, estimation and 
evaluation (Kline 2005), as can be explained below. 
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Model Specification 
In this study, the SEM technique is used as a confirmatory technique of the 
hypothesized model. Therefore, the relationships have been specified in advance in the 
model based on previous studies and theories. These relationships are categorized into 
two groups: measurement and structural models. The measurement model specifies the 
relationships between observed variables (indicators) and latent variables. This 
measurement model is assessed using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). In CFA the 
relationship between the observed variables and the latent variable is interpreted as 
“factor loadings” (regression coefficients). In order to scale the latent variable, one of the 
factor loadings should be fixed to one (1).   
The structural model specifies the relationships among latent variables and/or 
observed variables. This structural model is assessed using a multi-regression technique. 
Therefore, the interpretation of the coefficient of the relationship is interpreted like the 
regression coefficient, such as: holding other variables constant, with one unit increase 
in x, y increases by certain (the value of regression coefficient) units. 
In the measurement model, the hypothesized model of this study consists of four 
latent variables, namely: Fundamentalism (14 indicators), Trust (14 indicators), Efficacy 
(6 indicators) and Violence (6 indicators). Additionally, it also has two latent 
interactions, namely the interaction of Fundamentalism-Group (Fungroup) and Efficacy-
Trust (Efftrust).  
In the structural model, the hypothesized model consists of path relationships 
between the independent latent variables of Fundamentalism, Trust, Efficacy, Fungroup 
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and Efftrust, and the dependent latent variable of Violence. Furthermore, it includes 
assessments of the differences between FPI and the moderate groups in the conditional 
means of the four latent variables: Fundamentalsim, Trust, Efficacy and Violence (see 
Figure 3.2). 
 
Estimation 
 In SEM, the estimation is done by fitting the actual covariance matrices and the 
covariance matrices predicted by the model. This means that SEM tries to minimize a 
discrepancy function (fitting function) of those two covariance matrices. Maximum 
likelihood (ML) is the most common estimation method to minimize this discrepancy 
function. The ML assumes that the population normal distribution for the endogenous 
variables is multivariate normal (Kline 2005). However, if the normality cannot be 
assumed, the researcher cannot use the ML method.  In Mplus, the software that is being 
used in this study, if the multivariate normality is not assumed, the MLM (maximum 
likelihood parameter estimates with standard errors and a mean-adjusted chi-square test 
statistics) or the MLMV (maximum likelihood parameter estimates with standard errors 
and a mean- and variance-adjusted chi-square test statistics) can be applied (Muthen and 
Muthen 2010). However, this study uses the ML since the normality assumption is met. 
In dealing with the missing values, this study does not put any imputation 
strategies in the estimation process, which is the default in Mplus.  Therefore, it does not 
impute values for the data that are missing. All available data are used to estimate the 
model using full information maximum likelihood.  
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Additionally, in the hypothesized model of this study, there are two specific 
estimation strategies that are being used to deal with the group comparisons (FPI and the 
moderate groups) in the latent variables and the interaction between two variables 
(Efftrust and Fungroup). First, in dealing with group comparison, this study will use the 
MIMIC (Multiple Indicator Multiple Causes) approach. In dealing with the latent 
interactions, this study will use LMS (Latent Moderated Structural) equations approach.  
The MIMIC approach is an extension of CFA, where the model contains one or 
more latent variables simultaneously identified by multiple indicators and multiple 
causal variables; or in other words, these latent variables are regressed on the group 
variable (Kline 2005). For example, in this study, the latent variable of fundamentalism, 
which has 14 indicators, is regressed on the dichotomous cause indicator, Group (the 
moderate groups = 0 and FPI = 1).   
Unlike a multi-sample approach, MIMIC does not need to partition the total 
sample into subsamples. Therefore, MMIC is best for the small sample size, like the 
current study which only has 341 samples. Additionally, in the MIMIC model, there is 
no need of a special identification of the measurement invariance. It is because, in this 
model, the factor loadings between groups are assumed to be equal, or the measurement 
model is assumed to be invariant over groups. Some scholars also suggest that if the 
measurement is not completely invariant, the MIMIC model can be improved by adding 
the direct effect from a dummy, or group variable, to the measures or indicators of the 
latent variable being compared (Thompson and Green 2006; Muthen and Muthen 2010). 
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The LMS (Latent Moderated Structural) equations model is perhaps the newest 
approach in dealing with the latent interactions. Besides the LMS model, there are many 
approach to deal with the interaction between two latent variables, or the interaction 
where one of them is a latent variable, such as constrained approach, GAPI (Generalized 
Appended Product Indicator) approach,  unconstrained approach and multi-group 
approach. In MPlus, the LMS approach maybe the simplest estimation in dealing with 
latent interaction. It does not need to create a product term of the interactions, and the 
interpretation is the same as that of the interaction between two observed variables in the 
multiple regression analysis. That is why this study employs the LMS equations model 
to deal with the latent interaction between Efficacy (latent) and Trust (latent), and the 
interaction between Fundamentalism (latent) and Group (observed). LMS uses the 
estimation maximation algorithm to estimate the interaction. This estimation can 
produce parameter estimates that are consistent, unbiased and efficient. In addition, the 
LMS is also robust to non-normal distribution (Klein and Moosbrugger 2000; Kline 
2005; Marsh, Wen, and Hau 2006). However, in Mplus, LMS does not produce 
standardized estimates and several fit indices, like chi-square and RMSEA fit tests. 
Therefore, in the analysis, first, I estimate the hypothesized model without interaction 
(without applying LMS). It is because the LMS equations approach does not give 
comprehensive fit indices, so it is difficult to evaluate the fit of the model.  After the 
good model is achieved, then I estimate the full model (with the interactions). The model 
without interactions and the model with interactions are compared using the AIC 
(Akaike’s Information Criterion) test. The model with less value of AIC is the better fit. 
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Model Evaluation 
As mentioned above, the basic statistic in SEM is the covariance.  Therefore, 
model evaluation means comparing the observed (data-based) covariance matrix with 
the model-implied covariance matrix. If the two matrices are consistent, or fit, then the 
researcher’s model can be considered a good; then, the researcher can move to look at 
the statistical tests of the specific hypotheses in the model. In SEM, the estimation that is 
used to compare these two matrices is called fit test. In general, the fit tests measure how 
far or close the distance between these two matrices. Researchers always expect that the 
two matrices are as close as possible. 
There are a number of fit tests that can be used to evaluate the models. This study 
uses the following model fit tests to evaluate the hypothesized model.  
1. Chi Square is the most basic fit test. It is a function of the sample size and the 
difference between the observed covariance matrix and the covariance matrix of 
the hypothesized model.  The null hypothesis for this test is that the observed 
covariance matrix is the same as the model covariance matrix (H0: Ʃ = Ʃ0). 
Therefore, it is expected that the test fail to reject the null hypothesis (higher p-
value). In other words, we expect that the value of chi-square as small as 
possible. Therefore, this test is also called a badness-of-fit because the higher 
value of chi-square indicates the worse the model will be.  However, the chi-
square test is overly sensitive to sample size and multivariate deviations of 
normality. Therefore, this study renders the chi-square value less important  for 
the model evaluation. 
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2. RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation) is another badness-of-fit 
index. It means that the higher value indicates the worse the model. The value of 
zero (0) indicates the best fit. The value < .05 is considered to be a good fit; the 
value of < .08 is considered to be a fair fit.  Some factors that influence this value 
are sample size and degree of freedom. The RMSEA value decreases as the 
sample gets larger and the model has more degree of freedom.  In short, we 
expect that the value of RMSEA should be as small as possible. 
3. CFI (Comparative Fit Index) is the percentage of observed measure covariance 
explained by the hypothesized model. Therefore, we expect the greater value of 
CFI. The value > .95 is considered to be a good fit. 
4. Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) is the fit index that can be used to compare 
two different models. These two models do not need to be nested. The model 
with the lower value of AIC indicates the better fit. This fit index will be used in 
this study because the LMS equations that estimate the hypothesized model with 
the interactions do not produce chi-square test and other common fit indices. 
Therefore, the hypothesized models, with and without interactions, are compared 
to know which model better fit the data, or in other words if the hypothesized 
model has less AIC’s value, it indicates that this model is better than the model 
without interactions. 
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CHAPTER V 
ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUNDS: 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, IDEOLOGY 
AND FPI’S ADOPTION OF VIOLENT MEANS 
 
The current chapter is aimed at investigating organizational contexts that may 
explain FPI’s adoption of violent means. This includes (1) the socio-historical context of 
the Islamist movements in Indonesia, (2) FPI’s organizational structure and ideology, 
and (3) lastly, FPI’s formal justifications of its collective violence. First, regarding the 
socio-historical context, this chapter discusses the genealogy of Islamist movements 
throughout the history of Indonesia and then locates FPI within this historical context. 
Second, regarding the organizational structure, it addresses some aspects of the 
organization that may relate to FPI’s adoption of violence, such as basic organizational 
principles, the concept of jihad, martyrdom and amar ma`ruf nahi munkar (AMNM). 
Finally, the last part of this chapter discusses how FPI officially explained itself in its 
adoption of violent means. 
 
Towards Radical Islamist Movements: the Early Tensions of Islam-State Relations 
in Indonesia 
The radicalization of Islamist movements is often a result of severe tensions and 
irreconcilable conflicts between the movements and their states. This problem often lies 
in their differences about the status of the sovereignty and ideology of the state. Most 
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governments of Muslim countries adopt the principles of democracy which hold the 
belief that sovereignty belongs to the people. However, most Islamists believe that 
sovereignty belongs to God, and thus the state should be based on the principle of 
shari`ah, the law that is made by God (Ayoob 2007; Wicktorowick 2003). Therefore, the 
different belief in the status of sovereignty have become an important factor fueling 
conflicts between Islamist movements and states, and even has led to the radicalization 
of Islamist movements in Muslim countries, including in Indonesia. Therefore, it is 
necessary to trace FPI’s adoption of violent means to the dynamic of the state-Islam 
relations and the waves of the struggles to apply shari`ah in Indonesia. After all one of 
the organizational goals of FPI is the placement of shari`ah into the Indonesian 
constitution. 
 
The Tensions of State-Islam Relations during the Early Years of Indonesia (1945) and 
the Sukarno Regime (1945-1966) 
In Indonesia, the current tensions between Islamist movements and the state can 
be traced back to the birth of Indonesia as an independent state in 1945 and its first 
regime, the Sukarno regime (1945-1966). After the collapse of Japan ending World War 
II, the Japanese government promised independence for Indonesia by setting up the first 
committee for this purpose in March 1945. The committee was called Badan Penyelidik 
Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI), or the Committee for the 
Investigation to Prepare for Indonesian Independence. During the first meeting of this 
committee, held from May 28 – June 1, 1945, there appeared an irreconcilable issue 
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regarding whether Indonesia would be “a national” or “an Islamic” state. This conflict 
led to a major division among BPUPKI members, namely, the so-called “nationalist” 
and “Islamic” factions (Noer 1987).  
The nationalist faction wanted Indonesia to be a secular national state. For 
example, Sukarno (nickname: Bung Karno), the primary proponent of the nationalist 
faction and who later became the first president of Indonesia, said, “We want to establish 
a state that is one for all…so the first principle is nationality; we will establish a national 
state.” He also argued that a national state was not in contradiction with the idea of an 
Islamic state, as he said: “Open and look at my heart; you will see Islam; and the heart of 
Bung Karno (he pointed to himself) will defend Islam through the principle of general 
agreement and mutual deliberation; through this principle, we will safeguard religion” 
(Bahar, Kusuma, and Hudawati 1995).  
By contrast, the Islamic faction demanded that the new state of Indonesia be 
based on shari`ah or God’s law. Its proponents mostly argued that the ideology of an 
Islamic state was logical and fair because Islam was the religion of the majority of the 
Indonesian population. For example, Sanoesi, a proponent of the Islamic faction, said:  
“an Indonesian state should be led by an Imam because 95 percent of Indonesians are 
Muslims” (Bahar et al. 1995).  
In short, these two factions were not able to reach an agreement about the new 
state’s ideology. Thus, BPUPKI’s committee formed a smaller committee to deal with 
this debate about state ideology.  This small committee was named “the Committee of 
Nine” because it consisted of nine members of BPUPKI: four people from the nationalist 
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faction and five people from the Islamic faction. This committee ultimately was able to 
reach an agreement and formulated it in the document known as the Piagam Jakarta (the 
Jakarta Charter). This document was also intended to be the preamble of the Indonesian 
constitution. The compromise between these two factions was reflected in the sentence: 
dengan kewadjiban mendjalankan sjari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknja (with the 
obligation for Muslim adherents to practice the Islamic shari`ah), or the so-called Seven 
Words (Bahar et al. 1995: 96).  
Even though the appraisal of other members of BPUPKI the Committee of Nine 
had settled the dispute between the nationalist faction and the Islamic faction, many 
proponents of those two factions were not satisfied with the Jakarta Charter. For 
proponents of the Islamic faction, this agreement was considered as a failure as it did not 
establish a state under the rule of God. For example, Ki Bagus Hadikoesoemo (of the 
Islamic faction) rejected the Jakarta Charter and demanded that the committee clearly 
state its view about the relationship between the state and Islam and suggested a vote on 
this idea. By contrast, some proponents of nationalist ideology considered the Jakarta 
Charter as the failure because it did not establish a state for all Indonesians. 
Djajadiningrat (of the nationalist faction) was afraid that the Seven Words in the Jakarta 
Charter would produce Islamic fanaticism. However, Sukarno rejected those arguments 
and insisted on using the Jakarta Charter as the introduction to the Indonesian 
constitution because it was the only solution that could unify the two factions in the 
committee of BPUPKI (Bahar et al. 1995).  
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Soon after that, a second committee for Indonesian independence, the PPKI 
(Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) was establised in the mid of August 1945. 
Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta were appointed as the chairman and the vice chairman 
respectively. Surprisingly, during the first meeting of the PPKI, on August 18, 1945, 
when Sukarno and Hatta introduced the Indonesian constitution, they deliberately 
ignored the Jakarta Charter and removed all Islamic symbols remaining in the 
Constitution. As the spokesman of the Committee, Hatta argued that in order to 
safeguard the unity of all Indonesians, the controversial articles had been removed from 
the Constitution. First, the term “Mukaddimah” (the Arabic word for introduction) was 
replaced by the term “Pembukaan” (the Malay or Indonesian word for introduction). 
Second, the sentence “the state based on belief in God with obligations for the Muslim 
adherents to practice shari`ah” was replaced by the sentence “the state based on belief in 
God.” Third, the sentence “the president must be a native Indonesian who is a Muslim” 
was replaced by the sentence “the president must be a native Indonesian.” At the same 
time, Sukarno and Hatta were also announced as the first president and vice president of 
Indonesia (Bahar et al. 1995:414-16; Boland 1971:34-35).  
This arbitrary decision by Sukarno and Hatta created frustration and anger among 
the proponents of the Islamic faction. Most members of the Islamic faction considered 
this decision as betrayal as it appear to accept the Jakarta Charter, or the agreement 
between the nationalist and the Islamic members of the committee. Responding to this 
situation, the proponents of Islamic ideology divided into two groups.  Some preferred 
the use of conventional ways of struggling for the establishment of a state that was based 
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on Islam and God’s law. In doing so, they then established a political party, the 
Masjumi. The second group preferred the use of radical means in order to establish an 
Indonesian Islamic state or a separate independent Islamic state. Both groups are 
explained as follows. 
First, the political party of Masjumi was established on November 7, 1945. It was 
established by Muslim leaders, particularly by formers members of the Islamic faction 
that served on the Committee of Indonesian’s Preparation for Independence, namely 
Kahar Moezakir, Wachid Hasyim, Soekiman and Ki Bagoes Hadikoesomo. The goals of 
this political party were to establish the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia and to 
implement the ideals of Islam in the state. One of its efforts included proposing in the 
Constituent Assembly the general idea of an Islamic state or a state based on Islam.  
In addition, Masjumi also proposed a draft of an Islamic constitution, namely the 
Konstitusi Republik (Islam) Indonesia (the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Indonesia). Among the important concepts in relation to the Islamic ideology of this 
draft was that the foundation of the state should be based on Islam (Article One). In 
Article Three, it was also stated that sovereignty was vested in the hands of the 
Indonesian people as a mandate from God; and the people are eligible to occupy all state 
positions, except the positions of the presidency and the vice-presidency, which must be 
held by Muslims. In short, Masjumi’s concepts of the state were the same as those of the 
Islamic faction.  
Thus, Masjumi position often contradicted that of the Sukarno Regime. Finally, 
the government considered Masjumi a threat to nationalist ideology. Some of  Masjumi’s 
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top leaders were jailed. For example, Muhammad Natsir was jailed for being involved in 
the rebellious movement of the PERMESTA in Sumatra; and Kasman Singodimejo was 
sentenced to three years for his speech criticized Sukarno on August 31, 1958. In 1959, 
Sukarno abolished Masjumi. This was the end of the Muslim struggles for the 
establishment of an Islamic state through conventional means during Sukarno’s regime. 
However, the second group supporting Islamic ideology used radical non-
conventional means to struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state. For some this 
included the formation of a rebellious movement to overthrow the nationalist 
government and the establishment of an independent Islamic state separate from 
Indonesia. For example, under the name of  Darul Islam (an Islamic state),  
Kartosuwiryo led a rebellious movement in Java;  Daud Beureuh led a rebellion in Aceh; 
and Kahar Muzakar led a rebellion in the Southern Celebes . However, many of these 
Islamist rebellious and separatist movements could be handled by the government. The 
government was even able to use the issue of Islamist rebellious attempts as propaganda 
and agitation in order to suppress Islamist movement and political parties that supported 
the Islamic ideology, such as Masjumi (Noer 1987:256). 
 In short, tensions between Islam and the state have appeared since the early 
stages of Indonesia as an independent state. The manifestations of these tensions often 
appeared in the conflict between “an Islamic state versus a nation state,” or “a state 
based on God’s law versus a state based on human’s law” (using the language of 
Islamists), or “Islamist versus Nationalist.” However, the Islamists failed to introduce 
Islamic ideology into the center of the state.  
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In August 1945, Indonesia was declared as a nationalist state. Soon after that, 
several Islamist rebellious and separatist movements appeared across the country. Under 
the banner of Islam, these movements wanted to establish an Indonesian Islamic state 
and an independent Islamic state separated from Indonesia. At the same time, some 
Islamists (the proponents of the Islamic faction) preferred to establish a political party, 
namely Masjumi, to continue struggling for the creation of an Indonesian Islamic state. 
However, later Sukarno considered Masjumi as a threat to the unity of the Republic of 
Indonesia and abolished Masjumi in 1959. Therefore, in the late years of the Sukarno 
regime, the position of the Islamic ideology was completely on the periphery of the state. 
Islamic ideology indeed existed, but it was maintained and promoted by radical Islamist 
movements. This situation persisted into the Suharto regime, as explained below.  
 
The Tensions of State-Islam Relations during the Suharto Regime (1967-1998)  
In 1966, intense elite and military conflicts occurred. These were critical years 
for the Sukarno Regime. This condition culminated with the coup attempt by the self 
proclaimed group, the Gerakan 30-September (the September-30th movement), made up 
of Indonesian army forces and the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party or Partai 
Komunis Indonesia).   At least six top army generals and several other military personnel 
were assassinated. Sukarno was unable to control the situation, and he was also forced to 
give a mandate in March 11, 1966 to Lieutenant General Suharto to take any actions 
necessary in order to restore the order and security. This mandate gave Suharto a 
powerful political role in the state. Led by Suharto, the army was able to restore peace 
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and put down the September-30 movement in just one day (March 12, 1966). Suharto 
blamed the Indonesian communist political party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) as 
the culprit behind this coup d’état. He also abolished the communist party, a party that 
had strongly supported the Sukarno regime. As Sukarno’s power got weaker, Suharto’s 
political power became stronger. Finally in March 1967, Sukarno was forced to resign, 
and Suharto was officially appointed as the second president of Indonesia. This was the 
beginning of the Suharto regime, or the so-called New Order regime. 
Under this new regime, Suharto militarized the government. All strategic 
positions of the state, from the central to the local governments, such as ministers, 
governors, and mayors, were occupied by elite military personnel. In addition, Suharto 
also homogenized the ideology of the state by declaring that Pancasila 5(the Five 
Principles) was the only ideology that should be embraced by all groups in Indonesia. 
Most Islamic organizations, which mostly declared the Quran and the Hadith as the 
highest organizational references, had to replace their Islamic ideology with the 
Pancasila. Under this strategy, Suharto possessed full control over the state and created 
an absolute authoritarian military regime.  
In the early years of the Suharto regime, the leaders of Masjumi who were jailed 
by Sukarno were released. However, like Sukarno, Suharto regime continued to monitor 
                                                 
5Pancasila (the Five Principle) was introduced by two figures of the nationalist faction, Muh Yamin and 
Sukarno during the meeting of the Committee for the Investigation of Preparation of Indonesian 
Independence, in June 1945. During the Sukarno regime, Pancasila was the symbols of the nationalist 
ideology. However, unlike Suharto, Sukarno did not enforce the non-state organizations to embrace the 
ideology of Pancasila. These five principles of Pancasila are  1) Belief in the one and only God, 2) Just and 
civilized humanity, 3) The unity of Indonesia, 4) Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity 
arising out of deliberations amongst representatives and 5) Social justice for the all of the people of 
Indonesia.   
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their activities and prohibited them from engaging in political activities. It appeared that 
the Sukarno regime’s fear of Islamist oppositions and Islamist rebellions carried over 
into the Suharto regime. Suharto suppressed all Islamist political activities. 
Consequently, this forced many former leaders of Masjumi to exit the political sphere 
and enter socio-religious activities, like da`wah (propagation and missionary) activities. 
For example, Natsir, a former leader of Masjumi used Masjumi networks to establish a 
religious organization, the DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic 
Council of Missionary). Their mission was simply to purify the Islamic practices in 
Muslim society rather than to “islamize” the state. The DDI was fully supported by the 
government of Saudi Arabia (Bruinessen 2002). 
Similar to Masjumi, other Islamic groups, such as NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and 
Muhammadiyah tended to compromise with the military government by accepting the 
Pancasila as the ideology of their organizations, and tended to avoid political conflicts 
with the government. Both focused more on education and social welfare rather than on 
political activism.  NU focused more on Islamic education (madrasah and pesantren), 
while Muhammadiyah focused on secular educations. For the most part, both 
Muhammadiyah and NU maintained a good relationship with the government.  
Formally the Suharto regime also allowed Muslim participation in political 
activism, such as the establishment of an Islamic political party, PPP (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan). However, its existence was also controlled by the government. At that 
time, only three political parties were allowed to participate in the political process, 
namely Golkar (Golongan Karya), PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and PDI (Partai 
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Demokrasi Indonesia). Golkar was the biggest party and the two others were the small 
minority parties. Golkar was the party of the government and it was under the control of 
Suharto. Muslims’ interests were symbolically represented by the PPP. PPP was the 
fusion of four Muslim parties,  NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), PSII (Partai Serikat Islam 
Indonesia), PERTI (Persatuan Tarbiyyah Islamiyyah), and PARMUSI (Partai Muslimin 
Indonesia).   
In addition, during the Suharto regime, there were some Islamist movements that 
continued to struggle to establish an Islamic state or at least demand the re-inclusion of 
the Jakarta Charter in the state constitution. Many of them were radical underground 
movements, such as Komando Jihad, Teror Warman, and Jemaah Islamiyyah 
(Bruinessen 2002).  However, the scale of these radical Islamist movements were too 
small and their scope was very local. Therefore, their efforts did not significantly affect 
the supremacy of the Suharto regime.  
In conclusion, the discourse of Islamic ideology was completely forbidden by the 
Suharto regime. The government refused to tolerate any expression of political Islam 
that challenged the nationalist ideology of the regime. Therefore, the expression of 
political Islam was only introduced by a few small, radical, underground movements.  
There were no options for Islamist movements to openly express their beliefs in 
more moderate ways. Until the early 1990s, the Suharto regime was still able to fully 
control and suppress radical Islamist movements. The Suharto military regime made it 
difficult for the Islamists to develop and for Muslims in Indonesia to support Islamist 
movements.  
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In short, from 1966 to 1998 the position of Islamist movements, or the 
movements that demanded the application of shari’ah in Indonesia, were kept in a 
marginal position; this was similar to what happened during the Sukarno regime. Thus, 
Islamic political activism consistently opposed the state, and most of Islamist groups 
became radical underground movements. Later, this inharmonious relationship between 
Islam and the state (Islamist movements and the government) during the Suharto and 
Sukarno regimes may have also affected the relationship between new Islamist 
movements and the state after the collapse of the Suharto regime, as will be explained in 
the following discussion. 
 
The Emergence of New Democracy 
Beginning in 1997, the Asian monetary crises weakened the Suharto regime. The 
crises caused social and economic lives to collapse. The value of Indonesian currency, 
the rupiah (IDR), dropped drastically; the exchange rate, which was roughly 2600 rupiah 
per 1 USD, plunged to 8000-14000 per 1 USD.   The prices of basic goods soared. The 
Suharto regime could not control the monetary crisis. Thus, friction between the military 
elites and Golkar (government party) increased. Mass demonstrations condemning the 
Suharto regime became wide spread across the country. On May 21, 1998, forced by 
public pressure, Suharto resigned his presidency. This date marked the collapse of the 
Suharto authoritarian military regime and started of a new era of democracy, which is 
often called the era of reformation. 
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During this new era of democracy, all social, religious and political expression 
was tolerated by the state and was often beyond control of the state. The military 
attempted to show neutrality regarding politics, and, therefore, created a distance 
between the state and themselves. Many groups, especially Islamist groups that had been 
suppressed during the Suharto military regime, re-emerged either as political parties or 
social movements. Several radical Islamist movements, such as Laskar Jihad, MMI 
(Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) and HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), openly declared their 
existence.   
The emergence of MMI in August 2000 and HTI in 2000 aptly describes a case 
of so-called “blocked opportunity.” Some leaders of MMI were the former members of 
the rebellious movement of Darul Islam and were closely linked to the terrorist 
movement of Jemaah Islamiyyah.  However, under the new Indonesian democracy, 
MMI presented itself to the public as a nonviolent Islamist organization. MMI indirectly 
opposed the ideology of democracy because it called for the voice of the people (not 
God) to be supreme. However, MMI also supported the new democratic system and 
benefitted from it because it allowed MMI to pursue its goals. For example, MMI has 
publicly campaigned for Islamic ideology and had proposed the application of shari`ah 
to local (kabupaten/kota), regional/provincial (propinsi), and central governments.  
Similarly, HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), which is often considered as a radical 
and a terrorist organization in several other Islamic countries, also appeared in Indonesia 
to be an ordinary conventional organization. HTI proposes and promotes the idea of one 
single Islamic state. It publicly has opposed the democratic idea, but it has not advocated 
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violence. Therefore, these two groups demonstrate that when the political opportunities 
are unblocked, social movements tend adopt nonviolent means.  
However, open political opportunity, which de-radicalized Islamist movements, 
is not a single story of the new democracy in Indonesia. Many conflicts that were 
previously suppressed by the military regime also reemerged as more severe conflicts in 
some parts of Indonesia. Some of those conflicts specifically victimized Muslim 
communities, such as the conflict in Ambon, Moluccas and the Ninja-secreat killing that 
targeted Muslim scholars in Eastern Java.  These were among the events that created 
historical context claimed by FPI founders to be the reason for the establishment of FPI.  
For example, the Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon caused thousands of both 
Muslims and Christians to be killed, mosques and churches to be destroyed, and 
thousands of people to lose their homes, especially the Muslims.   For some Muslims 
outside the Ambon islands and some Muslim military elites, this conflict was often 
portrayed as (1) Christian’s effort to banish Muslims from a predominantly Christian 
island of Moluccas and (2) efforts of  the separatist movement, the RMS (the Republic 
of South Moluccas), to establish an Independent state. Therefore, not only several 
Muslim groups, like Laskar Jihad, but also some military personnel were involved in 
those conflicts.  
The emergence of a radical Islamist movement, Laskar Jihad, was a response to 
this conflict; or using its language, the formation of Laskar Jihad was a reaction of 
Muslim solidarity towards their Muslim fellows who were victimized by Christians on 
the predominantly Christian island, Ambon.  Laskar Jihad was officially established in 
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Januari 2000 by Ja’far Umar Thalib, an alumnus of the Afghan War and a graduate of 
the Maududi Islamic Institute in Lahore, Pakistan in 1987. He declared a holy war 
against Christians in Ambon Moluccas. Backed up by a fatawa (religious promulgations) 
from the Muslim leaders in the Middle East, Thalib pronounced that waging war against 
Christians in Ambon was an obligation for every Muslim. Laskar Jihad soon gained 
enormous support among Muslims, including from the top army personnel, who 
sympathized with the cause. Laskar Jihad dispatched approximately seven thousand 
militia members to fight the Christians in Ambon (Hasan 2006:215-21).    
However, after the religious conflict in Ambon was relatively finished, Ja’far 
Umar Thalib declared the dissolution of Laskar Jihad via a fatwa (a religious 
promulgation) from Rabi` ibn Hadi al-Madkhali. The fatwa demanded the dissolution of 
Laskar Jihad because it had deviated from its original aims. These aims, which involved 
helping Muslim victims in Ambon, had become mixed with political interests in 
Indonesia. Thalib also argued that the presence of Laskar Jihad in Ambon was no longer 
necessary as the conflict could now be controlled by the government (Hasan 2006).  Of 
course, there are many factors that led to the dissolution of Laskar Jihad. Most 
importantly, this case supports the argument that the violence by a social movement 
drops as the capacity of the democratic state becomes stronger (Tilly 2008).  
In conclusion, the collapse of the military authoritarian regime in 1998 soon 
resulted in two important conditions that related to the birth of FPI:  several bloody 
chaotic incidents across Indonesia and an open political opportunity. The chaos occurred 
because the government no longer possessed strong control over much of Indonesian 
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society. Some of these incidents victimized the Muslim community. Therefore, the 
incidents were often depicted as religious conflicts, such as the Christian-Muslim 
conflict of Ambon and the “Ninja Killing” targeting Muslim leaders in Java.   
However, open political opportunity attracted many elements of Indonesian 
society to formally establish associations within their communities. Therefore, some 
Islamist groups that previously had been suppressed by the military government emerged 
or reemerged as open social movements, such as MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) 
and HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia).  Similarly, under these social conditions, FPI also 
emerged. 
 
The Birth of FPI (Islamic Defenders’ Front) 
As discussed above, two major conditions that facilitated and shaped the 
emergence of FPI. They are the fall of the Suharto military authoritarian regime and the 
emergence of new conflicts and chaos across Indonesia that specifically victimized the 
Muslim community. For FPI, the fall of Suharto was an opportunity for Habaib 
(Hadrami Family)6, Ulama and Muslim preachers to freely form an Islamist movement 
called FPI. The conflicts that victimized Muslims united these Muslim leaders on the 
importance of the establishment of an organization defending Islam and Muslim 
                                                 
6 Hadrami refers to the community of Muslims in Indonesia who are descendants of Muslim Arab who 
migrated to Indonesia from Hadramawt, the ancient region in Yemen, around eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. The people from the Hadrami community can be divided into two groups: sayyid or habib 
(plural=habaib) and common Hadrami. The sayyid or habaib are the Hadrami people who has direct 
descendant with the prophet, Muhammad. Therefore, they enjoyed special status among the Muslims of 
Indonesia. People in this community usually identify them by using the word sayyid or habib at the 
beginning of their names, such as Habib Rizieq Syihab, FPI founder (Jacobsen 2009). 
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interests. These conditions were also reflected in FPI’s documents and statements, such 
as:  
The establishment of FPI was motivated by 1) the suffers of Muslim in Indonesia 
caused the weaknesses of the civil and military government, and in turn they also 
committed several human right violations and injustice, and 2) the Islamic 
obligation to take care and defend the dignity of Islam and Muslims (Syihab 
2008:589).  
 
The emergence of Islamic movement (read: FPI) is because of (1) the injustice 
that is undergone through the Muslim society and (2) local and global 
movements that threaten the moral and belief of Muslim society. The effort to 
defend the Muslim society in more systematic and organized is urgent (Syihab 
2007). 
 
Based on these reasons some Muslims leaders –led by Habib Muhammad Rizieq 
Syihab– declared the establishment of Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or Islamic Defenders’ 
Front in the pesantren (Islamic boarding school) of al-Umm, Kampung Utan Ciputat, 
Jakarta Selatan on August 17, 1998.  Among those leaders were K.H. Cecep Bustomi, 
Habib Idrus Jamalullail, K.H. Damanhuri, Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab and K.H. 
Misbahul Anam. Initially, members of FPI were the only followers of these FPI 
founders. Most the founders are well-known charismatic preachers in their community. 
Some of them also ran Islamic boarding houses and schools. Their followers vary from 
hundreds to thousands of people (Jahroni 2008).   
From the beginning, FPI was designed not only as a social religious organization 
but also a political group, not in the narrow sense of a political party.   Syihab argues 
that FPI should function as a group that pressures the government to actively improve 
morality and to develop a social, political and legal structure that obeys the values of the 
Islamic shari`ah (Syihab 2007). In doing so, the Islamic concept that is adopted to 
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achieve these concerns is AMNM (Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar), or Enjoining the Good 
and Forbidding the Evil, as will be elaborated more in the next sub chapter (Syihab 
2008:126). These FPI’s concerns are also reflected in the name of FPI (Front Pembela 
Islam): 
1. Front means that FPI is expected to be the front line of society in the fight 
against injustice and immorality. Therefore, the orientation of FPI is to do things 
that are real or physically obvious in implementing AMNM.  
2. Pembela (defenders) means that FPI will always defend the values of 
righteousness and justice. 
3. Islam means that FPI organization is based solely on Islamic tenets. Combining 
all of this, FPI will be ready on the front line to defend and struggle for the 
application of Islamic shari`ah in Indonesia (Syihab 2008:129).   
At this point, there are two important ideological concepts of FPI that relate to 
the previous discussion of Islam and state relations, namely: the Islamic shari`ah and 
AMNM. The application of shari`ah is the main goal of FPI’s struggle and AMNM is a 
means to achieve that goal. In general, what FPI means by the application of shari`ah is 
the application of law, which is based on God’s laws to replace the law made by men, 
such as those in the Indonesian constitution. This is exactly the same idea held by the 
Islamist faction and Islamist movements during the Sukarno and Suharto regimes.   
As discussed earlier, during these two previous regimes (1945 to 1998) the 
position of Islamist movements was always politically marginal, in opposition to the 
state, and was mostly radical. In other words it can be said that over the past 53 years, 
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the position of the movements that demanded the application of shari’ah was marginal 
and in opposition to the government. Therefore, when FPI emerged as a movement that 
carried the Islamist ideology, FPI situated itself in conditions that made it likely to play 
the same role as the older Islamist movements that had adopted radical strategies and 
maintained opposition with the nationalist government. Thus, FPI became less likely to 
cooperate with the nationalist government. Similarly, the government was likely to find 
it more difficult to co-opt FPI.  Therefore, even though FPI received considerable 
support from several military elites, FPI still maintained its distance from the 
government.  
In the new era of democracy, FPI had more freedom to act and even to put 
pressure on the government. At its early months, FPI utilized moderate means to pursue 
their goals, such as 1) sending a humanitarian mission to help Muslim victims in the 
conflict of Ambon and 2) establishing an independent group to investigate the case of 
“Ninja Killing” that victimized many Muslim leaders on the island of Java. FPI provided 
recommendations to the government in order to resolve the problems and to push the 
government to respond more quickly and properly to the problems that victimized 
Muslims.  
However, after the Ketapang-Jakarta incident in October 1998, FPI started using 
violent means. From its establishment in 1998 to 2010, FPI has committed or has been 
involved in more than 64 cases of violent activities, especially around the capital city of 
Jakarta. They targeted night clubs, brothels, churches, Ahmadiyah group, the LGBT 
(Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender) community, the American embassy and 
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consulates on the grounds of defending Islam and Islamic moral values, as discussed 
more specifically in Chapter 7. 
In addition, FPI has kept using moderate means. Most of the activities that are 
associated with the demand for the application of shari`ah have been peaceful. 
Similarly, when the direct targets have been government’s institutions, FPI has used 
moderate and conventional strategies. FPI has also been involved in many social 
activities, such as sending humanitarian aid to the victims of Tsunami in Aceh in 2005 
and the victims of the Merapi volcano eruption in Yogyakarta-Central Java in 2010. In 
its routine activism, FPI also has regularly conducted some social activities, especially 
around the capital city of Jakarta, like helping the victims of annual flood in Jakarta. 
 
Organizational Structure 
FPI registered its organization with the Department of Internal Affairs of the 
Republic of Indonesia on November 14, 1998. FPI also declared that its organization 
was legal and that it fulfilled all the state requirements for such organizations. This 
implies that FPI formally supports the nationalist ideology of the state, namely the 
Pancasila (the Five Principles). Even though FPI has routinely adopted violent strategies 
and has been threatened with abolishment several times, FPI has been able to maintain 
itself as a legal organization.  
  Similar to other modern organizations, especially modern Islamic groups, the 
organizational structure of FPI generally consists of two parts: a consultative assembly 
(majelis syura) and an executive committee (majelis tanfidzi). The consultative assembly 
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is the highest position in the organization that advises the executive committee 
concerning the general policies and activities. This consultative assembly consists of five 
boards: the Syari`ah, Honorary, Supervisory, Advisory and Supervisory Boards.  All of 
these positions are usually held by the older respected members or founders of FPI 
(Syihab 2008:195). 
The executive committee is the body of the organization that runs the daily 
activities of FPI. Since its establishment, the executive committee has been chaired by 
Habib Rizieq Syihab. The chairman of the executive committee is assisted by several 
deputies, a secretary general and treasurer. In order to run its programs, FPI also formed 
twelve departments, four specialized agencies, four autonomous bodies, and four 
organizational wings, as explained below (Syihab 2008:194-202). 
1. The twelve departments are the Department of Religion, Foreign Affairs, Internal 
Affairs, State Defense and Jihad, Socio Politics Law and Human Rights, 
Education and Culture, Economics, and Research and Technology. 
2. The four specialized agencies (Badan Khusus) are the Investigation Front (Badan 
Investigasi Front), the Anti-terror Front (Badan Anti Terror), the Recruitment 
Front (Badan Pengkaderan Front) and the Expert Front (Badan Ahli Front). 
3. The four autonomous bodies (Lembaga Otonom) are the Immorality Watch Front 
(Lembaga Pemantau Ma`siyat), the Propagation Front (Lembaga Da`wah Front),  
Economics Front (Lembaga Economics), and the Advocacy Front (Lembaga 
Bantuan Hukum). 
  
72 
72 
 
4. The four organizational wings are the Paramilitary Islamic Defenders (Laskar 
Pembela Islam), the Women`s Paramilitary of Islam Defenders (Mujahidah 
Pembela Islam), the Labor Union Front (Serikat Pekerja Front) and the Islamic 
Students Front (Front Mahasiswa Islam). 
Among these divisions of organizational structure, only the Paramilitary Islami 
Defenders, or LPI (Laskar Pembela Islam), is the most visible in relation to FPI’s violent 
activities.  LPI consists of the young, male members. It is intended to be the front line of 
FPI’s physical activities in doing AMNM (Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar). Most of the 
violent activities were committed conspicuously in the name of FPI and/or LPI.  There 
are also some divisions of the organization that seem to relate to FPI’s violence, such as 
the Department of State Defense and Jihad, the Immorality Watch Front (Lembaga 
Pemantau Ma`siyat), and the Women’s Paramilitary of Islam Defenders (Mujahidah 
Pembela Islam). However, their involvement and role in FPI’s violent activities is 
invisible to the in public. 
In general, based on previous studies by Jahroni (2008) and Al-Zastrouw (2006), 
the organizational structure of FPI is traditional and its scope is limited, especially in 
comparison to NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah. The divisions in the 
organizational structure seem to follow the standard format and the trends of a modern 
organization. In addition, its activities are still centralized by a few elite leaders, like 
Habib Rizieq Syihab, Ahmad Sabri Lubis,  Munarman, KH. Misbahul Anam and Habib 
Salim Bin Umar Al-Attos. This may be because FPI, as a nonprofit and non-political 
organization, still depends on these top leaders who have wide-spread networks and are 
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able to obtain resources for organizational activities. Additionally, age of FPI is still 
relatively young and it often receives consistent pressure from some elements of society 
and the state. Therefore, the organizational structure of FPI has not developed as well as 
it could have, especially in comparison to other movements, which have no issues 
regarding political and social problems. 
According to Jahroni, the development of FPI has been much determined by the 
networks of its leaders, namely the hadrami or  habaib networks. Some of FPI top 
leaders are from hadrami or habaib families. Many leaders of FPI local branches also 
come from the hadrami families, such as branches in the city or district of Brebes, Tegal, 
Pemalang, Bogor, Depok and Sukabumi. However, Syihab rejected the idea that FPI is 
dominated by the persons from habaib’s family because they only made up five percent 
of FPI’s committee members (Syihab 2008).  
 Despite the clear hierarchical structure of the organization, communication and 
coordination in FPI tend to be loose and open. Syihab argues that, financially, all FPI’s 
branches are independent from each other and from the central committee. The central 
committee gives freedom to FPI’s branches to establish their own policies (Syihab 
2008).  FPI in Surakarta have even claimed to be completely independent from the 
central FPI in Jakarta (Jahroni 2008). Nevertheless, this study still treats FPI of Surakarta 
as part of FPI’s central organization, as they  have been involved in similar activities and 
possessed the same concerns, such as  pro shari`ah, anti-communism and anti-
immorality. 
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 In another example, when an interviewer on this study gave the questionnaire and 
consent information to one of FPI leader and founder, he declined to be interviewed and 
did not want to fill the questionnaire. He suspected that this survey research was being 
done in order to spy on FPI; and it had to be part of an American plan. However, when 
the interviewer visited another of FPI’s founders, that person accepted the interviewer 
warmly and answered all his questions. However, he reminded the interviewer to be 
objective in his writing about FPI and not to blindly trust FPI’s coverage in the media. In 
addition, he gave his personal card and suggested to use the book written by Syihab as 
the main reference in describing about FPI. These examples indicate that FPI’s 
organizational structure is less coordinated, loose and more open.   
 Similarly, the membership of FPI is also open and loose. Any Muslim can 
become a member of FPI without going through specific rituals (bai`at) and formal 
organizational procedures. Therefore, if someone joins the activities of FPI and shows 
his or her enthusiasm, he or she can be regarded as a FPI member.  According to Al-
Zastrouw, FPI does not systematically recruit potential members. Many Muslims joined 
FPI because their religious leaders joined FPI. The loyalty of members towards their 
religious leader binds them to FPI (Al-Zastrouw 2002). 
 Syihab acknowledged that at the beginning, members of FPI were followers of 
FPI leaders, or the members of Islamic circle led by FPI leaders. However, after the 
incident of Ketapang Jakarta, FPI started to formally recruit its membership.  He also 
said that FPI even recruited former hoodlums; they often became the front line during 
AMNM operations that targeted immoral places (Jampanx 2007).  
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 Al-Zastrouw divides FPI members by four social characteristics: awam (ordinary 
people), intelektual-akademisi (higher educated people), mantan preman (former 
hoodlums) and ulama-habaaib. First, awam are members who are followers of FPI 
leaders (ulama and habaaib). Second, intelektual-akademisi are members who are 
students or faculty members of a university; but most of them are from secular 
universities. Third, mantan preman are former hoodlums who usually take part in violent 
activities. Fourth, the habaib and the ulama make up the brain of the organization and 
mostly hold important positions in the organization (Al-Zastrouw 2006). 
 Syihab (2008) also claims that FPI is a traditional, moderate Islamic 
organization. Traditional means that FPI is respectful of local culture, not anti-mazhab 
(Islamic Schools) and honors classical and modern Ulama (Muslim scholars). Moderate 
means that FPI does not focus on Islamic rituals only, or follow a certain sufi order. FPI 
emphasizes the balance between the “world” and the “hereafter.”  Syihab (2008) also 
rejects some claims that FPI is more a sectarian and Arab oriented organization, for 
example through the domination of habaib (the decedents of Muhammad) in FPI 
organizational boards and Arab-style clothing (white dress with white turban for the 
leaders and white cap for the common members) worn by FPI members. He argues that 
habaib leaders only make up five percent of FPI committee. FPI’s white Arabic 
uniforms are also used during the official activities of FPI. Other than that FPI gives 
freedom to its members to wear whatever clothes or fashion styles they like (Syihab 
2008).  Syihab’s argument seems also to be a response to the accusation that FPI is part 
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of the Indonesian Wahabi (puritan) movements. Wahabi movements in Indonesia are 
usually identified by their Arab oriented culture, anti-mazhab and anti-local culture.  
 Finally, in general, the organizational structure and culture of FPI are very 
similar to other Islamic moderate organizations in Indonesia, such as NU and 
Muhammadiyah. For example, FPI’s organizational structure is open, and it has a 
paramilitary division but it is not prepared for military action. Therefore, there is little 
indication that the organizational structure of FPI has inspired its adoption of violence. 
Nevertheless, there are several ideological components of FPI that need to be discussed 
further. They are the concepts of shari`ah, AMNM (Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar) and 
jihad. The last two concepts were often mentioned by FPI when it adopted violent 
means. Additionally, in the study of Islamic political violence these concepts are often 
associated with violent Islamist movements.  
 
The Demand for the Application of Shari`ah (Islamic Shari`ah)  
As described above, the struggle for the application of shari`ah  by Islamist 
movements has fueled the tensions between state and Islam relations, which in turn 
sometimes radicalized Islamist movements. The application of shari`ah is one of FPI’s 
core goals. FPI wants the Islamic shari`ah to be applied in all aspects of life. However, 
unlike the other Islamist groups, such as MMI, HTI and Darul Islam, that are politically 
oriented and wish to establish an Islamic state, FPI does not insist on the establishment 
of an Islamic state of Indonesia. According to FPI, the Quran and the Hadith, the two 
primary sources of Islam, do not command Muslims to establish an Islamic state. Both 
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holy sources order Muslims only to follow the laws of God; the law of God can be 
followed and implemented in either an Islamic state or a non-Islamic state (Syihab 
2008).  
What FPI intends by the application of Islamic shari`ah is the implementation of 
God’s laws in society and by the state. In society, for example, it can be done by 
ensuring the practice of fasting and five-time-a day prayer (for Muslims) and preventing 
drug’s consumption, prostitution and gambling. At the state level, FPI has conducted 
many activities for 1) the re-inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the Indonesian 
constitution, 2) the application of shari`ah in the local regulations and 3) the enactment 
of anti immorality acts in the national and local governments. Therefore, for FPI, the 
application of  shari`ah does not mean overthrowing the state, because FPI contends that 
the status of national government of the Republic of Indonesia is legitimate and is not in 
contradiction with the Quran and the Hadith (the two primary sources of Islam). 
According to FPI, the root of many problems faced by Indonesia is that the 
government does not totally apply the Islamic shari`ah. Therefore, shari`ah is the real 
answer to these problems. Many of the Indonesian regulations are still based on Western 
concepts, especially Dutch law, which is man-made-law. That is why these laws are so 
weak and have produced many problems.  However, Syihab argues that not all 
Indonesian state regulations are bad. Many state regulations are in concordance with the 
values of shari`ah and therefore, all Muslims are obliged to follow those laws. But, if the 
state regulations are in contradiction with the shari`ah, Muslims must reject them 
without violating state laws (Syihab 2008). 
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According to FPI, another important reason for the need to apply shari`ah in 
Indonesia is that historically shari`ah was officially agreed upon by the founding fathers 
of Indonesia. In the original document of the Jakarta charter, they agreed to mention 
Islamic shari`ah as part of the Indonesian constitution. However, this agreement has 
been betrayed and taken from the Indonesian constitution. Therefore, this agreement 
should be returned in the current constitution, especially the sentence “with the 
obligation to apply Islamic shari`ah for Muslims” (Syihab 2008).  
  Therefore, a blending of the ideology of Islamism and nationality shaped FPI 
concept of shari`ah.  According to Jahroni (2008), who also lives in the same city as the 
central FPI offices, the nationalism of FPI is not questioned. For example, during the 
celebration of FPI’s birthday which coincides with the Indonesian celebration of 
Independence Day, FPI members always bring two symbols: green-white (the colors of 
FPI uniforms and flags) and red-white (the colors of the Indonesian flag). In addition, on 
its official website, FPI has also put the Indonesian flag on its homepage, www.fpi.or.id, 
together with FPI’s logo. This scene is very different from other Islamist movements, 
such as HTI and MMI that seem to never demonstrate their symbolic loyalty to the 
Republic of Indonesia. 
 In relation to democracy, many Islamist movements used the concept of shari`ah 
(God’s law) to oppose the principles of democracy.  Many Islamists see that democracy 
contradicts with principle of shari`ah because it believes that sovereignty belongs to the 
people not God.  In contrast, FPI does not oppose the concept of democracy in 
relationship to the concept of shari`ah.  Instead, FPI looks at democracy as a process to 
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gain an agreement based on people’s power, or the majority. Therefore, FPI accepts the 
principles of democracy, and even demands that democracy should be applied correctly 
in Indonesia.  FPI sees that democracy provides a feasible road to the application of 
shari`ah.  Once, Syihab argued that the government should conduct a referendum on 
whether or not shari`ah could be applied nationally. If the results of the referendum 
showed support for the application of shari`ah, then the government should apply it 
nationally. However, if the result showed the opposite, the government should give the 
opportunity for the local governments to implement shari`ah if their people wanted 
shari`ah. This is what Syihab calls democracy (Jahroni 2008).   
However, Syihab argues that the application of democracy in Indonesia is still far 
away from the ideal concept of democracy. For example, according to the principles of 
democracy, which are based on the voice of majority, the political policies should be 
applied proportionally. Therefore, the interests of Muslim majority should be heard. In 
fact, efforts of Muslims to implement shari`ah continue to be ignored by the state 
(Jahroni 2008). 
 In short, FPI has tried to show that its concept of Islamic shari`ah  does not 
contradict with the Indonesian ideology; it also does not necessarily mean the 
establishment of an Islamic state is necessity.  Instead, it is about the implementation of 
God’s law in state and society. At the state or political level, FPI has consistently 
engaged in activities demanding the application of shari`ah. For example in August 
2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004, demanding the application of shari`ah, FPI rallied in the 
capital city of Jakarta and in front of the office of the People’s Representative Assembly 
  
80 
80 
 
(MPR). Similarly, in August 2002, FPI signed the  shari`ah petition to demand the re-
inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the Indonesian constitution. However, FPI has not 
demanded the removal of the nationalist ideology from the constitution. In addition, 
these activities targeting the state level have been generally peaceful.  
At the societal level, FPI has also consistently forced Indonesian Muslim 
communities to implement and obey the Islamic shari`ah, such as the campaigns against 
anti-immorality in the hotels, night clubs and brothels. However, unlike the activities of 
struggling for the implementation of shari`ah at the state level, the activities at the 
societal level included force and violence. FPI used the so-called AMNM strategy to 
apply shari`ah to the life of the people, as explained below. 
 
AMNM (Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar): Definition and Procedures 
Defining the concept of AMNM, Syihab argues that AMNM consist of two 
elements: amar ma`ruf  and nahi munkar. First, amar ma`ruf means an order or call to 
something that is good according to the Islamic shari`ah and is able to bring people 
closer to God. Second, nahi munkar means avoiding something that is against the 
Islamic shari`ah. Therefore, in general, AMNM means every systematic effort to ask 
Muslims to implement all Islamic teachings in total and to prevent them from engaging 
inany activities that can destroy the morals and beliefs of Islam (Jahroni 2008; Syihab 
2008). This concept is based on the sayings of the Quran: “Let there become of you a 
community shall call for righteousness, enjoin justice and forbid evil” (The Koran 
3:104).  
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According to FPI documents, AMNM is an absolute tool and method to 
implement the Islamic shari`ah in Indonesia. Syihab argues that the application of 
AMNM is the only solution in order to remove all types of destruction (zalim) and 
corruption (munkar). Without AMNM, it is almost impossible to end destruction and 
corruption.  Then, its goal is to create a good society within a prosperous country filled 
with the blessings and love of God (Syihab 2008). Of course, this concept of AMNM –
except in relation to the implementation of Islamic shari`ah in Indonesia– is not an 
exclusive interpretation of FPI. Most Islamic organizations in Indonesia have similar 
ideas about AMNM. However, they differ in implementing the concept.  
 Theoretically, based on the above definition, AMNM can be any social, religious 
activities, such as calling Muslims to go to the mosque, building Islamic schools, giving 
scholarships to the poor and punishing criminals. However, in relation to FPI, AMNM is 
associated with activities of enforcing religious and moral values in society, such as 
raiding night clubs, discotheque and brothels. Therefore, when FPI explains how to 
implement AMNM, FPI confines itself to how to actively end immorality within society 
(Syihab 2008).   
Based on this concept, there are two different ways to apply AMNM, namely by 
doing AM (amar ma`ruf or enjoining good) and NM (nahi munkar or forbidding evil). 
First, AM (enjoining good) is done by calling and spreading what is considered good by 
God’s law (shari`ah) and logic (akal). The targets of the amar ma`ruf are people in the 
community who live around immoral places and who are permissive towards the 
presence of immorality in their area. According to FPI, those people should be taught the 
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proper knowledge of Islam and science in relation to the danger of prostitution.  
Therefore, in doing amar ma`ruf, FPI prioritizes the use of wisdom (hikmah) and good 
advice (mauizah hasanah) (Syihab 2008).   
Second, NM (nahi munkar or forbidding evil) is done by preventing any religious 
destruction (munkar) or anything that is considered evil by God’s law and logic, using 
any means necessary. The targets of NM are brothels, night clubs and other immoral 
places, where the surrounding community rejected the presence of those immoral places 
(Al-Zastrouw 2004; Jahroni 2002).  Syihab argues that according to the Hadith 
(Muhammad’s sayings) NM can be done through three steps: 1) using physical force to 
prevent injustice and corruption, but if force cannot be applied, then 2) words or writings 
will be used, but if words cannot be used, 3) the last thing can be done is to personally 
reject that corruption. However, in practice, FPI used the opposite steps, namely by 
sending letters to their targets and government authorities requesting the closure of 
immoral business operations. Then, if their targets do not comply with this written 
demand, FPI will force the targeted immoral places to close (Syihab 2008:249).  
Syihab divides places of immorality into two types: illegal (such as hidden 
brothels and unlicensed nightclubs) and legal (such as discotheques). First, regarding 
illegal places, the steps required to close them are sending a letter of protest to the owner 
of the immoral place with a copy to the chief of the village (Lurah), the chief of the sub-
district (Camat), the chief of the Sub-district Department of Religious Affairs 
(Kakandepag), the chief of the Sub-district Police Department (Kapolsek), the chief of 
the Sub-district Army (Danramil), and the local Ulama (religious leaders). If they do not 
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respond to the letter and the owner does not comply with the demand, then FPI along 
with the community surrounding the place will force the closure the illegal immoral 
place with the coordination of LPI (the paramilitary wing of FPI) and local authorities.   
Second, regarding the legal places of immorality, the steps required to close 
those places are almost the same as those of targeted illegal places. The only differences 
is that the letters of directly send to the chief of the village (Lurah) with a copy to the 
owner and to all above institutions.  In addition to that, the letters are sent to the 
authorities at the provincial level, including the Provincial People’s Representative 
Asembly (DPRD Tingkat I). If they do not respond to it, then FPI will use any necessary 
to close those places with the coordination of LPI and local authorities (Syihab 2008, p. 
253-55). 
Even though, it is difficult to verify how FPI has implemented these official 
procedures, there are strong indications that FPI applied the general guidelines of 
AMNM, in the sense that it tried to communicate with the government officials and the 
owners before its collective actions. 
 
Jihad, the Extension of AMNM (Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar) 
In addition to the concept of AMNM, another important concept that often 
identifies FPI is jihad. FPI has used the word jihad as a marker for its movement. As an 
example, the word jihad can be found in the lyrics of FPI anthem. The following is the 
translation of its lyrics from the Arabic and the Indonesian versions: 
Title: Let’s go Jihad 
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Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest (2X)  
Allah is our God, He is our destination 
Muhammad, the messenger of God, is our example  
Al-Quran is our guidance 
Jihad is our struggle 
Being a martyr is our expectation 
Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest (2X) 
Let’s go jihad (2X) 
To defend Islam and Muslims 
Let’s go jihad (2X) 
To defend Islam and Muslims 
Live with honor or die as a martyr (4X) 
Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest (2X) 
Muslim scholars have various interpretation of Jihad.  Some argue that jihad is a 
physical struggle against adversaries, which is called a lesser Jihad, while others argue 
that the real jihad is an inner struggle against oneself, which is called a bigger Jihad.7 
FPI leaders, who are mostly educated in Islamic studies, do understand the debates 
regarding the concept of jihad.  Syihab acknowledges that jihad can mean any struggle 
                                                 
7 Some scholars of political Islam, such as Peter (1996), Cook (2005) and Bonner (2006) see that the 
interpretation and manifestation of jihad varies during the history Islam. In the classical doctrine, jihad is 
interpreted in more armed ways (the lesser jihad) because the situation of war was prevalent during the 
first century of Islam (Peter, 1996). Then,  in the  8th and 9th century,  the interpretation of jihad started to 
move to the peaceful interpretation (the bigger jihad) as Muslim conquest began to move to more distant 
regions and many Muslims were unable to abandon their homes and families to go to fight.  However, 
since 19th century when most Muslim worlds were colonized by the West or non Muslim countries, the 
interpretation has started to radicalized. In 1967, the idea of lesser jihad became more popular, when the 
Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian armies were defeated by the Israeli army. Thus, understanding social 
contexts is crucial to the understanding of jihad (see Cook 2005).   
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for the sake of God. However, in the context of Islamic law (fiqh), he argues that jihad is 
about a fight with or a war against the enemy of Islam in order to defend the Words of 
God (Syihab 2008:151).   
In 2002, 2005 and 2006, FPI declared to recruit jihadist volunteers to be sent to 
Palestine and Lebanon.  In each recruitment, FPI was able to collect volunteers ranging 
from hundreds to thousands. However, there is no information how many of these 
volunteers were sent to Palestine and Lebanon. The only information available is that 
they were only sent about 20 people to join Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestine in 2006 
because it had limited funding (“Jihad Fighters” 2006). 
 Several times the members of FPI were also accused for their involvement in 
terrorist attacks, such as FPI members of Aceh, Lampung and Pekalongan. However, 
none of them were proven. For example, FPI leader of Aceh argued that if his members 
was involved in a terrorist group, it was not because of FPI but because that person is 
involved in Jema`ah Islamiyyah (“FPI Aceh” 2010). In addition, FPI leader of Lampung, 
Habib Hasan Al-Jufri was also suspected for the bombing of the Bethany Church in 
Bandar Lampung. He was even charged with causing death by the general attorney 
(“Simpati Berdatangan” 2002). However, because of lack of evidence, Jufri was 
acquitted (“Ketua FPI” 2003).  
Although many FPI leaders admire Osama bin Laden, FPI does not consider 
several terrorist attacks in the name of Islam as part of jihad. For example, responding to 
the Bali bombings, Syihab argues that those attacks cannot be considered as jihad 
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because the perpetrators victimized innocent people and harmed themselves, and he 
considers the attacks as criminal and stupid actions (“FPI Akui” 2005).  
 In practice, however, FPI sees that jihad is concerned with the implementation of 
AMNM. According to Syihab, this more specific interpretation of jihad is based on the 
Hadith or Muhammad traditions as follows: 
Abu Bakr (Muhammad companion) said to Muhammad: “the messenger of God, 
is there any other jihad besides the fight against infidels?” Muhammad then 
answered: “Hi Abu Bakr, indeed God has people (mujahid) that are better than 
the martyrs. They make a living and walk on earth.  God is proud of them in front 
of His angels; and the heaven is decorated for them, just like Ummu Salama 
dressed up for her husband (Muhammad).” Abu Bakr responded: “The 
messenger of God, who are they?” Muhammad answers: “they are the people 
who are doing AMNM (enjoining good and forbidding evil), they love because 
of God and hate because of God” (quoted by Syihab 2008:152).  
 
In addition to the meaning of jihad, another important element that makes jihad 
important in FPI’s organization, and generally in the Muslim lives, is its extraordinary 
rewards and status. For example, in two Hadith quoted by Syihab, it is said: first, “Once, 
a man came to Muhammad; he said: the messenger of God, could you teach me an action 
that can emulate the jihad. Muhammad answered: none,” and second, “Whoever does 
not do a jihad, he/she will not experience the happiness of the world and hereafter” 
(Syihab 2008:153-54). Similarly, as it is stated in FPI’s anthem and is commonly 
believed by Muslims, that the mujahid (the person doing jihad) will always be successful 
in his or her life. If he/she is alive, he will live with honor, but if he/she dies, he/she will 
die as a martyr. 
Finally, these all imply that the concept of jihad has been used by FPI to 
empower doing AMNM. On one hand, the concept of AMNM has provided guidance for 
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FPI on whom or what are the targets of the operations and how to get rid of them. On the 
other hand, jihad provides encouragement for FPI members to participate in AMNM. In 
practice, many of AMNM activities have resulted in violence. Partly, this may be 
because not all FPI’s demands, like closing legal nightclubs, are well responded to by 
the government and the business owners. At the same time, according to FPI’s procedure 
of AMNM, if its demands, like closing places of immorality, are not responded to, then 
FPI will use force to close those places. Consequently, many of FPI’s AMNM operations 
ended in violence.  Additionally, the spirits of jihad, as understood by FPI’s members, 
also give them support to continue to adopt violent strategies. 
As will be discussed in chapter 7, during 1998 to 2010, FPI has been involved in 
at least 64 cases of violent collective actions. Because of this, since its first violent 
actions in 1998, FPI has been bombarded with some harsh criticisms from many 
different elements of the community. Criticism of FPI’s violence has been part of its 
development. Therefore, in many occasions, like in FPI’s documents, official homepage, 
and public media, FPI continues to explain why it has chosen to use violent means, as it 
is shortly discussed below. 
 
Justifying Violence 
According to FPI, violent and peaceful strategies are parts of AMNM. Both have 
religious bases and reasoning. Violence is not necessarily bad, as long as it is used at the 
right place and time. Syihab argues that violence is a manifestation of two possible 
characteristics:  toughness and brutality. The first one is the acceptable violence. 
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Additionally, it is aceptable if the violence does not contradict the values of Islamic 
shari`ah and is aimed at implementing the Islamic shari`ah. Syihab gives some religious 
reasons of why violence is allowed in Islam: 
1. Once, Muhammad ordered his companions to burn a mosque because it was built 
not as a place to worship but a place to divide the unity of Muslim community. 
The logic is that if a place having a good connotation is allowed to be destroyed, 
so should a place of immorality, such as a nightclub or brothel. 
2. Once, Muhammad ordered his companions to burn the house of a Muslim who 
did not want to gather with the group. 
3. Muhammad ordered his companion, Abu Tholhah, to dump the liquor and 
destroy its containers.  
4. Muhammad destroyed the statues around the Ka`bah in Mecca and ordered his 
companions to destroy them too (Syihab 2008). 
Syihab also acknowledges that the Islamic shari`ah also order to use a peaceful and wise 
strategies in doing AMNM. He also mentioned several verses of the Quran and the 
Hadith on the importance of using peaceful strategies. For example, he quotes the Quran:  
Call men to the path of your Lord with wisdom and kindly exhortation. Reason 
with them in the most courteous manner. Your Lord best knows those who stray 
from His path and those who are rightly guided (The Koran 16: 125). 
 
Therefore, FPI prioritizes the use of peaceful and wise means to do AMNM. However, 
in practice, not all peaceful means work well to do AMNM operations. So, according to 
Syihab, in this situation, there is a need to move from peaceful means to the right use of 
violence, as explained above in the procedure of AMNM. 
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Moving towards FPI’s Adoption of Violence 
In summary, there are two important factors that might facilitate FPI’s adoption 
of violence. They are the structure of the political process and the framing factor. First, 
the history of Indonesia began with a huge debate over whether the new state would be 
based on Islamic or nationalist ideology. Both proponents of these ideologies competed 
to dominate the state. However, from the beginning of Indonesian independence in 1945 
to the fall of the Suharto military authoritarian regime in 1998, the proponents of 
nationalist ideology were able to control the state. On the other hand, the proponents of 
Islamic ideology were always in a marginal position. Most of them existed as rebellious 
and clandestine radical Islamist movements rather than as legal groups that openly 
opposed the nationalist state.  During this 53 year period (1945-1998), the government 
fully suppressed these Islamist movements.  
After the collapse of the Suharto military authoritarian regime (1998), the 
government no longer possessed significant control over society. Consequently, this 
created an open political opportunity for the Islamist movements to emerge or reemerge, 
including FPI. FPI declared its establishment and identified itself as a proponent of the 
Islamist ideology (shari`ah). This means that FPI actually situated itself in a condition 
similar to previous Islamist movements, which were radical and in opposition to the 
state. Therefore, FPI’s choice to support Islamic ideology made it more prone to emulate 
radical Islamist movements; in turn this made it difficult for FPI to create a harmonious 
relationship with the government.    
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 Second, as will be discussed in the next chapter, since its establishment in 1998, 
FPI has aggressively raided night clubs, brothels and other targets or places which it 
considers as sources of immorality.  According to its organizational documents, FPI used 
the concept of AMNM (amar ma`ruf nahi munkar) and jihad to explain its major 
programs, including some activities that used violent means. Additionally, FPI also 
formulated its social and religious justifications for why it chose to adopt violent means 
in some of its activities.  
 These FPI concepts of AMNM, jihad and its reasoning for violence can be 
understood in two contexts. First, these concepts can be understood as means for FPI to 
justify its violent actions rather than as direct source violence. This is because most of 
these concepts were developed and internalized in FPI after it was involved in violent 
activities. Second, more than a means of justification, these concepts can also be 
understood more generally as means for FPI to frame its overall activities, so that FPI 
was able to launch its activities and continue to adopt violent means.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, framing is closely related to social 
movements’ activities, which means that successful collective actions also depend on the 
soundness of framing strategies.  Snow and Benford (1998) also provide three core 
framing task that can be used to assess the soundness of the framing, namely: 1) 
prognostic framing, or problem identification and attributions, 2) diagnostic framing, or 
strategies and solution for the problem, and 3) motivational framing, or calls for action.  
The concepts of shari`ah, AMNM, jihad, martyr and religious justification for 
violence fulfill these three core framing tasks.  For example, the shari`ah has shaped 
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how FPI identifies the problems of the society and who is responsible for these problems 
(diagnostic framing). FPI’s understanding of shari`ah lead to its perception that the 
Indonesian constitution, night clubs and brothels were the sources of these problems. 
AMNM provides FPI the means for solving these problems, such as by sending a letter 
to the government and owners of immoral places and/or directly attacking these immoral 
places (prognostic framing). Lastly, FPI’s concept of jihad and martyrdom provide 
religious encouragement and rationale for FPI members to engage in AMNM 
(motivational framing). Finally, by combining these three framing tasks, violent 
collective actions have become more feasible, relevant and rational for FPI. Thus, FPI 
continues to adopt violent means in it collective actions.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIVISTS  
IN RELATION TO VIOLENCE 
 
The current chapter is aimed at investigating individual characteristics of FPI’s 
activists that might facilitate FPI’s adoption of violence. Previous research on social 
movements and political violence suggests that there are, at least, three individual 
characteristics, which allegedly account for violent collective actions. They are 
fundamentalism, lower trust in government and the interaction between trust in 
government and political efficacy. Using a quantitative approach, these theories will be 
used to look at the characteristics of FPI activists in relation to FPI’s adoption of violent 
means.   In doing so, the main focus of this chapter is to test the following hypotheses. 
First, the more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they are to justify 
violence (H1a). If this is true, then FPI will be likely more fundamentalist than that of 
the moderate groups (H1b) and the relationship between fundamentalism and violence 
justification will be stronger for FPI than the moderate groups (H1c). Second, people 
who have lower trust in government will be more likely to justify the use of violent 
means (H2a); people who have low trust in government but high political efficacy will 
be likely to justify violence (H2b). If H2a and/or H2b are true, then FPI will be likely to 
have a lower trust in government than that of the moderate groups (H2c), and FPI will be 
likely to have a higher political efficacy than that of the moderate groups (H2d). The 
following discussion is the result of the analysis. 
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Data Description 
The total valid returned questionnaire is 371. However, 30 of the respondents (27 
from MMI and 3 from HTI) are dropped from the analysis because in the middle of data 
collection, these two organizations declined to participate.  Therefore, only 341 
respondents are used to analyze the hypotheses. This total number of 341 consists of 135 
FPI respondents (the violent group) and 206 respondents of moderate activists (142 are 
NU activists and 64 are Muhammadiyah activists). All of these respondents are male 
because all these organizations are dominated by male activists. 
The following Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics of all measured variables 
for the two groups (FPI and the moderate groups), which includes mean, range, standard 
deviation and test of normality (skewness and kurtosis). All of the values of the 
measured variables are treated as approximately interval.  
In general, most of the measured variables are normally distributed.  All of the 
skewness values are between -3 and 3. Many of them have values close to zero. 
Similarly, most of the kurtosis values are between -3 and 3.  However, there are four 
items of the measured variables that have values above 3. Three of them are under the 
latent construct of trust in government’s work, namely items Q7b, Q7c and Q7d, and one 
of them is under the latent construct of fundamentalism, namely item Q6e. Therefore, 
this can be a sign of potential problems. However, the kurtosis values are within the 
acceptable range for the normality assumption. Some argue that the data will be 
problematic if the absolute value is greater than 8.0 (extreme kurtosis), and others argue 
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it is problematic if the absolute value is greater than 10.0 (Klein 2005). Therefore, the 
following items can be assumed to be normally distributed.       
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Observed Variables  
Variable Mean Range SD Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Fundamentalism 
     
 Quran absolute (Q6a) 4.90 1-7 2.03 -.74 -.91 
 Quran right, science wrong (Q6b) 4.78 1-7 1.81 -.69 -.78 
 Threat of Christianization (Q6c) 5.45 1-7 1.59 -1.18 .65 
 Threat of liberalism (Q6d) 5.15 1-7 1.65 -.74 -.34 
 Threat of immorality (Q6e) 6.07 1-7 1.06 -1.71 3.93 
 Must protect Islam (Q6f) 5.78 2-7 1.10 -1.20 1.39 
 Immorality source of problem (Q6g) 5.61 1-7 1.30 -1.49 2.15 
 No female leader (Q6h) 4.33 1-7 2 -.25 -1.28 
 No female judge (Q6i) 4.59 1-7 1.90 -.39 -1.16 
 Not vote for female candidate (Q6j) 4.28 1-7 1.94 -.22 -1.17 
 Signs of end of world (Q6k) 5.05 1-7 1.61 -.75 -.20 
 US President: Dajjal (Q6l) 4.48 1-7 1.71 -.19 -.75 
 Indonesia a secular state (Q6m) 4.47 1-7 1.73 -.44 -1.02 
 Indonesia based on shari`ah (Q6n) 4.91 1-7 1.78 -.82 -.40 
      
Trust in Government’s work      
 Gov. runs by few big interest (Q7a)* 2.42 1-7 1.26 1.60 2.49 
 Gov. wastes money (Q7b)* 2.09 1-7 1.07 2.25 6.88 
 Gov. incompetent (Q7c)* 2.26 1-7 1.08 1.61 3.69 
 Gov. corrupts (Q7d)* 2.27 1-7 1.21 1.77 3.63 
 Gov. handles immorality (Q7e) 3.40 1-7 1.47 .40 -.47 
 Gov. handles corruption (Q7f) 3.20 1-7 1.40 .36 .26 
 Gov handles corporate mafia (Q7g) 2.96 1-7 1.47 .60 -.53 
      
Trust in Government’s Institutions      
 Trust president (Q8a) 1.87 1-4 .52 .24 2.45 
 Trust provincial government (Q8b) 1.80 1-4 .61 .47 1.2 
 Trust local government (Q8c) 1.85 1-4 .60 .32 .88 
 Trust policy (Q8d) 1.58 1-4 .56 .40 -.15 
 Trust court (Q8e) 1.60 1-4 .61 .84 1.37 
 Trust prosecutor general (Q8f) 1.57 1-4 .57 .46 -.08 
 Trust legislative institution (Q8g) 1.85 1-4 .51 .21 2.67 
      
Political Efficacy      
 Well-qualified (Q9a) 3.99 1-7 1.61 -.10 -1.18 
 Well-informed (Q9b) 4.74 1-7 1.34 -.67 -.26 
 Well-understanding (Q9c) 4.91 1-7 1.31 -.91 .35 
 Others understand better (Q9d)* 3.60 1-7 1.31 .67 -.15 
 Self-confidence (Q9e) 4.25 1-7 1.41 -.14 -.70 
 Unsure (Q9f)* 3.22 1-7 1.47 .80 -.41 
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Table 6.1 Continued 
Variable Mean Range SD Skewness Kurtosis 
      
Violent Attitudes      
 Against LGBT groups (Q10a) 4.82 1-7 1.78 -.81 -.63 
 Against blasphemous groups (Q10b) 5.21 1-7 1.90 -.95 -.47 
 Against illegal churches (Q10c) 5.23 1-7 1.65 -1.10 .26 
 Against prostitution (Q10d) 5.16 1-7 1.71 -1.03 -.06 
 Against gambling-drinking (Q10e) 5.17 1-7 1.69 -1.09 .14 
 Against immorality (Q10f) 4.85 1-7 1.83 -.71 -.74 
The variables with * are scored in reverse 
 
 
Reliability and Validity 
In SEM, factor loadings and fit indices can also indicate reliability and validity of 
the measurement and structural models. However, in order to get initial assessment of 
the quality of the data, the following is a brief discussion regarding reliability and 
validity of the measurement model. 
 First, concerning the reliability (internal consistency) of items Q6a to Q6n that 
measure fundamentalism, the values of Cronbach’s alpha is .913 (excellent). This value 
indicates high reliability or internal consistency. Additionally, it suggests that these 
fourteen items (Q6a to Q6n) are closely related as a group, and they may measure the 
latent construct of fundamentalism well. In relation to the validity, the values of the 
observed variables seem to be as expected by the theory. For example, the means of the 
moderate groups are around four (neutral position), and its standard deviations are also 
higher than those of FPI. Theoretically, the moderates are expected to respond to the 
questions moderately. Similarly, the variability (standard deviations) of religious 
opinions of the moderate groups is also expected to be higher than that of FPI because 
the leaders and activists of the moderate groups (NU and Muhammadiyah) are usually 
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more independent from each other. Additionally, they also get used to having different 
religious opinions within and outside their groups.   
Second, concerning the reliability of items Q7a to Q7g, which measure trust in 
government’s work, the value of Cronbach’s alpha is .693. This value indicates that 
those items are less consistent, or not homogenous. Therefore, they indicate a problem in 
measuring the latent variable of trust in government’s work. In general, the cut-off for 
the alpha value should be greater than .70 or even .80.  
One of the problems that may cause this lower value of alpha is an inaccurate 
strategy in designing the items of Q7a to Q7g, which made them confusing for the 
respondents. Based on the answer’s direction, these items (Q7a to Q7g) are divided into 
two groups. In group one (Q7a to Q7d), the answers tell that the “lower scores” indicate 
a “higher trust.” On the other hand, in group two (Q7e to Q7g) the answers tell that the 
“lower scores” indicate a “lower trust.” Many respondents might have been confused 
with the directional shift of answering these similar questions (from group one to group 
two).  Therefore, the Pearson correlations of the items within “group one” (or group two) 
are mostly high. On the contrary, the Pearson correlation between an item in “group 
one” and another item in “group two” are very low.  For example, the values of Pearson 
correlation between item Q7a (group one) and Q7b (group one) is .556, but the 
correlation between item Q7a (group one) and Q7e (group two) is only -.016(see 
appendix).  
Finally, considering this low value of reliability caused by the ineffective design 
of the questionnaire, this study drops all of these items from the analysis.  Even though 
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there is an alternative to only drop some of the unreliable items (such as items Q7e to 
Q7f), this study chose not to do so. It is because retaining some items, such as Q7a to 
Q7d, and dropping some other items (Q7e to Q7f) also can hurt the dimensions of the 
latent concept of trust in government’s work, which exist in Q7e to Q7f. Especially, 
these latter questions are about corruption, which is very important indicators in 
measuring trust in government and is relevant to the current context of Indonesia. In 
addition to that, combining items Q7 and Q8 still produces the low value of Cronbach’s 
alpha of .642. 
In short, as discussed in the previous chapter, scholars used two different 
strategies in measuring trust in government, namely: questioning about people’s trust in 
government’s work and people’s trust in government’s institutions. Initially, this study 
combined both strategies to measure trust in government. However, because of the 
problem on the data of items measuring trust in government’ work, this study only used 
the items measuring trust in government’s institution to measure the latent variable of 
trust in government.     
Third, concerning the coefficient of reliability, the value of Cronbach’s alpha for 
items Q8a-Q8g that measure trust in government’s institutions is .79 (or .81 if item Q8g 
is deleted).  However, in the next analysis, this item was not deleted because it did not 
significantly affect the alpha, and the value of .79 is still acceptable. Additionally, 
deleting item Q8g can reduce the dimensionality of the latent construct of trust in 
government’s institutions.   
  
98 
98 
 
Forth, concerning the coefficient of reliability, the Cronbach’s alpha for items 
Q9a to Q9 that measure political efficacy is .74, which is acceptable.  Therefore, this 
indicates that items Q9a to Q9f are closely related and consistent. It is also evidence that 
these items measure the same latent construct of efficacy.    
Fifth, concerning the coefficient of reliability, the values of Cronbach’s alpha of 
items Q10a to Q10g that measure violent attitudes is .93 (excellent). Therefore, this 
indicates that these items are closely related and consistent. It is also evidence that these 
items measure the same latent construct of violent attitudes. In addition, in relation to the 
validity, the values of the observed variables seem to be as expected by the theory.  FPI 
shows its tendency towards violent attitudes and the moderate groups shows their 
tendency towards moderate attitudes. As it is also expected, the variability of FPI is 
lower than that of the moderate groups and the variability of the moderate group is also 
higher than FPI. This indicates that, assuming normal distribution, some respondents of 
the moderate groups also tend to be violent, and some of them tend to be anti-violent. 
 
Preliminary Analysis: Mean Differences of the Observed Variables 
Table 6.2 shows that, in general, there are statistically significant differences in 
the means of the observed fundamentalism variables between FPI and the moderate 
groups. The only exception was found in the item Q6e (threat of immorality); here the 
case of difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, this is an initial indication 
that FPI are more fundamentalist than the moderate groups.  
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Table 6.2 Means (or Proportions) and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the 
Observed Variables Measuring Fundamentalism by Groups 
Variable Moderate 
 
FPI 
 
Mean Difference 
p-Values 
Quran absolute (Q6a) 4.07 (2.12) 6.15 (.96) .000 
Quran right, science wrong (Q6b) 4.20 (2.02) 5.65 (.89) .000 
Threat of Christianization (Q6c) 5.20 (1.73) 5.83 (1.28) .000 
Threat of liberalism (Q6d) 4.89 (1.78) 5.54 (1.34) .000 
Threat of immorality (Q6e) 6.02 (1.01) 6.15 (.98) .273 
Must protect Islam (Q6f) 5.58 (1.18) 6.07 (.91) .000 
Immorality source of problem (Q6g) 5.38 (1.56) 5.97 (.64) .000 
No female leader (Q6h) 3.47 (1.94) 5.63 (1.28) .000 
No female judge (Q6i) 3.81 (1.9) 5.76 (1.16) .000 
Not vote for female candidate (Q6j) 3.36 (1.79) 5.67 (1.18) .000 
Signs of end of world (Q6k) 4.62 (1.71) 5.70 (1.2) .000 
US President: Dajjal (Q6l) 3.89 (1.65) 5.38 (1.4) .000 
Indonesia a secular state (Q6m) 3.85 (1.76) 5.41 (1.16) .000 
Indonesia based on Shari`ah (Q6n) 4.17 (1.83) 6.04 (.9) .000 
 
Table 6.3 shows that in general, the difference of the means measuring trust in 
government’s work between FPI and the moderate groups are not consistent. For 
example, in item Q7a, the mean of moderate groups is significantly higher than that of 
FPI, but in the items Q7e, Q7f and Q7g, the means of the moderate group are 
significantly lower than those of FPI. Additionally, there are no significant mean 
differences between those two groups in items Q7b, Q7c and Q7d. These indicate that 
there is no difference between FPI and the moderate groups (Muhammadiyah and NU) 
regarding their trust in government’s works.   
 
Table 6.3 Means (or Proportions) and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the 
Observed Variables Measuring Trust in Government’s Work (Trust One) 
Variable Moderate FPI Mean Difference p-Values 
Gov. runs by few big interest (Q7a)* 2.69 (1.49) 1.98 (.62) .000 
Gov. wastes money (Q7b)* 2.15 (1.21) 2.01 (.82) .193 
Gov. incompetent (Q7c)* 2.30 (1.23) 2.21 (.802) .459 
Gov. corrupts (Q7d)* 2.25 (1.31) 2.31 (1.05) .644 
Gov. handles immorality (Q7e) 3.17 (1.53) 3.76 (1.28) .000 
Gov. handles corruption (Q7f) 2.94 (1.47) 3.59 (1.19) .000 
Gov handles corporate mafia (Q7g) 2.61 (1.44) 3.46 (1.39) .000 
The variables with * are scored in reverse, so that the higher score indicate higher trust. 
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Table 6.4 shows that there are statistical differences between FPI and the 
moderate groups in the means of items (Q8a to Q8f) measuring trust in government’s 
institutions. FPI members have lower trust in the government’s institutions than that of 
the moderate groups, except for item Q8g (trust in legislative institution). Generally, this 
indicates that FPI and the moderate groups are different in their level of trust in 
government’s institutions. However, in reality the differences are not that great because 
the scores of both FPI and the moderate groups are concentrated in the lowest range, or 
between 1 = never and 2 = sometimes and the pattern of differences is not consistent.  
 
Table 6.4 Means (or Proportions) and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the 
Observed Variables Measuring Trust in Government’s Institutions (Trust 
Two) 
Variable Moderate 
 
FPI 
 
Mean Difference 
p-Values 
Trust president (Q8a) 1. 95(.56) 1.77 (.43) .002 
Trust provincial government (Q8b) 1.90 (.67) 1.66 (.47) .001 
Trust local government (Q8c) 1.95 (.66) 1.70 (.46) .000 
Trust policy (Q8d) 1.68 (.59) 1.44 (.50) .000 
Trust court (Q8e) 1.71 (.67) 1.46 (.50) .000 
Trust prosecutor general (Q8f) 1.66 (.82) 1.46 (.56) .003 
Trust legislative institution (Q8g) 1.79 (.60) 1.93 (.35) .014 
 
Table 6.5 shows that there is no pattern in the means of efficacy based on the 
group’s affiliation, namely the moderate groups and FPI. For example, the means of FPI 
and the moderate groups of items Q9a and Q9e are not statistically different. 
Furthermore, in the case of items Q9b and Q9c, the means of FPI members are 
significantly higher than those of the moderate group members, but in items Q9d and 
Q9f, the means of FPI members are statistically lower than those of the moderate group 
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members. Therefore, there is no consistent difference between the moderate groups and 
FPI with regard to self-reported political efficacy.  
 
Table 6.5 Means (or Proportions) and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the 
Observed Variables Measuring Political Efficacy 
Variable Moderate 
 
FPI 
 
Mean Difference 
p-Values 
Well-qualified (Q9a) 4.03 (1.68) 3.92 (1.51) .518 
Well-informed (Q9b) 4.59 (1.53) 4.96 (.93) .011 
Well-understanding (Q9c) 4.62 (1.51) 5.35 (.71)  .000 
Others understand better (Q9d)* 3.84 (1.49) 3.24 (.87) .000 
Self-confidence (Q9e) 4.21 (1.52) 4.30 (1.21) .601 
Unsure (Q9f)* 3.35 (1.54) 3.02 (1.33) .042 
The variables with * are scored in reverse, so that the higher score indicate higher efficacy. 
 
Table 6.6 shows that the means of the items measuring violent attitudes (Q10a to 
Q10f) of FPI members and the moderate groups are statistically different. FPI are more 
violent than the moderate group members, as expected. Therefore, there is strong 
indication that they are different. Additionally, the scores of those groups are 
concentrated in different places. FPI tends to be concentrated in the values between 6 
and 7, which indicate the agreement on the use of violence and force in collective 
actions. On the other hand, the moderate groups tend to concentrate in the values 
between 4 and 5, which indicate their neutrality.   
 
Table 6.6 Means (or Proportions) and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the 
Observed Variables Measuring Violent Attitudes 
Variable Moderate FPI Mean Difference 
p-Values 
Against LGBT groups (Q10a) 4.09 (1.88) 5.93 (.73) .000 
Against blasphemous groups (Q10b) 4.44 (1.99) 6.39 (.88) .000 
Against illegal churches (Q10c) 4.62 (1.78) 6.17 (.76) .000 
Against prostitution (Q10d) 4.48 (1.86) 6.19 (.59) .000 
Against gambling-drinking (Q10e) 4.47 (1.81) 6.24 (.54) .000 
Against immorality (Q10f) 3.90 (1.75) 6.29 (.56) .000 
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Model Results 
Based on the aforementioned preliminary results of data collection, especially the low 
value of reliability in questions 7 (Q7a to Q7g), the hypothesized model is reformulated 
in the following Figure 6.1: 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Hypothesized Model after Deleting Items Q7a to Q7g Measuring Trust in 
Government’s Work. 
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Using LMS (Latent Moderated Structural) approach (or XWITH in MPlus), the 
model was estimated in two steps in order to evaluate the goodness of fit. First, the 
model was estimated without including the latent interactions (trust-efficacy and 
fundamentalism-group) or the dashed paths (Model 1).   The analysis with maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation converged to an admissible solution.  Values of the selected 
fit indexes for this model are Akaike (AIC) = 30909.695, Chi-square or χ2 (475) = 
1093.353 with p < 0.000, RMSEA = 0.062 (fair fit), CFI = 0.912 (fair fit), and SRMR = 
0.080 (fair fit).   
The high value of Chi-square, which is not desired, may indicate that the 
hypothesized model and observed covariances are statistically difference with p < 0.000. 
However, the chi-square is overly sensitive to sample size and multivariate deviations of 
normality; in fact, the sample size of 341 in this study is relatively high, which is larger 
than 200. Therefore, this study renders the chi-square value less important for evaluation 
of model fit. Instead, this study uses RMSEA, CFI and SRMR values to evaluate the 
model; they indicate that the hypothesized model and observed covariances are about the 
same.         
Second, the full model (with the interactions or Model 2) was estimated. The 
result of the second estimation did not produce Chi-square, RMSEA and CFI. Instead it 
reported the Akaike (AIK) value to evaluate the model. The value of AIC is 30862.417. 
This value is smaller than the value in the previous model by 47.278 (30909.695 - 
30862.417).  As it is commonly accepted, the model with the smaller Akaike (AIC) is 
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considered as a better model. Therefore, the second model with interactions (Model 2) is 
better than the model without interactions (Model 1). 
 In addition, the estimations of Model 1 and Model 2 are almost similar, or their 
parameter estimates are stable in that their factor loadings, path coefficients and p-values 
are relatively the same. Those indicate that the estimations are good and consistent.  
However, Model 2 may give more precise parameter estimates than that of Model 1 
since it gives a lower AIC value. Therefore, the following interpretations and the 
hypothesis analyses are based on Model 2. 
 Model 2 shows that most observed variables measure their four latent variables 
very well. First, all the factor loadings of fundamentalism are statistically significant.  
For example, the coefficient of  Fundamentalism → Q6g (.82) can be interpreted that 
holding other variables constant, with every one unit increase in the latent variable of 
fundamentalism,  the value of Q6c will increase about .82 units, and it is statistically 
significant with p < .000.  
Second, all the factor loadings of Trust in Government are also statistically 
significant. For example, the coefficient of Trust → Q8g (1.58) tells that holding other 
variables constant, with every one unit increase in Trust, the score of Q8g will increase 
about 1.58 units.  
Third, four of five factor loadings of Efficacy (political efficacy) are statistically 
significant. Only one of them, namely item Q9d, is not statistically significant, which 
means that item Q9d is different from the other items measuring Efficacy, or it does not 
measure the latent variable of political efficacy. Lastly, all factor loadings of Violence 
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(violent attitudes) are statistically significant. For example, the coefficient of Violence 
→ Q10d (.94) tells that holding other variables constant, with one unit increase in the 
latent variable of Violence, the Q10d will increase by .94 units. It is statistically 
significant with p < .000.  
 As for the relationships between Violence (violent attitudes) and other variables, 
Model 2 shows that Fundamentalism and Fungroup are significantly associated with 
Violence. However, Trust, Efficacy and Efftrust are not significantly associated with 
Violence.  Additionally, the group differences in the latent variable of Fundamentalism, 
Trust and Violence are vary inconsistently between FPI and the moderate groups. The 
coefficients of these relationships are interpreted as follows. 
The coefficient of 1.053 (Fundamentalism → Violence) tells that, holding other 
variables constant, with every one unit increase in Fundamentalism, Violence will 
increase about 1.05 units. It is statistically significant with p < .000. The coefficient of 
1.61 (Group → Violence) tells that holding other variables constant, FPI will have a 
higher mean of about 1.61 units for Violence than that of the moderate groups. It is 
statistically significant with p < .000. The coefficient of the interaction between latent 
variable Fundamentalism and Group (or Fungroup) is statistically significant with a path 
coefficient of -.918. It cannot be directly interpreted. Therefore, the coefficient of -.918 
should be put in the formula as follows: 
Violence = bviolence.group + bviolence.fundamentslim + bviolence.fungroup 
Violence = 1.61 + 1.053 + (-0.918) 
1. For the Moderate Groups (Group = 0)  
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Violence = 1.61(0) + 1.053 - 0.918 (0)  
Violence = 1.053 
2. For FPI (Group = 1) 
Violence = 1.61(1) + 1.053 - 0.918(1)  
Violence = 1.745 
Thus, this significant interaction effect indicates that, holding other variables constant, 
the more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they are to have violent attitude. 
However, this relationship is moderated by Group, which means that FPI has steeper 
slope than that of the moderate groups (the slope for the moderate = 1.053 and FPI = 
1.74), or in other words, fundamentalism among FPI members have a stronger effect on 
violence than for the moderate group members. 
 The coefficient of .592 (Trust → Violence), .072 (Efficacy →Violence) and .183 
(Efftrust → Violence) are statistically insignificant. The first two values tell that trust in 
government (Trust) and political efficacy (Efficacy) are not associated with violent 
attitudes (Violence). Similarly, the insignificant interaction between Efficacy and Trust 
(or Efftrust) also tells that a person who has low trust in government and higher political 
efficacy is not likely to be more violent. 
 In relation to the differences between FPI and the moderate groups in the latent 
variables Fundamentalism, Trust and Efficacy, the coefficient of 1.976 (Group → 
Fundamentalism) tells that FPI tends to be more fundamentalist by about 1.976 than that 
of the moderate groups. It is statistically significant with p < .000. The coefficient of -
.036 (Group → Trust) tells that FPI is likely to have less trust in government by about 
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.036 than that of the moderate groups. It is statistically significant with p < .05. Lastly, 
the coefficient of -.003 (Group → Efficacy) tells that FPI is likely to have less political 
efficacy than that of the moderate groups by about .003 but it is statistically not 
significant. This means that FPI and the moderate groups have the same level of political 
efficacy.     
 Finally, based on this result, this Hypothesized Model (Model 2) may be 
modified by dropping the latent variables of Trust, Efficacy and their interactions (see 
Model 3). As suggested by Kline (2003) at least, there are two reasons that should be 
fulfilled for dropping variables from the model: empirical and theoretical reasons.  First, 
empirically based on the estimations in Model 1 and Model 2, the latent variable of Trust 
and Efficacy fail to explain the latent variable Violence (violent attitude). Second, 
theoretically most social movement studies suggest that social movement is about 
“collective challenges” and it is mostly about outside state institutions seeking to 
forward or halt social change. Therefore, whether or not a social movement adopts 
violent strategies, social movement actors will be likely to have a high political efficacy 
and a low trust in government.  In short, the interaction between political efficacy (high) 
and trust in government (low) may explain only the emergence of social movements, not 
the adoptions of violent strategies by social movements. The following Table 6. 7 are the 
summary of the maximum likelihood estimation of the Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3.   
 
 
 
  
108 
108 
 
Table 6.7 Maximum likelihood Parameter Estimates of the Models 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
Parameter Estimate SE 
 
Estimate SE 
 
Estimate SE 
Fundamentalism → Q6a 1a 0 
 
1a 0 
 
1a 0 
Fundamentalism → Q6b 0.79*** 0.054 
 
0.785*** 0.042 
 
0.785*** 0.043 
Fundamentalism → Q6c 0.922*** 0.089 
 
0.905*** 0.088 
 
0.896*** 0.087 
Fundamentalism → Q6d 0.822*** 0.081 
 
0.838*** 0.088 
 
0.831*** 0.087 
Fundamentalism → Q6e 0.268*** 0.054 
 
0.277*** 0.073 
 
0.271*** 0.072 
Fundamentalism → Q6f 0.308*** 0.042 
 
0.315*** 0.053 
 
0.316*** 0.053 
Fundamentalism → Q6g 0.377*** 0.049 
 
0.372*** 0.057 
 
0.375*** 0.058 
Fundamentalism → Q6h 1.117*** 0.075 
 
1.116*** 0.055 
 
1.124*** 0.056 
Fundamentalism → Q6i 0.957*** 0.071 
 
0.964*** 0.058 
 
0.968*** 0.059 
Fundamentalism → Q6j 1.14*** 0.072 
 
1.139*** 0.056 
 
1.147*** 0.057 
Fundamentalism → Q6k 0.897*** 0.078 
 
0.905*** 0.068 
 
0.91*** 0.069 
Fundamentalism → Q6l 0.793*** 0.064 
 
0.796*** 0.057 
 
0.8*** 0.057 
Fundamentalism → Q6m 0.697*** 0.065 
 
0.698*** 0.072 
 
0.702*** 0.073 
Fundamentalism → Q6n 0.967*** 0.067 
 
0.959*** 0.054 
 
0.962*** 0.054 
         Trust  → Q8a 1a 0 
 
1a 0 
 
  
Trust  → Q8b 2.809** 1.007 
 
2.613** 0.889 
 
   
Trust  → Q8c 2.998** 1.075 
 
2.78** 0.996 
 
  
Trust  → Q8d 5.053* 1.983 
 
4.63** 1.715 
 
  
Trust  → Q8e 7.114* 2.808 
 
6.54** 2.327 
 
  
Trust  → Q8f 6.9* 2.733 
 
6.287** 2.34 
 
  
Trust  → Q8g 1.567* 0.654 
 
1.441* 0.593 
 
  
         Efficacy  → Q9a 1a 0 
 
1a 0 
 
  
Efficacy  → Q9b 0.597*** 0.061 
 
0.6*** 0.072 
 
  
Efficacy  → Q9c 0.587*** 0.056 
 
0.59*** 0.06 
 
  
Efficacy  → Q9d 0.076 0.06 
 
0.078 0.076 
 
  
Efficacy  → Q9e 0.894*** 0.074 
 
0.9*** 0.085 
 
  
Efficacy  → Q9f 0.376*** 0.067 
 
0.378*** 0.078 
 
  
         Violence  → Q10a 1a 0 
 
1a 0 
 
1a 0 
Violence  → Q10b 0.983*** 0.056 
 
0.983*** 0.049 
 
0.988*** 0.046 
Violence  → Q10c 0.876*** 0.048 
 
0.873*** 0.044 
 
0.881*** 0.042 
Violence  → Q10d 0.941*** 0.047 
 
0.956*** 0.041 
 
1.007*** 0.039 
Violence  → Q10e 0.893*** 0.049 
 
0.91*** 0.052 
 
0.984*** 0.054 
Violence  → Q10f 0.849*** 0.055 
 
0.879*** 0.06 
 
1.079*** 0.047 
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Table 6.7 Continued 
Parameter 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
Estimate SE 
 
Estimate SE 
 
Estimate SE 
Fundamentalism → Violence   0.803*** 0.072 
 
1.053*** 0.095 
 
0.979*** 0.095 
Trust → Violence   -1.62 1.042 
 
0.592 0.942 
 
  
Efficacy →Violence   0.089 0.049 
 
0.072 0.058 
 
  
Fungroup → Violence   
 
-0.918*** 0.127 
 
-0.893*** 0.095 
Efftrust  → Violence   
 
0.183 0.934 
 
  
         Group → Fundamentalism  1.973*** 0.167 
 
1.976*** 0.149 
 
1.963*** 0.149 
Group → Trust  -0.032* 0.016 
 
-0.036* 0.018 
 
  
Group → Efficacy  -0.005 0.162 
 
-0.003 0.158 
 
  
Group → Violence  0.227 0.165 
 
1.61*** 0.198 
 
1.717*** 0.129 
Note. Model 1: hypothesized model without interactions, Model 2: full hypothesized model and Model 3: 
modified model. 
Fungroup is the interaction between Fundamentalism and Group; in the model, it appears in the dashed 
line. 
Efftrust is the interaction between Efficacy and Trust; in the model, it appears in the dashed line 
aNot tested for significance; *p < .05     **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)  
 
 
Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1a: The more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they are to justify 
violence. 
This hypothesis is supported by the data. There is a significant relationship 
between fundamentalism and violent attitude with a path coefficient of 1.053. This 
relationship indicates that people who are more fundamentalist are more likely to justify 
the use of violent means. 
Hypothesis 1b: FPI will likely be more fundamentalist than the moderate groups. 
 This hypothesis is supported by the data. There is a significant difference 
between FPI (coded 1) and the moderate groups (coded 0) in fundamentalism with a 
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coefficient of 1.976.  This indicates that FPI is more fundamentalist than the moderate 
groups. 
Hypothesis 1c: The relationship between fundamentalism and violence will be stronger 
for FPI than moderate groups. 
 This hypothesis is supported by the data. There is a significant interaction 
between latent variables fundamentalism and group on violence with a path coefficient 
of -.918.  Computing this number in the model, the path coefficient of fundamentalism 
on violence for the moderate groups (coded 0) is 1.053 and the path coefficient for FPI 
(coded 1) is 1.745. This indicates that FPI has a steeper slope in the relationship between 
Fundamentalism and Violence than that of the moderate groups. 
Hypothesis 2a: People who have lower trust in government will be more likely to justify 
violence. 
This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The relationship between Trust and 
Violence with a path coefficient of 0.592 is statistically not significant. This indicates 
that people with lower trust in government are not more likely to justify the use of 
violent means. 
Hypothesis 2b: People who have low trust in government but high political efficacy will 
be likely to justify violence. 
 This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The interaction effect between the 
variables Trust and Efficacy, or Efftrust, with the coefficient of .183 is statistically not 
significant. This indicates that people who have low trust in government and high 
political efficacy will not be likely to justify the use of violent means. 
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Hypothesis 2c:  FPI will be likely to have a lower trust in government than that of the 
moderate groups. 
 This hypothesis is likely supported by the data. There is a statistically significant 
difference of the conditional mean of Trust between FPI and moderate groups with the 
coefficient of -.036. This indicates that FPI will be likely to have a lower trust in 
government than that of the moderate groups. However, in reality, the difference is not 
that great. First, it is because their difference value is very small (.036 point) and the 
mean of each observed variable of Trust for both FPI and moderate groups are 
concentrated in the value between 1.4 and 1.95. This indicates both of them have very 
low trust in government (see also Table. 6.4)  
Hypothesis 2d: FPI will be likely to have higher political efficacy than that of the 
moderate groups. 
 This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The relationship between the 
observed variable Group and the latent variable Trust with the coefficient of .003 is not 
significant. This indicates that the scores of political efficacy for FPI and moderate 
groups are about the same. 
 
Conclusion  
The present study confirms that fundamentalism is associated with violence 
(Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992, 2004; Moaddel and Karabenich 2008; Rothschild et 
al. 2009; Ginges and Atran 2009). This association clearly depicts the positive 
relationship between FPI and violence.  This means that FPI activists are more 
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fundamentalist than the activists of the moderate groups (Muhammadiyah and NU). 
Therefore, they are also more prone to violent attitudes than that those moderate groups.  
However, the measurement of fundamentalism in this study is somewhat 
different from the previous quantitative studies of fundamentalism, which merely focus 
on the aspect of beliefs (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992, 2004; Moaddel and 
Karabenich 2008). The current study takes into account both aspects of belief and its 
manifestation in social and political life, which are based on the theoretical concept 
developed by Marty and Appleby (1993), Almound et al. (2003) and Frey (2007). 
On the other hand, this study does not support the argument regarding a 
relationship between trust in government and violence (Zimmermann 1983). This is 
because most of respondents have very low trust in government but at the same time 
they vary in their tendency on the use of violent means. This means that both 
respondents, who are violent (FPI) and not violent (the moderate groups), have low trust 
in government.  Even though the group comparison on the latent variable of Trust 
between FPI and the moderate groups is statistically significant, this study contends that 
they have very low trust in government. The scores of both groups are concentrated in 
the range of one (1 = never) and two (2 = rarely), where FPI scores lie in the lower range 
and the moderate groups’ score lie in the upper range (see Table 6.4). 
In short, in the context of social movements, trust does not relate to movements’ 
adoption of violence. This may be because by definition a social movement is a 
challenger of authority, and therefore, activists in social movements, whether they adopt 
violent means or not, should have low trust in government. 
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Similarly, the latent interaction between trust and political efficacy is not 
supported by the data (Kornhauser 1959; Lipset 1960; Bell 1963; Ransford 1968; 
Gamson 1968; Paige 1971).  This means that the respondents who have low trust in 
government and high political efficacy will be unlikely to justify the use of violent 
means. This may be because both FPI (the violent group) and the moderate groups have 
the same level of distrust in government and mid-levels-political efficacy (see Table 
6.5).    
 Last but not least, only the latent variable fundamentalism sheds light on FPI’s 
adoption of violent means. This indicates that types of religiosity, such as 
fundamentalism, moderation and liberalism, of the activists shape the dynamics of 
religious social movements. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE SOCIAL MECHANISM OF FPI’S VIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the pattern of FPI’s violent actions, and 
socio-political environments surrounding those actions, in order to explain FPI’s 
adoption of violent means. In doing so, this chapter examines the general picture of FPI 
collective actions, the pattern of its violent actions and the nature of its socio-political 
environment, including Islamic culture that might facilitate FPI’s violent actions.  
 
Locating FPI’s Violent Collective Actions 
 Based on the data that I collected from Antara (the state national newspaper 
agency), Kompas (the secular national newspaper), Republika (the Islamic national 
newspaper) and other newspapers from the period of 1998 to 2010, FPI collective 
actions can be divided into four types:  violence, nonviolence with physical threat, 
nonviolence with verbal threat and nonviolence. Violence consists of about 27 percent 
(64 cases) of FPI collective activities; nonviolence with physical threat consists of about 
14 percent (34 cases) of the activities; nonviolence with verbal threat consists of about 8 
percent (18 cases) of the activities; and pure nonviolence consists of about 50 percent 
(118 cases) of its collective activities, as can be seen in the following Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1 The Classification of FPI’s Collective Actions 
Types of Actions Frequency Percent 
Violence 64 27.5 
Nonviolence with Physical Threat 33 14.2 
Nonviolence with Verbal Threat 18 7.7 
Nonviolence 118 50.6 
Total 233 100 
  
 
There are some definitions that I used to categorize the above FPI collective 
actions. First, “violence” in this study means any FPI’s collective actions that 
immediately inflicted physical damage on persons and or objects, regardless of the level 
of damage. Therefore, causing a person to die or merely breaking windows and tables 
are both categorized as violence.  
Second, “nonviolence with physical threat” means any FPI’s collective actions 
that made persons or groups comply with FPI demands by using forceful means but 
without inflicting damage. For example, hundreds of FPI members with wooden sticks 
and any simple weapons came to a night club and coerced the manager to close the 
business operations during the holy month of Ramadan but without damaging the club.  
Third, “nonviolence with verbal threat” means any peaceful collective actions 
that entail an oral threat to the target groups. For example, during the protest in front of 
state offices, FPI leaders said “if the government did not order the night clubs to be 
closed during the holy Ramadan, FPI would close them with any necessary means” 
(“Judi Akan” 2005) and “if the Government did not abolish the blasphemous Ahmadiyah 
sect, FPI would sweep and expel Ahmadiyah’s followers from the land of Indonesia” 
(“Surat Terbuka” 2008).  
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Fourth, “nonviolence” means any peaceful collective actions without physical 
force and threat, such as signing petitions and conducting dialogues with authorities.  
Looking at the above four categories of FPI collective actions, two categories 
may be considered in between violence and nonviolence, namely, nonviolence with 
physical threat (33 cases) and nonviolence with verbal threat (18 cases).  Both are 
neither violent nor peaceful in nature. However, those collective actions (total: 51 cases) 
are prone to violence, in terms of their potentiality to inflict damage. Therefore, it is 
important to note that beside the 64 FPI violent actions; there are still about 51 FPI 
collective actions, which are close to violence. In most cases, the collective actions that 
used force or coercion did not result in violence because of the massive presence of 
security forces and or the targets’ compliance with the demand of FPI. In addition, many 
cases of violence were preceded by nonviolent actions that consisted of threat. Threat 
was often the implicit message for FPI’s violence. Therefore, about 51 cases of FPI 
collective actions reported by the media are prone to be violent. The adjacency of those 
two types of nonviolent actions to violence can be seen as follows. 
First, two different examples of collective actions with physical threat are can be 
seen in the case of Peta Magazine and the occupation of the provincial offices of Jakarta. 
On February 6, 2006, hundreds of FPI members of Bekasi tried to attack the office of 
Peta Magazine after its re-publication of the Muhammad cartoon, which FPI considered 
as blasphemous towards Islam. However, before they arrived in the office of Peta 
Magazine, hundreds of police officers blocked the way to the office, and none of FPI 
members could approach the office. Instead, FPI only held a demonstration condemning 
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the Peta magazine and other parties that published and re-published the Muhammad 
cartoon. In short, this action likely did not result in violence because of the massive 
protection of the police officers (“Ratusan Warga” 2006). 
Another example of the use of force is FPI’s occupation of the provincial offices 
of Jakarta. About 2,000 FPI members came to occupy the complex of provincial offices 
of Jakarta in the early morning of December 14, 1999. It was too early and only a few 
security personnel guarded the provincial office complex, so that FPI members could 
enter the area easily. They blocked and locked all gates leading to the office. A few 
hours later, about 1,000 provincial staff started to arrive in front of the office complex, 
but FPI did not let the employees enter their offices. FPI demanded a dialogue with the 
governor of Jakarta, Sutiyoso, and questioned the governor’s concern in dealing with the 
proliferation of immoral places of entertainment in Jakarta. In short, after Sutiyoso 
complied with FPI demands and promised to enforce the law towards the places of 
entertainment, FPI then opened the gates and let the provincial employees enter their 
offices. Thus, FPI left without vandalizing facilities of the offices or committing 
violence (“Kantor Gubernur” 1999). 
 Second, two different examples of nonviolent actions with verbal threat can be 
seen in the case FPI demonstration in the office of Provincial People’s Representative 
Assembly (DPRD) of Banten and the meeting of Anti-Ahmadiyah group in Banjar West 
Java. On January 3, 2002, about 200 members of FPI gathered in front of the office of 
DPRD. FPI demanded that the DPRD passed anti-immoral legislation. After having the 
dialogue with the members of DPRD Banten and receiving a promise from the DPRD to 
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follow up on FPI demands, the head of FPI’s branch of Banten then said to the DPRD 
members: “FPI will watch the works of the DPRD Banten; and by the end of this year if 
the DPRD will not enact the acts of anti-immorality, do not blame us. We, FPI, will take 
all necessary actions to stop immorality. We have done all legal procedures” (“FPI 
Unjuk”  2002). 
In another example, at the meeting of Anti Ahmadiyah Sect in Banjar, West Java, 
on February 18, 2008, one top leader of FPI said in front of thousands of people:  “if the 
government does not abolish Ahmadiyah, we will call Muslims to fight against the 
followers of Ahmadiyah, kill them wherever they live… Kill them… It is because you, 
the Ahamadiyah, hurt our beliefs. Their blood is allowed to be shed.”8 In short, even 
though this case did not result in violence, these cases were closely related to the later 
prosecutions of the Amhadiyah’s members, especially in Java. 
 During the period from August 1998 to the end of 2010, or from FPI’s 
establishment to the end of data collection in 2010, FPI’s use of violent means (including 
the use of force and threat) occurred at a stable rate. This means that FPI has continued 
to adopt violent means over this time period. The police responses to FPI’s violent 
actions and pressure from elites seem to not significantly affect how FPI used violence. 
For example, the arrest of more than 150 FPI leaders and members by the police from 
1998 to 2010 did not significantly reduce the rate of violence.  
Similarly, this can also be seen when FPI received probably the most severe 
criticism and pressure in 2008. After FPI’s attack against the interreligious community 
                                                 
8 The video of this meeting has been widely spread in internets, especially in youtube.com (see Wongnews 
2008). 
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(AKKBB) in the National Monument in July 2008, at least 60 members of FPI were 
arrested, including its two most important leaders, Habib Rizieq Syihab and Munarman. 
Many elements of the society, such as ministers, members of the People’s 
Representative Assembly, leaders of the two biggest Muslim groups (Nahdlatul Ulama 
and Muhammadiyah) and other religious activists demanded the abolition of FPI. Many 
branches of FPI were even forced to dissolve by the members of Nahdlatul Ulama. 
However, FPI continued to use violent means after 2008. 
In short, as can be seen in Figure 7.1, FPI kept using violent means and other two 
disruptive means (nonviolence with physical threat and verbal threat) during the new 
democracy of Indonesia. FPI’s use of violence, nonviolence with physical threat and 
nonviolent with verbal threat grew from the period of 1998 to 2002; it decreased in 2003 
but it then grew again from the period of 2003 to 2010. The government’s efforts to stop 
FPI’s violence did not significantly affect FPI’s use of violence. However, FPI’s number 
of collective actions declined in 2003, and I do not have enough information to explain 
why all four types of FPI actions declined in that year. 
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     : Nonviolence    : Nonviolence with Physical Threat 
    : Nonviolence with Verbal Threat : Violence 
  
Figure 7.1 FPI’s Collective Actions from 1998 to 2010 
 
 
Another way of looking at FPI’s violent actions and its other nonviolent 
collective actions can also be seen from the point view of motivation. Based on this, the 
motivations and concerns of the above 233 cases of FPI collective actions can be 
simplified into nine categories. They are morality (45.5 percent), blasphemy (13.3 
percent), anti-US and its allies (10.7 percent), brotherhood (9.4 percent), state policies 
(7.3 percent), anti-communism (5.2 percent), internal interest (4.3 percent), anti-
Christianization (2.1 percent) and demands of shari`ah or Islamic law (2.1 percent).   
In dealing with this categorization of these actions, there are several collective 
actions that might come together as multiple motivations in each action. However, for 
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the purpose of differentiating and patterning FPI’s concerns, each case of collective 
action is assigned into one category of motivation based on the most visible concerns 
reported by the media.  For example, FPI attacks on Danish Embassy and American 
Embassy in Jakarta can be considered as either “blasphemy” or “anti-US and its allies.” 
Based on the media report, the main reasons for FPI’s protests were because of the 
publication of Muhammad cartoon by the Danish newspaper and the depiction of 
Muhammad in the Supreme Court in Washington DC. Therefore, those violent actions 
are categorized under “blasphemy.” 
 A collective action falls under the category of “anti-immorality” if it relates to 
religious moral issues, such as the protest or attack on the LGBT (Lesbian Gay Bisexual 
and Transgender) community and places associated with gambling, prostitution and 
drugs. A collective action falls under “blasphemy” if it relates to the issues of blasphemy 
against Islam, such as the protest against the publication of the Muhammad cartoon by 
the Danish newspaper, Jylland-Posten, in front of the Danish Embassy of Jakarta, 
Indonesia. The action falls under the category of “anti-US and its allies” if it is 
associated with perceived anti-hegemony of the West in Islamic countries. The action 
falls under the category of “brotherhood” if it relates to the issues of victimization of 
Muslims in Indonesia or solidarity towards Indonesian Muslims, such as the rally for the 
conflict that occurred in Ambon, Moluccas that victimized thousands of Muslims. The 
action falls under the category of “state policy,” if it is aimed at supporting or rejecting 
the policy of the government, such as FPI’s rally to support the regulation of SKB Tiga 
Mentri (the Act of Three Ministers) regarding “the Act of Neighborhood’s Consent for 
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the Establishment of Places of Worship” and FPI’s protest against the plan of 
government to take blood samples and finger prints of every student in pesantren 
(Islamic boarding schools).  The action falls under the category of “internal interest” if it 
relates to the internal interests of the organization, such as demanding the police to free 
FPI leaders and taking revenge against its rival groups. The action falls under the 
category of “anti-Christianity” if it is against Christian or Catholic interests, such as 
FPI’s attack on the Catholic school of Sekolah Sang Timur in Jakarta.  Finally, the action 
falls under the category of “shari`ah demand” if it is aimed at demanding the application 
of shari`ah (Islamic Law) at the state (national or local levels) and or the re-inclusion of 
Piagam Jakarta (the Jakarta Charter) in the Indonesian constitution.  
 In addition, combining these nine categories of concerns and the four types of 
FPI’s collective action, those actions can be seen in Table 7.2.  This table shows that 
FPI’s actions are mostly dominated by religious issues, particularly the problem of 
immorality, and usually at met with violent action (see the percentage of the first line). 
For example, about 40 percent of FPI’s violence was related to the issue of anti-
immorality. 
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Table 7.2 Cross Tabulation of Frequency and Percentage of the Four Types of FPI’s 
Collective Actions and the Nine Concerns  
   Types   
Concerns Nonviolence Nonviolence 
with Verbal 
Threat 
Nonviolence  
with Physical 
Threat 
Violence Total 
Anti-immorality  40 (33.9) 10 (55.6) 17 (51.5) 39 (60.8) 106 (45.5) 
 (37.7)  (9.4)  (16)  (36.8)  (100)  
Blasphemy 16 (13.6) 1 (5.6) 2 (6.1) 12 (18.8) 31 (13.3) 
 (51.6)  (3.2)  (6.5)  (38.7)  (100)  
Anti-US and Allies 16 (13.6) 5 (27.8) 4 (12.1) 0 (0) 25 (10.7) 
 (64)  (20)  (16)  (0)  (100)  
Brotherhood 19 (16.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (4.7) 22 (9.4) 
 (86.4)  (0)  (0)  (13.6)  (100)  
State Policy 12 (10.2) 2 (11.1) 3 (9.1) 0 (0) 17 (7.3) 
 (70.6)  (11.8)  (17.6)  (0)  (100)  
Anti-communism  6 (5.1) 0 (0) 2 (6.1) 4 (6.3) 12 (5.2) 
 (50)  (0)  (16.7)  (33.3)  (100)  
Internal Interest 4 (3.4) 0 (0) 1 (3) 5 (7.8) 10 (4.3) 
 (40)  (0)  (10)  (50)  (100)  
Anti-Christianity 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (12.1) 1 (1.6) 5 (2.1) 
 (0)  (0)  (80)  (20)  (100)  
Shari`ah Demand 5 (4.2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (2.1) 
 (100)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (100)  
Total 118 (100) 18 (100) 33 (100) 64 (100) 233 (100) 
 (50.6)  (7.7)  (14.2)  (27.5)  (100)  
Notes: 
: Frequency  
: Percentage of the Nine Concerns based on the Four Types of actions 
: Percentage of the Four Types based on the Nine Concerns 
 
 
FPI’s collective action can also be viewed from the direct target or whom FPI 
wanted to meet in order to pursue its goal. For the most part, I identified the direct target 
using the type of place where the collective actions occurred and whom FPI wanted to 
talk to or with. For example, if the collective action occurred in the police office area, 
then the case will be categorized as “law enforcement;” if the action occurred in a hotel 
but the target was an LGBT community conducting a program in the hotel, then the case 
will be categorized as “socio-religious-political groups.”  From this point of view, about  
33.8 percent of FPI’s collective actions occurred in state related institutions, namely the 
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offices of the DPR-MPR, or the legislative institution (15.5) percent; the offices of the 
government, or the executive institution (9 percent); offices of law enforcement such as 
police office and judicial institutions (19.3 percent). In addition, 18 percent of collective 
actions occurred in the places of entertainment, which FPI called as the place of 
maksiyat (immorality); 20.6 percent cases occurred in and against other socio-religious-
political groups (such as the church community and the National Liberation and Union 
Party); and 6.9 percent cases occurred in the foreign embassies or consulates.   
However, in relation to FPI’s violent collective action, the targets of the actions 
are dominated by the place of entertainment and socio-religious-political groups. Almost 
all of the actions against the places of entertainment resulted in violence (33 out of 42 
cases); and the other 9 cases resulted in nonviolence but with the use of force. Similarly, 
in the case of the violence against socio-religious-political groups, about 23 cases (47 
percent) resulted in violence and 13 cases (27 percent) resulted in nonviolence with 
physical threat (see Table 7.3). This table shows that FPI’s nonviolent action is more or 
less about contentious politics. However, looking at the violence, FPI actions are more 
associated with religious domain or contentious religion. This is because both the targets 
of places of entertainment and socio-religious-political groups are related to the issues of 
religion, or something that is considered against Islam. 
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Table 7.3 Cross Tabulation of the Four Types of FPI’s Collective Actions based on 
Target Places 
 Types  
Target or 
Place of Actions  
Nonviolence Nonviolence 
with Verbal 
Threat 
Nonviolence  
with Physical 
Threat 
Violence Total 
Public 17 4 1 3 25 
DPR-MPR (Legislative) 29 4 3 0 36 
Government 16 4 1 0 21 
Law Enforcement 35 5 4 1 45 
Places of Immorality 0 0 9 33 42 
Socio_Rel_Pol Groups 11 1 13 23 48 
Foreign Embassy 10 0 2 4 16 
Total 118 18 33 64 233 
 
 
In addition to the targets, it is also important to look at the geographical areas 
where the collective actions occurred, especially in relation to violent action. More than 
half of FPI’s collective action occurred in the capital city of Jakarta, while the rest of the 
action occurred across the areas of FPI branches. Similarly, in the cases of violent action, 
many of them (34 cases) occurred in the capital city of Jakarta, 11 cases occurred in the 
cities surrounding the capital Jakarta (Bandung, Bekasi, Bogor, Depok and Tangerang), 
and the remainder (19 cases) occurred in other cities or branches of FPI, such as Ciamis, 
Cirebon, Pekalongan, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Surabaya, Jember, Pamekasan, Lampung, 
Samarinda and Singkawang.  
In summary, the data from various different newspapers used in this study show 
that the level of FPI’s engagement in violent activities seems to be very intensive. FPI 
continuously launched violent actions every year despite the social and political 
pressures to terminate FPI, such as the arrest of many FPI leaders and members and the 
massive demand of many elite figures and religious organizations to abolish FPI. FPI’s 
violence is dominated by religious issues, namely anti-immorality and blasphemy, which 
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is about 80 percent of its violent actions. Similarly, based on the target or place where 
the action took place, most of FPI’s violent actions (including nonviolence with physical 
threat) also relate to the religious domain, such as immoral places of entertainment and 
other socio religious groups, while pure nonviolence actions are related to the state 
institutions (politics).  In addition to this, even though about half of the cases of 
collective violence occurred in Jakarta, FPI violence was not dominated by the central 
committee of FPI. Violence is systematically adopted by other FPI branches across 
Indonesia, especially the violence that relates to religious issues, such as blasphemy and 
morality.  
The facts about these FPI violent activities, then, raise some questions: why does 
FPI choose to intensively engage in violence, or why does FPI continuously adopt this 
violent strategy with those above mentioned patterns? How do the social factors 
facilitate the use of violent actions?  
The following discussion then tries to answer the above questions by seeking 
similarities and differences of each pattern of violence, or by investigating the 
communalities and uniqueness of social factors of each case that led to FPI adoption of 
violence. In doing so, first, all of the violent cases are clustered into five categories 
based on the nine concerns or motivations of the actions. This categorization into five 
groups, instead of nine, is because some of the actions under concerns contain no violent 
actions, such as the categories of “State Policy” and “Shari`ah Demand.” Also, the 
“Anti-Christianity” category consists of only one incident, so this category is grouped 
with other similar group, which possesses the same pattern.  Then, the patterns of violent 
  
127 
127 
 
scenarios are investigated in each category, including the scenarios or situations 
preceding, during and following the violent actions. 
 
The Scenario of Violence Based on Brotherhood 
Among 64 cases of FPI’s violent collective action, there are only three cases that 
are categorized under “brotherhood” or Islamic brotherhood. Even though the number of 
the case is only a few, these three violent cases are important enough to get special 
attention. This is because one of those cases is the first FPI violent collective action and 
that is the only FPI violent action that caused people to die. Before discussing those 
cases, it is important to mention the concept of brotherhood in Islam in order to get 
further explanation of how this value has fueled FPI’s violence in combination with 
other social factors. 
Islamic brotherhood, or a social bond on the basis of Islam as a religion, is one of 
the common doctrines in the Muslim society. Most of Muslim organizations in 
Indonesia, such as FPI, mention the values of brotherhood as part of their organizational 
doctrines. The concept of Islamic brotherhood can be seen in the following examples of 
phrases from the Quran (the sayings of God): “The believers are a band of brother” (The 
Koran 49:10) and the Hadith (the sayings of Prophet Muhammad): “ A believer to 
another is like a building  whose different  parts enforce each other. The Prohet then 
clapsed his hands, with the fingers interlaced, while saying that (Bukhari 1981:374). 
 
FPI concept of brotherhood is often manifested as the sense of solidarity with the 
Muslim victims in Indonesia, Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan.  Therefore, the 
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manifestation of the concept of brotherhood may also have resulted in the sentiments of 
being anti-US and its allies. However, as discussed above, the concept of brotherhood in 
this study will be confined to FPI’s collective activities that relate to the solidarity of 
victimization of Muslim in Indonesia. 
 Islamic brotherhood is among the most important doctrines in the history of FPI. 
FPI was established as a reaction to the victimization of Muslims in Indonesia by 
governments and other parties that FPI claimed disrespected Islam. Interestingly, 
brotherhood was also the concept that forced FPI to be involved in violent activities. 
 From these three cases of violence under the category of “brotherhood” there are 
two different patterns. The first is in the case of the Ketapang incident (1998) and the 
Mbah Priok’s shrine incident (2004), and the second is the attack of Komnas HAM (the 
Indonesian National Commission of Human Rights).  
In the first pattern, both the Muslim group, whom FPI considered as victims, and 
its rival parties were initially in a situation where the violent conflict was occurring or 
most likely to occur. Then, FPI took part in this conflict on the grounds of defending 
their Muslim brothers. The violence seems not to have been premeditated by FPI, but 
rather it was more random acts of violence, or spontaneous reactions of FPI at the scene.  
For example, in the case of the Ketapang incident –a conflict between the 
Muslim residents of Ketapang and Ambones gangsters (the bodyguards of entertainment 
clubs around Ketapang)–, FPI took part in this conflict, and even became a central party 
in the conflict. Similarly, in the incident of Mbah Priok’s shrine, the people from the PT 
PELINDO (Indonesian Port Company) and JICT (Jakarta International Container 
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Terminal) were involved in conflict with the Muslim residents around Tanjung Priok 
concerning the ownership of the area of Mbah Priok’s shrine. PT PELINDO and JICT 
tried to take over the land around the shrine, and the Muslim residents and the 
descendents of Mbah Priok tried to defend this area. Then, FPI took part in this conflict 
by joining the Muslim residents of Tanjung Priok. 
 In the second pattern, however, the violence was more premeditated. FPI and the 
target group had been interacting for relatively long period of time. For example, in the 
case of FPI’s attack on Komnas HAM (the national commission of human rights), FPI 
had already used moderate means to protest Komnas HAM, which they considered as 
discriminating against Muslims. The violence occurred after FPI felt that their criticism 
was not acknowledged by Komnas HAM.  In order to get a clear understanding of these 
patterns, the following are the stories of these two FPI violent actions that were 
motivated by the sense of Indonesian Islamic brotherhood. 
 
Brotherhood: The Incident of Ketapang  
On November 21 and 22, 1998, the Muslim community of Ketapang 
commemorated the religious day of Islam, Isra Mi`raj, which was led by Habib Rizieq 
Syihab, the founder and leader of FPI at the mosque of Ketapang village. At the same 
time, on the evening of November 22, some residents of Ketapang were involved in 
conflict with the Ambones bodyguards of the Kino entertainment and gambling club. 
One version of the stories indicates the action was provoked by a fight for parking 
spaces in Ketapang (KPI 1998); and another version, which is more popular, suggests it 
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was because several Muslim residents of Ketapang requested that the gambling club to 
close. However, the bodyguards of the Kino club rejected their request and punched one 
of them. Some residents of Ketapang, especially the family of the person who was 
punched planned to get revenge. This situation then created tension between the 
residents of Ketapang and the bodyguards of Kino. Hearing that this conflict potentially 
could escalate, the local officials (Muspida) and some community leaders tried to 
reconcile the Ketapang residents and the bodyguards of the club. In short, both parties 
agreed to end the conflict (Forum Warga Ketapang 1998; “Aparat Diminta” 1998). 
However, several hours later approximately four hundred bodyguards, mostly 
from Ambones and Batak ethnic backgrounds who were also known Christians, 
unexpectedly attacked the village of Ketapang. They threw some stones and wooden 
sticks at the residents’ houses and a small mosque (musola). They created fear and 
anxiety for the residents of Ketapang. Two people were reported to have been critically 
injured. According to the reports of Ketapang Forum, some of those Ambonese 
bodyguards said: “Where are the people of Betawi (the indigenous people of Jakarta) 
and Muslims? We will destroy them.”  A bodyguard, who was captured by the residents 
of Ketapang, told that the four hundred bodyguards were ordered by the owner of the 
gambling club to attack the residents of Ketapang (Forum Warga Ketapang 1998). 
The news of the attacks, along with the rumors, spread quickly in the Muslim 
communities around the capital city of Jakarta. Some of the triggering rumors were that 
the “Christian Ambones” gang burned one mosque in Ketapang and killed one ulama 
(Muslim leader) using a sword. Within hours, thousands of people, from around the 
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Jakarta city (Tambora and Tanjung Priok) including FPI members, brought simple 
weapons and gathered in Ketapang. They gathered with the Muslim residents of 
Ketapang and FPI members, who were celebrating the commemoration of the Isra  
Mi`raj.  According to Syihab (2008), FPI leader, there were at least 300 members of FPI 
that were ready to fight back against the Ambones bodyguards. 
Thousands of people then came to the Kino gambling club and other clubs. At 
the beginning, they only attacked and burned two of them. The fire from those two 
buildings spread burning a church that was located near the burning gambling clubs. 
Hundreds of the bodyguards and the workers of the clubs were trapped in those 
buildings.  Six or seven people died because of breathing carbon dioxide and/or being 
burned by the fire.  Ambones bodyguards who could escape the fire were trapped in the 
middle of the crowd and became the target of an angry mob. Syihab, a FPI leader, 
argued that his members, along with the people of Ketapang, and the Ambones 
bodyguards attacked each other. The military commander of Jakarta was injured by the 
sword of an Ambones bodyguard. However, FPI members were able to repel the 
bodyguards and kill 15 of them.  
Syihab along with 19 ulama (Muslim leaders) came into the middle of the crowd. 
They tried to control the crowd and negotiated with the military and police commanders 
in the field. They requested that all the remaining bodyguards be saved and arrested by 
the police and/or the army. However, they felt that their request was ignored. Therefore, 
some of those leaders left the scene conflict.  
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Consequently, the angry crowd got out of control. They burned the Kristus and 
Pantekosta churches. After that, the crowd was divided into two groups in order to find 
the remaining Ambones gang members left in the area. They also attacked churches, a 
Catholic school, any places of entertainment and business offices they encountered.  
The extended attack on churches and Catholic schools may be because the idea 
of the conflict had spread from merely Muslim residents of Ketapang versus Ambones 
bodyguards of the Kino club into Muslims versus Christians. The logic from the Muslim 
side was that the bodyguards were Ambones, and the Ambones were Christians. 
Therefore, something related to Christianity also became the target of FPI and the 
Muslim crowd.  
The presence of the police and army could not stop the angry crowd. They 
localized the chaos by blocking off the location of conflict, so that it would not spread. 
The conflict started to decrease after the Air Force sent its special squads to the location 
of conflict. However, the crowd had devastated most of the business places and churches 
in Ketapang. The Department of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia reported that the 
incident in Ketapang caused the death of 16 persons; all of them are the bodyguards. In 
addition, 81 people from both Muslim and Ambones parties were critically injured, 427 
people from both sides were injured, one mosque was destroyed, 16 churches were 
burned or damaged, three Christian/Catholic schools were burned, 15 bank offices were 
damaged, seven houses were damaged, 32 cars and trucks were burned, three 
motorcycles were damaged, one gas station was destroyed, six government buildings 
were damaged and one local army office building was damaged.  
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After the incident the police captured 187 people from both sides. However, only 
28 of them were processed by the court, while the others were released due to the lack of 
evidence (Forum Warga Ketapang 1998; “Aparat Diminta” 1998; SiaR 1998). 
 This story implies that the Ketapang incident was not the intended product of 
FPI. The conflict between the residents of Ketapang and the Kino entertainment forced 
FPI to get involved in the intense conflict. This was because from FPI’s point of view, 
the conflict appeared in a fight between Muslims of Ketapang and the bodyguards of 
immoral places. At the onset, the Muslims of Ketapang were considered the victims of 
the Ambones bodyguards. Therefore, the value of Islamic brotherhood had led FPI’s 
leaders to sent about three hundred members to help their Muslim brothers of Ketapang 
to deal with the Christian bodyguards. Finally, this conflict turned into bloody incident 
that killed 16 people and caused massive damages around the Ketapang area. 
In addition, the quick reaction of FPI was because during the initial days of the 
incident, FPI and the Muslim residents of Ketapang were gathering to celebrate the day 
of Isra’ Mi`raj. This means that they were having intensive contact and emotional 
bonding during the days of the conflict. Therefore, when the rumors of victimization of 
Muslims in Ketapang, or the burned mosque by Ambones bodyguards spread, FPI 
members became the target of the rumors. In turn, they could be mobilized quickly; they 
also could spread the rumors to the Muslim communities around Ketapang, Jakarta. 
Therefore, soon after the conflict began, thousands of Muslim sympathizers, including 
other FPI members, came to Ketapang.   
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The presence of another thousand Muslims from around the capital city of 
Jakarta might also be perceived by FPI as considerable support from the Muslim 
community in Jakarta toward FPI’s involvement in the conflict. In addition, the response 
of military and police institution, which did not fully enforce the law during the incident 
of Ketapang or preferred more conciliatory social approach to deal with the problem, 
gave significant incentives to FPI about their tendencies towards violence in the future. 
In short, these all might lead to FPI’s perception that its involvement in the bloody 
Ketapang incident was justified by either government or society. Therefore, FPI leaders, 
such as Syihab, proudly argued that their members along with the Residents of Ketapang 
killed several Ambones bodyguards (Syihab 2008).  
 
Brotherhood: The Attack on Komnas HAM (the National Commission of Human Rights) 
A different pattern of FPI’s violent action can be seen in its attack on the office 
of the National Committee of Human Rights, or Komnas HAM. On January 10, 2000, 
about 200 members of FPI conducted a nonviolent protest in front of the office of 
Komnas HAM. They yelled at Komnas HAM and carried some posters condemning this 
top national commission of human rights in Indonesia.    
FPI demanded that Komnas HAM be abolished. Some FPI representatives, 
including Hafidz Lukman and Alawi, met the vice chief of Komnas HAM, Djoko 
Soegianto, and his staff member, Soegiri. FPI addressed several questions: 1) why did 
Komnas HAM ignore human rights violations of Muslims, such as in the cases of the 
Muslim-Christian conflicts in Ambon, the massacre of Tanjung Priok and the military 
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operation in Aceh? 2) Why did Komnas HAM only focuse on the human rights abuse in 
the case of East Timor, and why did they only suspect the Muslim top military generals? 
In short, FPI argued that Komnas HAM discriminated against Muslims. FPI also 
demanded that five members of Komnas HAM to be removed, namely: Munir, Asmara 
Nababan, T Mulya Lubis, Alber Hasibuan and BN Marbun on the grounds that they 
were the sources of the problem (“FPI Minta” 2000). 
 At that time, FPI was not the only group that criticized Komnas HAM.  The 
Islamic political party, PBB (the Party of Moon and Star) also endorsed the demands of 
FPI. In their press release and dialogue with FPI, four elite politicians of PBB, Ahmad 
Sumargono, Hamdan Zoelva, Amanullah and Mawardi Abdullah, argued that Komnas 
HAM discriminated against the interests of Muslim ummah and was not responsive 
towards human rights violations that victimized Muslims.  Ahmad Sumargono argued 
that the reorganization of Komnas HAM, as demanded by FPI, was urgently needed 
(“FPI Minta” 2000; “Menanti Sang” 2000; “Front Pembela” 2000).  
 Similarly, the Forum of Muslim Brotherhood of MUI (Indonesian Muslim 
Scholars’ Council or Majlis Ulama Indoneisa) also supported FPI cause. In their official 
statements on January 12, 2000, they also demanded the abolition of Komnas HAM and 
NGOs that were proved to be using double standards in dealing with law enforcement. In 
short, in protesting Komnas HAM, FPI received considerable support from several 
important political and social groups, such as from the Islamic political party of PBB and 
MUI, the official Muslim organization funded by the government (“Front Pembela” 
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2000). Until early 2000, FPI still used moderate strategies in dealing with their hatred 
against Komnas HAM.  
However, on June 23, 2000, FPI members’ anger turned into violence after 
Komnas HAM reported the massacre of Muslims in Tanjung Priok by the army on 
September 12, 1984. On June 2000, Komnas HAM reported its investigation that the 
number of casualties was 23 people and put the blame on the people of Tanjung Priok 
for this incident.  Most of the non-government reports estimated that the total death 
casualties in this tragedy were in the hundreds. For example, the report of Lembaran 
Putih (the White Book’s report), a source that is believed by some of FPI leaders, 
mentions that the deaths were about 400 to 500 hundred people (PSPI Partai Bulan 
Bintang 1998; Syihab 2008).9  
Yet, on June 23, 2000, about 300 people with white and green shirts, typical of 
FPI uniforms, conspicuously attacked Komnas HAM’s office in Jakarta.  In broad 
daylight they threw some stones into the office and damaged some office facilities. 
Consequently, some windows, doors and the booth of the security office were damaged. 
The police could not stop the large number of angry people of FPI members from 
causing destruction in the office of Komnas HAM.  
                                                 
9 Komnas HAM’s report was almost the same as that of military government in 1984. At that time, the 
General Army LB. Moerdani reported that the death victims were less than 20 people. Up to day, there is 
no clear estimation about the casualties of the Tanjung Priok massacre. People believe that the New Order 
government or the army lied about the tragedy and also still hide the information about where they buried 
the Muslim casualties of Tanjung Priok.  The tragedy of Tanjung Priok also has stimulated a religious 
sentiment because the incumbent general army, LB Moerdani was Christian. Some Muslims believe that 
Mordani was a bloody Christian who was intolerant against Muslims’ interest. So, sometimes the 
discourse of Tanjung Priok appears as a conflict between Muslim groups sympathizing for the Muslim 
victims and the Christian, LB. Moerdani.   
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While attacking the facilities of Komnas HAM’s office, some people wrote 
graffiti in the office buildings condemning Komnas HAM. Others made orations in the 
front of the office and distributed flyers. In these flyers, FPI members mentioned the 
reasons why Komnas HAM should be abolished. These included 1) Komnas HAM 
discriminated against the interests of Muslim society, 2) betrayed the truth about the 
incident of Tanjung Priok, 3) ignored the prosecution of Muslims in Moluccas and 
Posso, and 4) finally had been contaminated by the idea of the Christian general, LB 
Moerdani. Similarly, in their orations, FPI leaders criticized the works of Komnas HAM 
and demanded its abolishment. For example, Alwi Utsman  said: “How could Komnas 
mention only 23 people died without digging the tomb” (“FPI Mengamuk” 2000).  
This disruptive action finally stopped after two members of Komnas HAM, 
Benyamin Mangkoedilaga and Soegiri met with FPI protestors. Benjamin than stood up 
on the car and talked to this group stating that he personally agreed with FPI’s demand 
that Komnas HAM should be abolished; and he promised to pass these demands to the 
executive head of Komnas HAM. After that, FPI members left Komnas HAM. However, 
on the way home they passed some cafes and nightclubs. They broke many 
advertisements for beer and threw stones into the cafes. The places that FPI attacked 
were New Cafe, Kafe Salsa, Warung Kemang and Cafe Jimbani; all of them are located 
in the capital city of Jakarta. However, none of these cafes’ personnel fought back with 
the angry FPI demonstrators and therefore none of these attacks caused casualties. 
Soon after the attacks, much criticism began to flow from the state apparatus, 
politicians, and religious leaders regarding the collective violent action by FPI. 
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However, this does not mean that FPI stood alone in justifying its violence against 
Komnas HAM, as can be seen in the Kompas’s interviews with some activists of 
religious student associations, such as the HMI (Association of Islamic College Student), 
the PII (Association of Islamic High School Student), the PMKRI (Association of the 
Catholic College Student of the Republic of Indonesia) and PMII (Association of the 
Indonesian Islamic College Students). The student activists from these groups generally 
disagreed with the violent mean used by FPI. However, they supported FPI’s demands 
by showing that they understood the reasons why FPI attacked Komnas HAM. 
Therefore, instead of criticizing FPI, they tended to criticize the work of Komnas HAM 
which they considered unjust and unprofessional.   For example, the general secretary of 
HMI argued that the report by Komnas HAM did not reflect justice at all and it hurt the 
victim families. Djayadi Hanan (PII) argued that the violence was a spontaneous because 
of Komnas HAM’s failures. Facruddin (HMI) argued that FPI could not be totally 
blamed because the substance of the problem was that the public did not receive justice 
from the top national human rights institutions in Indonesia. He also argued that as long 
as the law had not been changed, there was still need to resort to mass mobilization to 
remind the government that it needed to change the law (“Budaya Kekerasan” 2000). 
 Another interesting response came from Munir, the head of KONTRAS (the 
Commission for the Missing Person and the Victim of Violence). Munir was one of the 
well-known human right activists in Indonesia. He suggested that Komnas HAM recant 
their report about Tanjung Priok.  He found that there were too many fundamental 
mistakes in the report. For example, Komnas HAM did not refer to the convention of 
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human rights violations engaged in by the state. This indicated that the investigators of 
Komnas HAM did not understand the concept of human rights. These mistakes finally 
led to the fatal conclusion that the violation of human rights in Tanjung Priok was 
perpetrated by the civilians. Even though, Munir’s arguments did not directly support 
FPI, FPI received leverage through Munir’s harsh criticism of the top national human 
rights commission of Indonesia (“Komnas HAM” 2000). 
 In short, this scenario regarding the attacks against Komnas HAM tells of two 
important factors that may help to explain FPI’s adoption of violent means. First, the 
violent action during the protest resulted from the failure of communication between FPI 
and Komnas HAM. Second, FPI had received considerable support in fighting against 
Komnas HAM. This may be because FPI was in a position of sharing the same opinions 
of many members of society, especially in the case of the Tanjung Priok incident. This 
second factor might also continue to give FPI the leverage and confidence to adopt 
violent means. 
  
The Scenario of Violence Based on Anti-Immorality 
FPI is committed to issues of anti-immorality. Its organizational documents 
mention repeatedly the importance of enforcing Islamic moral values (Syihab 2008). 
Since its early years, FPI has campaigned for Gerakan Nasional Anti Maksiyat (the 
national movement of anti-immorality). FPI’s commitment to moral issues can also be 
seen in Table 7.2. It shows that within the four types of FPI’s collective actions 
(nonviolence, nonviolence with verbal threat, nonviolence with physical threat and 
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violence) anti-immorality related actions dominate FPI’s collective actions. In the case 
of violent actions, about 61 percent (39 out of 64) are categorized as “anti-immorality.”  
In general, there are two slightly different patterns of these actions under the 
category of anti-immorality. In the first pattern the targets were identified by FPI before 
action was taken. In most cases, FPI members investigated their targets before they 
attacked them in order to make sure that those places obviously violated the law or 
religious values (Syihab 2008).  These targets include, for example, the attack on houses 
of prostitution in Salembaranjati (2000) and Cipendawa Bekasi (2009), Sahabat 
discotheque (2001), MMI or Magnum Metropolitan Indonesia (2004), the office of 
Playboy magazine (2006), Mrs. Man Contest by LGBT community in Depok (2010), 
and the statues of Three Female Dancers (Tiga Mojang) in Bekasi (2010). The primary 
goal of the actions was to enforce the values of morality on these targets.  
In the second pattern, the targets were usually less specific. FPI members 
seemingly did not investigate their victims before they took the action. These targets 
were more or less random victims. However, this does not mean that the violence was 
random, because during these actions FPI members always brought simple weapons, 
such as wooden sticks. So, there might have been some expectation of FPI members that 
they would use violent means.  
FPI’s attacks were usually a consequence of its collective activities that entailed 
potential violence. This had potential for violence because FPI participants always 
engaged in confrontation with security guards of the entertainment facilities. FPI called 
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these actions as the “safari of anti-maksiyat or campaign of anti-immorality” targeting 
hotels, nightclubs, bars and places of prostitution in the city or town.  
The victims of actions were usually not a single group or place. During one 
night, FPI might attack two or three places of entertainment. In addition, FPI randomly 
selected the places that could be considered as immoral, contaminating the holy day or 
month of Islam and/or violating the laws. For example, these included the campaigns of 
anti-immorality in the capital city of Jakarta (2000), Lampung (2001), Pamekasan 
Madura (2001), Bandung (2002), Cirebon (2007), Samarinda (2007) and Surakarta 
(2009).  
Despite the above differences, there are some general patterns of the scenario of 
the violent actions under “anti-immorality.” First, FPI was more active and aggressive 
than the target groups. For example, FPI came to a night club, forced the workers or their 
employer to close the club and then damaged the club’s facilities.  
Second, FPI engaged in damaging facilities, buildings and other material things. 
FPI did not attack persons but often created fear among the guests of the target group or 
place. For example, when FPI attacked entertainment clubs, they usually brought simple 
weapons, such as wooden sticks, and forced the guests to leave the club while damaging 
club facilities.  
Third, in most cases, FPI often sent letters of reminder or threat to the officials 
and/or the target groups. Fourth, interestingly, the timing of the actions were usually 
during the Islamic holy days, such as Ramadan, Isra Mi`ra (Muhammad’s travel and 
meeting with God), Maulid Nabi (Muhammad’s birthday) and Islamic New Year. This is 
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very similar to other cases of religious violence which typically take place during the 
special or sacred days of the group. 
Juergensmeyer (2003) argues that many incidents of religious violence have 
occurred in a special holy time. According to him, religious violence is a “performance 
or theater.” Therefore, timing (in addition to location) is an important element in the 
ritual of religious violence. The date or season or hour of day the religious violence took 
place has a symbolic meaning and importance. For example, the case of a Jewish attack 
on Muslims in Hebron by Goldstein during the day of Ramadan and the Jewish 
celebration of vengeance against Amalek did signify a symbolic meaning.  
Based on the Juergensmeyer’s study, the case of violence under “anti-
immorality,” might be interpreted in the same way. FPI may intend to deliver a symbolic 
meaning and a message on these sacred days. For example, FPI wanted for Muslims to 
return to their Islamic traditions and sent the message to the owner of entertainment 
clubs and brothels not to debase Ramadan or any other sacred days of Islam.  
However, this interpretation may not be true in the case of FPI violence. Looking 
at the stories or scenarios of FPI’s violent actions, the timing of the violence may imply 
more about the strategy of mobilization rather its symbolic meanings and messages. The 
logic of this can be explained as follows.   
In Indonesia, the sacred days of Islam are often acknowledged by the state. Most 
of the sacred days in Islam are also the official state holidays, such the day of Isra’ 
Mi`raj and  Muharram (Islamic New Year).  Many institutions in Indonesia often give 
additional holidays during the early days of Ramadan and allow the employees to leave 
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work early during the days of Ramadan. Therefore, generally Muslims have more free 
time during the Islamic holy days, which are also the state holidays. Many Islamic 
organizations often also take advantages of these special holidays as time for 
coordination, such as by conducting meeting or outreach events while celebrating the 
Islamic traditions.  
In addition, more Muslims usually go to, stay in, and even pass time in the 
mosque during sacred days of Islam, especially during the month of Ramadan; and at the 
same time, mosques often become a central location for the activities of Muslim 
organizations. In short, religious holy days are the time for Muslims to gather, meet each 
other and celebrate those days, and these are useful times to engage in organizing.  
Considering the facts regarding the Islamic sacred days in Indonesia, the timing 
of violence may consist more of availability of social resources for the movement to 
mobilize. Religious sacred days made it possible for FPI to gather hundreds to thousands 
members, and then launched its campaign of anti-immorality. These huge numbers of 
participants also made FPI actions, which were prone to violence, change into a real 
violence.  
To get a better understanding of this type of violence and how FPI adopted 
violent means in dealing with issues of anti-immorality, the following are some 
examples of the above scenarios. 
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Anti-Immorality: The Attacks on Specific Targets  
On August 21, 2002, about three hundred FPI members, along with the people of 
PT Jakarta Pertindo (JP) Corporation, came to the nightclub complex of Lucky Star 
around 6: 00 pm. Lucky Star was allegedly used not only for serving alcoholic 
beverages, but also for gambling and prostitutions. They forced the guests of Lucky Star 
to leave the club. After that, several heavy machines, such as backhoes, destroyed the 
main building of Lucky Star, while hundreds of FPI’s people were trying to destroy 
other buildings and club facilities, such as lamps, sound systems, windows, alcoholic 
beverages and glasses. Consequently, in only a couple of hours, buildings at the front of 
the complex were completely torn down and others were greatly damaged. 
 The JP (Jakarta Pertindo) is a corporation that belongs to the provincial 
government of Jakarta. The JP took part in this action because they wanted to take over 
the property of the provincial government that was being used by Lucky Star. Before this 
action, a staff member of the JP argued the JP requested that the manager of Lucky Star 
remove its businesses from the JP properties. However, Lucky Star did not respond to it. 
Therefore, the JP, in cooperation with FPI, used necessary violent means to take back the 
properties of the state.   
 One of FPI activists said that the JP staff came to FPI’s office asking help from 
FPI to retake the land occupied by Lucky Star management. Afterwards, JP provided 
transportation for FPI to come to Lucky Star club. However, FPI leaders, such as Alawi, 
rejected the information that this action was funded by the JP. Instead, the attack was a 
pure action to fight against immorality. Alawi also said that Lucky Star was built on the 
  
145 
145 
 
state property; and therefore, it should be used for the betterment of the people of 
Jakarta, not to intoxicate them with immoral activities, such as prostitution and drinking 
alcohol.  Similarly, the manager of public relations of the JP Corporation claimed that JP 
did not utilize FPI to attack Lucky Star (“PT Jakpro” 2002; “Masa Hancurkan” 2002). 
Similar action against a specific target group can also be seen in FPI’s attack on 
illegal prostitution in Cipendawa Rawalumbu Bekasi. On May 2, 2009, hundreds of FPI 
members, dominated by women, forced the closing of an illegal prostitution facility in 
the middle of the residential areas of Cipendawa Rawalumbu. They attacked the houses 
and small restaurants that they suspected to being used for prostitution and gambling. 
They damaged alcohol containers and pornographic VCDs. Again, FPI did not attack 
persons.  
Idris Abdul Rahman, a local FPI leader, argued that this action had to be taken 
because the government failed to respond FPI request for government action. FPI tried to 
start a dialogue with the local government to deal with the problem of prostitution in 
residential areas. However, Rahman argued that the dialogue did not solve the problem 
because the government was too weak. Therefore, FPI, along with the Muslim 
communities around Rawalumbu, initiated action to close this illegal prostitution 
(“Ratusan Warga” 2009). 
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Anti-Immorality: The Safari of Anti-Maksiyat 
On June 14, 2000 (Maulid or the Birthday of Muhammad) about a thousand FPI 
members rallied across the capital city of Jakarta.  They called this the Safari of Anti 
Maksiyat (the campaign of anti-immorality). Wearing white clothes with the green letter 
“FPI: Front Pembela Islam,” they rode trucks, busses and motorcycles to police some 
places that they accused to be the places of immorality. The Safari started at 11:00 pm 
and ended at 4:00 am the next day. They mostly traveled around areas of the capital city 
of Jakarta, such as Blora, Lokasari, Mangga Besar, Kota, Monas and Tanah Abang. 
Some police guarded the rally and followed FPI group from behind. 
On that day, most of the night clubs, karaoke clubs, bars and other places of 
entertainment were closed because they had heard about FPI plan’s to sweep these 
entertainment places. Many clubs were still guarded by private security groups and 
young people from the surrounding clubs. Most of them had already prepared with 
wooden sticks, swords, stones and many simple weapons to welcome FPI (“Seribu 
Anggota” 2000; “Jakarta Terbebas” 2000; “FPI Lampung” 2000).  
FPI members stopped in many places or clubs of entertainment around Jakarta. 
They often used force to enter the clubs. They took all the alcoholic beverages they 
found, yelled and asked people to stop and refrain from immoral deeds, such as drinking 
alcoholic beverages, gambling and dealing with prostitutes. However, not all of the 
private security guards of the clubs complied with the demands of FPI; some of them 
insisted on preventing FPI members from entering their clubs. Therefore, the encounter 
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between FPI and private body guards often inflamed the tensions between them. 
However, on this particular day the tensions did not result in physical conflicts. 
A similar story occurred for FPI’s branch in Samarinda. On September 29, 2007 
(the month of Ramadan) between hundreds and thousands of FPI members of Samarinda 
rallied across the city. They targeted city parks, hotels, motels, bars and other places of 
entertainment. In the street they spoke using loud speakers, requesting people to honor 
the Ramadan and keep the holiness of the month. The rally, which was guarded by 
police, was initially peaceful. However, when FPI members found a group of people 
having an alcoholic drinking party, FPI members got out of control. Many people then 
got off the cars and motorcycles; and then they attacked the people having party, such as, 
by destroying the tent used for the party and punching some of those party attendees who 
appeared drunk.  The head of the police district of Samarinda was also accidently hit by 
a FPI member when he tried to rescue a victim. FPI members left after they flattened the 
tires of motorcycles and cars of the party attendees. They continued the campaign of 
anti-immorality across the city of Samarinda. An FPI leader from Samarinda argued that 
this FPI collective action was intended as a reminder for the people of Samarinda to 
appreciate the holy month of Ramadan. He also argued: “FPI did not intend to do 
violence but because we, FPI, saw the immorality and we had to stop them” (“Konvoi 
Ratusan” 2007).  
A similar story occurred in the town of Cirebon, West Java. On September 8, 
2007, hundreds of FPI members rallied across the city of Cirebon, demanding all places 
of entertainment and prostitution to be closed. They mostly stopped at every hotel and 
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place of entertainment they encountered, such as in the Apita Hotel, Kharisma Hotel, 
Atlanta Pub, and Ayano Karoke. Some of them spoke outside the buildings using a 
sound system in a car to force the owners of the places of entertainment to close their 
places during Ramadan, otherwise they would use any means to close them. No violence 
occurred until they passed the central bus station of Cirebon, where they found two 
prostitutes with their customers.  They then came into the place, and broke broke 
windows and alcoholic containers. Then, they continued the rally across the town of 
Cirebon (“Massa FPI” 2007). 
In short, in comparison to the scenario of the effort against anti-immorality, the 
scenario of violence against the specific immoral places is only slightly different. The 
only difference between them is that the former involved more random targets and the 
latter involved more specific targets. Neither involved random acts of violence; they still 
can be categorized as premeditated violence. In addition, the types of the targets are the 
same, namely the places FPI considers as immoral, such as night clubs, bars, 
discotheques, gambling clubs, brothels and other places of immoral entertainment.   
  
The Scenario of Violence Based on Blasphemy 
 After anti-immorality, blasphemy is another important reason used by FPI to 
justify its violent collective actions.  Similar to concept of blasphemy in other religions 
or religious groups, for FPI activists, blasphemy is understood as any actions insulting 
the fundamental beliefs of Islam, including any actions of a person who claims to be a 
Muslim but disagree with the fundamental tenets of Islam, such as rejecting the belief of 
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Muhammad as the last prophet and believing that the five-time-prayer can be performed 
in languages other than Arabic. 
 On the basis of this concept, FPI defines its concept of tolerance and pluralism. 
Tolerance means mutual respect among different thoughts or religions, but without 
sacrificing the fundamental beliefs of Islam.  Therefore, FPI is against the Ahamdiyah 
sect because Ahmadiyah followers consider themselves as Muslim but believe that 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet. In fact, one of the basic tenets in Islam is a belief 
that there is no prophet after Muhammad. Therefore, tolerating the existence of 
Ahmadiyah sect in Indonesia can also be meant sacrificing one of the most fundamental 
beliefs of Islam (Syihab 2008). This concept of blasphemy suggests that FPI wants to 
indicate that its actions against blasphemy do not necessarily mean that FPI does not 
uphold the values of tolerance or mutual respect.  
 Among the 31 cases of FPI’s collective actions under “blasphemy,” 12 cases 
(38.7 percent) are violent (see Table 7.2), while in comparison to the total number of 
violent actions (64 cases), 12 cases of them (18.8 percent) are under the category of 
blasphemy.  Among these 12 cases: three cases are associated with Ahmadiyah; three 
cases relate to the publication of the Muhammad cartoon by the Danish newspaper, 
Jylland-Posten; two cases relate to the depiction of Muhammad at the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Washington DC; and the other 5 cases relate to the Islamic religious 
cults, such as the Wahidiyah in Tasikmalaya (2007), Nurul Yakin in Tangerang (2007), 
Sapta Darma in Yogyakarta (2008) and ar-Raudhah in Jakarta (2009).   
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 For the most part, the pattern of these violent cases is the same as the pattern of 
violent actions under the category of brotherhood and anti-immorality, in which the 
targets were identified and the violence was semi-premeditated. There were some 
expectations from FPI participants that they would probably use violent means. This was 
because during these actions, FPI members usually brought simple weapons, at least the 
wooden sticks.  However, there was a case that appeared to be random violence, namely 
the conflict between FPI and AKKBB (Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama 
dan Berkeyakinan or the Nationalist Alien for Freedom of Belief and Religon). In order 
to get a better understanding of these patterns of FPI’s violent actions under the category 
of “blasphemy,” the following are some examples from the stories. 
 
Blasphemy: Muhammad Cartoon and Sculpture 
 On September 30, 2005, the Danish Newspaper Jyllands-Posten published a 
controversial cartoon of Muhammad. Periodically this publication had aroused anger 
among Muslim groups around the world and especially in predominantly Muslim 
countries, as Muslims believe that drawing a picture of Muhammad is forbidden. 
Moreover, those cartoons tended to insult Muhammad, one of the most sacred profiles in 
Islamic beliefs. This cartoon, therefore, was considered as blasphemous. Several months 
later, the news about the Muhammad cartoon widely spread across Indonesia. Many 
Muslim organizations protested against this publication. Most of them used various 
kinds of nonviolence means, such as holding nonviolent rallies or protests and making 
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petitions against the Jyllands-Posten and the Danish government, and only few of them 
used light violent actions and force, such as in the following actions of FPI. 
 On February 3, 2006, hundreds of FPI members, along with other 
organizations, rallied in front of the Danish embassy in Jakarta. They protested against 
the publication of Muhammad cartoon in the Jyllands-Posten and its re-publication in 
other newspapers in France, Norway and especially in the newspapers of Rakyat 
Merdeka Indonesia.  FPI condemned the publication and republication of the 
Muhammad cartoon. They also requested that the Danish Government be responsible for 
the blasphemy and ask the Jyllands-Posten to make an apology to Muslims. One of FPI 
speakers argued that this blasphemy could no longer be tolerated; this was not the first 
time, the West tried to insult Islam. FPI members, along with others in the crowds, 
approached the balcony of the Danish embassy. However, the security forces were able 
to move them away from the embassy. In response, many FPI members threw stones and 
rotten eggs at the embassy (“FPI Menyusul” 2006).  
 Three days after that, or on February 6, 2006, hundreds of FPI’s members of 
East Java protested against the publication of the Muhammad cartoon in front of the 
Danish Consulate of Surabaya, the capital city of East Java Province. About ten FPI 
representatives were allowed to talk with the staff of Danish Embassy. However, 
because they were disappointed with the dialogue, some of them tried to damage the 
Danish consulate. Whereas other FPI members outside the Danish consulate threw 
stones, rotten tomatoes and rotten eggs at the Danish consulate, and thus caused some 
damage and foul odors around the building of the Danish consulate.  
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 Subsequently, they rallied at the US consulate of Surabaya, which is not very 
far from the Danish consulate. Apparently, the issue of the Muhammad cartoon revived 
the issue of the Muhammad sculpture on the US Supreme Court building. Even though 
the depiction of Muhammad was intended to honor him as a prominent lawgiver in 
history, FPI considered the depiction of Muhammad as an insult to Islam. FPI members 
forced their way to the US consulate. However, the police halted them.  FPI protesters 
then attacked these police officers and the US consulate. A small police station was 
damaged and the US state symbol in the front of the embassy was broken. In addition, 
two police officers were seriously injured and brought to the nearby hospital. The police 
then fought back against FPI. The protest finally was dissolved by the police. Six FPI 
activists were arrested. Two of them were FPI leaders, Ali al-Habsyi and Alwi al-
Habsyi.  Ali argued that he was not afraid of being investigated by the police because his 
actions were about enforcing the law of God not the law of the state (“Unjuk Rasa” 
2006; “Konsulat Kehormatan” 2006). 
 Several days later, on February 19, 2006, hundreds of  FPI members protested 
in front of the US embassy in Jakarta. They condemned the depiction of Muhammad in 
the Supreme Court building, and especially the depiction of Muhammad holding the  
Qur`an in his left hand and a sword on his right hand, which implied that Muhammad is 
a man of war rather than a man of peace. They also requested that the depiction of 
Moses in the floor of the Supreme Court be erased. A large number of police officers 
guarded the area of the US embassy so that FPI could not approach the area.  However, 
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FPI protestors were able to approach one of the embassy gates and damaged the area 
around the gate. They also threw stones and pavement blocks at the embassy.  
 Responding this attack on the US consulate and embassy, the US government 
urged the Indonesian government to deal with FPI demonstrators. A US Congressman 
who was visiting Indonesia reminded the Indonesian government should compensate the 
damaged in the US embassy. An Indonesian Police Chief, General Sutanto responded by 
saying that the police would take legal action against those FPI members that attacked 
the US embassy (“Ratusan Anggota” 2006; “FPI Lempari” 2006). 
  
Blasphemy: the Attack on AKKBB  
 The following scenario describes FPI attack on AKKBB (Aliansi Kebangsaan 
untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan or the Nationalist Alliance for Freedom 
of Belief and Religion), which appeared to be random act of violence. However, it is 
worthwhile to describe AKKBB and context behind this conflict.  
 The formation of AKKBB was initiated by several activists of socio and religious 
organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, interfaith NGOs, church communities, and 
other religious organizations.  The establishment of AKKBB was intended to help the 
minority group that often become the target of violence, especially Ahmadiyah sect.  At 
the beginning there was no previous conflict between FPI and AKKBB.  The conflict 
suddenly occurred in June 1, 2008, as explained below.   
  The Juni 1st is the Indonesian commemoration day for the birth of Pancasila, the 
state ideology. Many social organizations usually use that moment to voice their 
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concerns while celebrate day of the birth of Pancasila. On June 1, 2008, at least four 
organizations were demonstrating around two nearby strategic places: the Monas 
(National Monument) and the Presidential Palace. These organizations were FPI, HTI 
(Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), PDIP (Struggle of Democratic Party) and AKKBB. FPI and 
AKKBB were conducting their demonstrations near each other around the Monas. 
Munarman, the head of LPI (Laskar Pembela Islam), the paramilitary wing of FPI, 
argued that AKKBB started to ridicule FPI. He also said that AKKBB activities were 
also aimed at supporting Ahmadiyah’s cause.10 Because of these, FPI’s members reacted 
by attacking the gathering of AKKBB.  
 Hundreds of FPI members wearing white clothes penetrated AKKBB gathering, 
damaging appliances and supplies of AKKBB and hitting some of the participants. This 
situation created fear among AKKBB, which also consisted of many women and 
children. Many of them ran away to avoid FPI’s members. Many elite national activists 
who joined AKKBB meeting also became the target of FPI’s attacks. Some of them were 
severely injured. For example, Guntur Ramli (the director of the Journal of Woman 
magazine) got a broken nose and cracked temple, and Safi’i Anwar (the director the 
Islamic and Pluralism International Conference) recieved injury to his head. In total, 12 
people of AKKBB were badly injured; possessions brought by AKKBB and one of their 
truck were damaged (Kebhinekaan Dicederai” 2008; “Aksi Kekerasan” 2008; “Dugaan 
Kekerasan” 2008; “Polda Beri” 2008). 
                                                 
10 Ahmadiyah is the group that considered by major Islamic organizations in Indonesia, including FPI, as 
blasphemous against Islam. One them is because the Ahamadiyah teaches that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a 
prophet. In fact, most Muslims believe that there is no prophet after Muhammad. FPI have consistently 
demanded that the government abolish Ahmadiyah group.  
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 The attack that victimized several top Indonesian activists soon received national 
attention. This forced many members of the state apparatus, politicians and especially 
leaders of the affiliated organization of the victims, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, to 
respond to the incident of Monas. For example, the President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, Abdurrahman Wahid (the former president and the former head of 
Nahdlatul Ulama), Din Syamsuddin (the head of Muhammadiyah), Agung Laksono (the 
head of the People’s Representative Assembly), and Jimly Asshiddiqie (the head of the 
Constitutional Supreme Court) condemned  FPI’s attack on AKKBB. Many elite figures 
also demanded that the police seriously enforced the law to deal with FPI’s actions, and 
some of them even demanded the dissolution of FPI (“Aksi Kekerasan” 2008).  
 In response to FPI violence, the head of the general police of Indonesia, then 
warned all FPI members, who were involved in the incident, to surrender to the police by 
June 3rd. However, Syihab responded to this ultimatum by demanding the President to 
produce a decree that disbanded Ahmadiyah sect; if not then FPI would sue the 
President. He also announced that FPI paramilitary wing, LPI, was ready to wage war 
against Ahmadiyah sect (“Massa FPI” 2008; “Kebinekaan Diciderai” 2008). 
 During the last hours of June 3, approximately 800 police officers and security 
forces blocked off FPI’s central office in Petamburan, Jakarta, while about 200 FPI 
members were gathering in the central office. Approaching the end of the day, the police 
sent its highest ranking police officers to negotiate with Syihab, the leader of FPI. After 
negotiation, Syihab met his FPI members and requested that all FPI members not fight 
back or impede the police officers from doing their job. The police officers then took 59 
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FPI members in the police office for investigation. However, the head of LPI, 
Munarman chose to run away from the police but promised to surrender after the 
President disbanded Ahmadiyah sect (“Negara Tidak” 2008; “Ketua FPI” 2008). 
 Several days after the Monas incident, many came to think that the existence of 
FPI was near the end. Pressure towards FPI from elite politicians and the media was very 
strong. For several weeks, the media repeatedly showed the Monas incident that 
portrayed the barbaric side of FPI and presented elite politicians who condemned the 
incident. Consequently, soon after that, many branches of FPI, especially in Cirebon, 
Surabaya and Banyuwangi were forced to dissolve by the proponents of the  NU 
(Nahdlatul Ulama). It was because many of the victims were NU members.   
 However, surprisingly, on June 9, 2008 or eight days after the incident, the 
government produced an official decree to disband Ahmadiyah, which was signed by the 
Minister of Religious Affairs Muhammad M. Basyuni, the Attorney General Hendarman 
Supandji and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mardiyanto. This document is the so-
called “SKB-3 Mentri” (the Joint Document of Three Ministers). This document indeed 
gave the leverage to FPI in its fight against the massive demand for its dissolution and its 
efforts to legitimate the reasons it used to attack AKKBB.  
 In addition to that, in some other areas of Indonesia, the names of two FPI’s 
leaders, Syihab and Munarman, came to symbolize the Muslim community, which stood 
against Ahmadiyah sect. In short, despite criticisms and pressure from the state and 
various elements of the society, FPI received considerable support and endorsement 
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from many social and religious communities. Consequently, this could have led FPI to 
view more positively the utility and feasibility of violent strategies. 
    
The Scenario of Violence Based on Anti-Communism and Anti-Christianity 
Unlike the violence based on anti-immorality, blasphemy and brotherhood, 
which can be connected to FPI’s organizational documents, the violence based on anti-
communism and anti-Christianity is hard to trace from the organizational documents of 
FPI.  Based on its official documents, FPI is neither anti-communism nor anti-
Christianity. However, FPI committed about four cases of violent actions under the label 
of “anti-communism,” and only one case was under “anti-Christianity” label.  
 The reasons that FPI used to justify these attacks were that the ideology of a 
communism (including the ideology of Marxism and Leninism) has been rejected for 
long period of time in Indonesia.  This was because communism threatened the beliefs of 
Muslim community in Indonesia by spreading communist claims regarding the danger 
posed by religion (“Massa FPI” 2007). While in relation to FPI’s attack on the Catholic 
Schools of Sekolah Sang Timur (or anti-Christianity) was because the school illegally 
used the sporting facilities for religious services, as if they were a church.   
 In general, the scenario of FPI’s attacks under the category of anti communism 
and anti-Christianity is the same as the violence under the category of brotherhood, anti-
immorality and blasphemy. The target groups were already identified, and there might 
have been some level of expectation by FPI’s members that violent means were likely to 
be used. Therefore, FPI members usually brought some simple weapons, like wooden 
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sticks, to these collective actions. Thus, the violence might be semi premeditated, or not 
random. In order to get a better understanding of the pattern of violence under the 
category of anti-communism and anti-Christianity, the following are some examples of 
the stories. 
 
Anti-Communism 
On March 29, 2007 the National Liberation and Union Party or Partai Persatuan 
dan Pembebasan Nasional (Papernas) declared the establishment of its party. At the 
same time, FPI and other social organizations that identified themselves as an anti-
communist group rallied across the capital city of Jakarta. These groups regarded the 
Papernas as a new manifestation of communism, and thus a threat to the Indonesian 
constitution (“Massa FPI” 2007).  
FPI, along with these anti-communist groups, encountered the Papernas members 
at various places around the capital city. Around 10 am, a group of Papernas members 
riding on two small buses and four regular buses encountered FPI members in the area of 
Patung Proklamasi Jakarta. They threw stones at each other.   The Papernas group then 
fled. But soon after that, another three busses with Papernas members passed by the 
same area. FPI group blocked their way. Once again, the two attacked each other. The 
fight between members of FPI and Papernas was very visible. It happened during the 
daylight and the distinction between FPI and the Papernas was quite sharp. As usual, 
FPI’s members and its supporters mostly wore the so-called koko clothes: white shirts 
with white scarf and white hats, while the Papernas side mostly wore red t-shirts. FPI 
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group was more ready for conflict in comparison to the Papernas’s proponents. FPI 
group consisted of mostly young men, while the Papernas supporters consisted of not 
only young men but also women and children (“Bentrokan, Kepala” 2007; “Massa FPI”   
2007).    
At the same time, a group of Rakyat Miskin Kota (the Union of City Poor 
People), who were going to demonstrate against poverty, were stopped by FPI members 
in Duku Atas. FPI suspected that they were part of the Papernas organization. Their 
uniforms were red in color, similar to that of the Papernas uniforms. This group brought 
about 3800 people on 49 busses; most of them were women and children. About fifty 
FPI members with motorcycles blocked their way; they attacked the busses. People 
inside the buses ran away in order to save themselves. At least 20 buses were damaged 
because of stones thrown by FPI. The police then came to separate two different groups 
in conflict and evacuated the people of Rakyat Miskin Kota. Then, around 12:30 pm, the 
masses of FPI group headed towards the building of People’s Representative Assembly 
(DPR/MPR) to continue their anti-communist protest.   
 The central secretary of FPI, Irwan, argued that the purpose of FPI rally was to 
support the anti communist societies against the Papernas. He argued that FPI, along 
with other anti-communist organizations, would continue to fight against any new forms 
of communism. Beside FPI, the organizations involved in this anti-communist protest 
were FBR (the Forum of Betawi Society/Forum Betawi Rembug), GNPI, AAK (Aliansi 
Anti Komunis/Anti Communist Alliance), Forum Komunikasi '66 (Communication 
Forum of the 1966), Taruna Muslim (Muslim Cadets), Front Pembela Merah Putih (the 
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Defenders of Red-White), Mimbar Pemuda Islam (the Association of Muslim Youth) 
dan Komando Pemuda Anti Komunis (Kompak). Irwan argued that FPI sent 700 people 
and the FBR sent 1,200 people to participate in the protest (“Bentrokan, Kepala” 2007; 
Mass FPI” 2007). 
Several days later, many criticisms of FPI arose. One of them came from 
Abdurrahman Wahid, the fourth president of Indonesia. He condemned FPI attack on the 
Papernas. He argued that FPI had violated the constitution. Therefore, the government 
should take up the case of FPI’s attack on the Papaernas and enforce the law regarding 
perpetrators of violence.  
 Regardless of the harsh criticism of FPI, it still continued to protest the Papernas 
establishment. For example, a month later, or on April 29, 2007 FPI branch of Sukoharjo 
(about 500 km/310 miles from Jakarta) also attacked the Papernas, which was 
conducting the meeting to prepare the establishment of the Papernas organization.  With 
less than 50 people, FPI members forced the meeting to dissolve. The committee holding 
the meeting told FPI representatives that their meeting was legal and approved by the 
police. However, FPI members insisted that the meeting should be dissolved on the 
grounds that the Papernas was associated with communism; and communism could not 
be allowed to be growing in Indonesia. The mayor of Sukoharjo, accompanied by the 
head of Grogol police, came to mediate the conflict between them. In a closed meeting, 
FPI and the Papernas reached an agreement that the Papernas meeting would be 
dissolved after FPI left the area (“FPI Bubarkan” 2007). 
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Anti-Christianity 
In 2004, the Catholic community of Paroki St. Bernadette planned to build a 
church, which was close to the Sang Timur Catholic School in Cileduk, Tangerang 
Banten. This was because this Catholic school and the Catholic community in this area 
did not have a church. For almost ten years, the Catholic community in this area 
“illegally” used the school hall (or sports building) for religious services.11 However, the 
Sang Timur School was unlucky. The news of  Paroki community’s plan to build a 
church led the Muslim community to realize that the school had been “illegally” using 
the sports hall for religious services for almost ten years. This news finally reached FPI.   
On October 3, 2004, several hundred FPI members wearing white clothing and 
carrying some simple weapons arrived at the school in the early morning. FPI members 
contended that the Catholic community did not have the permission to build a church 
beside the Sang Timur School. In addition, FPI argued that this school abused the use of 
the school hall for religious services and accused the school of attempting to convert 
Muslims to Catholicism. Several FPI’s member yelled at nuns and staff members at the 
Sang Timur School that they should stop using the school hall for religious services and 
stop the plan to build the Catholic church in the area. They damaged some building and 
facilities at the school. In addition to that, they also blocked the road to the school with a 
permanent concrete. Therefore, no vehicle could enter that area after that day. Several 
FPI’s activist also met with the nuns and the staff of the school, and forced them to sign 
                                                 
11 The building of the place for religious services, such as a church or mosque, is required to have 
members at least 90 people and gets a support of at least 60 people from the neighborhood.  This 
regulation is commonly violated. Most of the mosques in Indonesia do not have an official permission 
from the government.  Therefore, in practice, this regulation is only applied for the minority religious 
group (see SKB Dua Menteri No. 1/1969 and PMB No. 9/2006  tentang Pendirian Rumah Ibadah ).  
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a document stating that the school would never again use the school hall for religious 
services. The police, who arrived later did not remove FPI members from the school 
area. The police tended to let FPI’s members to do what the group whished.   
Several days later, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gusdur), the fourth President of 
Indonesia, came to the Sang Timur School to show his support for the school. Many 
religious leaders and politicians condemned FPI action against the Sang Timur School. 
However, it seems that their criticism of FPI had no effect on the conditions at the 
school. As of 2011, the concrete blockade, which was erected in 2004, remains making 
the road to the school impassable by a vehicle (Interview with a school staff, on May 11, 
2011). This experience of lack of police interference may have given FPI confidence that 
it could use violence to achieve its goals. 
 
The Scenario of Internal Interests 
As discussed above the category of “internal interests” refers to FPI’s violent 
actions that took place as a result of conflict between FPI and other groups. Such 
violence occurred because of organizational ego rather than the religious values upheld 
by FPI organization. These values include Islamic brotherhood, anti-immorality (anti-
ma`siyat), and the application of shari`ah. Among these violent actions, five cases (9 
percent) are associated with internal interests of the organization. 
In general, the pattern of violence due to internal interests is similar to other 
categories of violence. However, there is a small difference between this category of 
violence and other categories, especially, the violence associated with anti-immorality. 
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In the case of violence based on internal interests of both FPI and opposition parties 
involved more aggression. Two examples are the case of the conflict between FPI and 
the supporters of AKKBB (The Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief) in 2008 
and the conflict between FPI and the athlete group in Samarinda in 2010. In order to get 
a better understanding of the violence based on the internal interests, the following 
provides one example of this scenario. 
Since the incident of Monas June 2008, the conflicts between FPI and AKKBB 
had expanded. Many branches of the Banser (the paramilitary wing of NU) and the 
Ansor (the youth wing of NU) declared to stand behind AKKBB and fight against FPI. 
The reason for this conflict was no longer based on blasphemy or AKKBB’s support for 
Ahmadiyah sect, but was a matter of revenge between FPI and AKKBB supporters (NU 
members).  
The initial physical conflict between them occurred during the trial of seven 
members of FPI in the court of Central Jakarta on September 22, 2008.  One of FPI 
leaders argued that the conflict was provoked by the actions of Guntur Romli, AKKBB 
activist who stared at a FPI witness, kicked his chair, and mocked FPI. After the end of 
trial, FPI members, both inside and outside the court room, tried to attack Guntur who 
was guarded by the police. Some people were able to reach Guntur and punched him. 
Police officers in the court room were able to separate Guntur from his attackers 
(“Persidangan: Sidang” 2008). 
Several days later, or on September 25 or at the trial of the two FPI leaders: 
Habib Rizieq Syihab and Munarman, the conflict between FPI and AKKBB escalated.  
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At this trial, AKKBB was backed up by a large number of the members of Banser, the 
paramilitary wing of NU. A leader of Banser said that he sent his people to protect 
Guntur Romli (AKKBB) from FPI. From the beginning of the trial, there had been 
tensions between the members of FPI and Banser. Finally, the conflict took place after 
the judge announced the break of trial. Romli reported that FPI started the attack, and 
then they attacked each other. The conflict spread beyond the court room, and produced 
a traffic jam on the streets near the court.  Some people from both sides, FPI and Banser-
AKKBB, were severely injured and taken to the nearby hospitals. The conflict did not 
last long, because a large number of police officers could separate the two masses. After 
this incident, the police arrested twelve members of FPI and one member of Banser-
AKKBB (“Bentrokan FPI-AKKBB” 2008; “12 Laskar” 2008). 
 
Moving towards the Social Mechanism of Violence 
In conclusion, FPI’s violent collective actions can be divided into several 
categories based on concerns, targets of the actions and the geographical areas in which 
the incidents took place. This classification helps to create a general picture of how FPI 
engaged in violence. Using these categories, data from several media sources show that 
there is a tendency for FPI’s violence to be associated with religious issues, namely anti-
immorality and blasphemy. FPI mostly attacked targets that appeared to violate religious 
norms and state regulations, such as night clubs, brothels, “illegal” church buildings and 
social groups that appeared to adopt communist ideology. For the most part, violence 
was most likely to occur when the targets were places of immoral entertainment, or what 
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FPI considered as places of maksiyat (immorality). From 1998 to 2010, FPI continuously 
launched these patterns of violent actions every year. 
In addition to that, FPI’s collective violent actions can be divided into two 
categories: random and nonrandom. About 95 percent of them are nonrandom; only a 
few of them appeared to be random. However, these few random actions, especially the 
incident of Ketapang, are essential in order to explain FPI’s violence.  
These nonrandom acts of violence were usually systematic or coordinated. Some 
indications  that show these actions are systematic are: 1) the violence appeared to be 
prepared and, therefore, could be expected; 2) what was done by the central office of  
FPI was also adopted by other local branches of FPI; 3) prior to violent actions, FPI 
usually performed the processes of negotiation or requested permission of collective 
action the government, police and/or informed to the target groups; and 4) for the most 
part, FPI also did not target people, even though they also often injured people. 
The typologies, patterns and the intensity of FPI’s violent collective actions then 
raise some questions: why did FPI chose to intensively engage in violence? What are 
some of the social factors or conditions that facilitated the use of violent actions and how 
did they explain the violence? Because most of violence was closely related to religious 
concerns, how did the Islamic system of beliefs take part in shaping this violence?  
Based on the above data, the following are some salient social factors that might 
have facilitated and shaped FPI’s violence, and therefore, may also help to answer these 
questions and concerns. They are the incident of Ketapang, the choice of engaging in 
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prone-violent activities, outsider support for the cause and low state capacity, as is 
explained below. 
 
The Incident of Ketapang   
As discussed above, this incident is different from the general trends of FPI’s 
violent actions. Most of the violent actions were non-random acts and only damaged 
non-human targets. The incident of Ketapang was more a random act and victimized not 
only material things but also humans; at least sixteen people died. However, it does not 
necessarily mean that the incident is insignificant in explaining the overall trends of 
FPI’s violence.  
There are, at least, two important reasons that make the Ketapang incident an 
important case that explains later violence by FPI. First, through the Ketapang incident, 
FPI was exposed to violent means and became aware of its significance for FPI 
movement.  
The incident occurred because after the collapse of the authoritarian military 
regime, the new government lost its ability to exercise its power in order to manage the 
state, including its ability to control violence-prone situations in Ketapang. The incident 
happened quickly and caused devastating damage in the Ketapang area. FPI might not 
have expected that its involvement in the Ketapang incident would cause a bloody 
incident because when FPI’s members first came to Ketapang, they planned on 
celebrating the day of Isra’ Mi`raj, which was led by the top leader of FPI, Habib Rizieq 
Syihab.  
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The inability of the new democratic government to control violence-prone 
situations in Ketapang created an opportunity for FPI to be exposed to so-called 
“justified” violence. It was religiously justified because the incident was often portrayed 
as the fight between good (FPI) and evil (Ambones Christian bodyguards). In this light, 
religion (Islam) provided a means to create a divide between “We” (Islam or FPI) and 
“You” (Ambones Christian bodyguards and the night clubs) and later also provided 
reasons to justify the violence in the Ketapang incident.  In addition to that, FPI was able 
to defeat its enemy by killing several bodyguards and damaging some churches and 
night clubs without any significant legal responses from state authorities. In turn, this 
could have affected how FPI viewed at violent means as an effective strategy for 
pursuing its goals.  
Second, despite some criticism of FPI’s violence during the incident of 
Ketapang, FPI received considerable support from Muslims in the capital city of Jakarta. 
After this incident, there seems to have been increasing interest by Muslims around the 
capital city of Jakarta regarding FPI. At least, it attracted thousands of young Muslims 
who were involved in the incident at Ketapang. Therefore, after the incident, FPI 
formally recruited members for the first time and started to build its financial foundation.  
In summary, the Ketapang incident provided two things in relation to FPI’s violence; a 
positive view towards the use of violent means and the readiness of FPI to engage in 
violence.  
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The Choice of Engaging in Violence-prone Activities  
FPI chose to involve itself in violent risky activities, such as policing and 
enforcing Islamic values, especially against what FPI consider “immoral places.” About 
52 percent of its violent actions were related to immoral places of entertainment, such as 
night clubs and brothels. About 36 percent of these actions were against social groups, 
such as Ahmadiyah sect, which FPI considered as blasphemous against Islam, and 
Papernas, which FPI considered a new face of communism. Many activities that related 
to these places and groups resulted in violence. Even all FPI collective actions that 
targeted the places of immorality resulted in either violence or nonviolence with physical 
threat; none of them involved pure nonviolence.  
The violence likely occurred because FPI possessed a direct physical contact 
with the group that they considered the problem. In this light, religion (Islam) played an 
important role in marking a boundary of “we versus you” between other groups and 
itself. For example, FPI members may consider themselves as representing Islam while 
seeing the target groups, such as brothels, places of entertainment and churches as 
representing evil. The religious concepts that were used to mark this boundary and to 
legitimize the violence were immorality or ma`siyat and blasphemy.  
In addition, most of the night clubs and brothels were usually guarded by the 
bodyguards. Therefore, this created a perfect condition for violence because both FPI 
and the target groups were basically ready to engage in violence. On the one hand, 
hundreds to thousands of FPI members, who were mostly young men, wanted to enforce 
the religious moral values at these places of immorality. On the other hand, the security 
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guards of those places were also trained and paid to protect the night clubs and places of 
prostitution.  
 
The Sacred Days of Islam  
As many other cases of religious violence, most of FPI’s violence  took place 
during the holy days of Islam, such as the month of Ramadan, the birthday of 
Muhammad and the first day of the Islamic calendar (1 Muharram). In Indonesia, a 
country with a Muslim majority, most of the sacred days of Islam are also official state 
holidays.  Muslims usually gather on these sacred days, especially in mosques in order to 
celebrate them. Many Islamic groups often organize these kinds of religious celebrations 
because at these times it is usually easier to mobilize people. During the “holidays” 
people have more free time and during the “holy days” people are more likely to engage 
in religious activities.  
FPI has used these moments to conduct some activities, including efforts to close 
night clubs, brothels and other immoral places. Because of the nature of these holy days 
of Islam in Indonesia, FPI was often able to gather hundreds to thousands of people 
when FPI launched its activities during these days. Consequently, these large numbers of 
people made FPI’s collective activities, which were also prone to violence, becomes 
really violent. In short, the sacred days of Islam (religion) has provided cultural 
resources for FPI to mobilize its members and launched its collective actions in more 
massive ways.  
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Significant Support for the Cause 
FPI has been condemned and threatened with disbandment because of its 
continuous adoption of violent means. However, not all elements of Indonesian society, 
and especially Muslim society, disagreed with FPI’s violent actions. In almost each 
action, FPI received significant support from various elements of society, ranging from 
elite politicians to religious leaders and many Islamic groups.  
For example, in the case of FPI’s attack against Komnas HAM (the Indonesian 
National Commission of Human Rights), many influential elites directly and indirectly 
supported FPI’s causes, such as Munir (a famous human right activist), the members of 
the legislative institutions (DPR-MPR), and HMI (the Association of Muslim Students).  
In relation to the support from Islamic groups, FPI did not only gain supports 
from the Islamist movement (the shari`ah movement), but also from many moderate 
groups, including MUI, the official state body of the Council of the Indonesian Muslim 
scholars and even from the organizational wings of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the group 
that were often in confrontation with FPI.  
For example, in Pekanbaru Riau, a number of Islamic organizations declared 
their support for FPI in the case of the Monas incident, which victimized many NU 
members. Even some of those organizations were the group that affiliated with NU: a 
provincial branch of NU, Pagar Nusa Riau (the paramilitary wing of NU) and GP Ansor 
(the youth wing of NU). In relation to the state, there were at least four institutions that 
often supported FPI, namely MUI (Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars), PKS (Party 
of Justice), PBB (Party of Moon-Stars), and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, especially 
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during tenure of ministers Maftuh Basyuni (2004-2009) and Surya Dharma Ali (2009-
now).  
There were many ways in which people supported FPI. Some obviously stated 
their support to FPI; for example, the statement of the head of MUI (the Indonesian 
Council of Muslim Scholars) of Lampung: “FPI actions of sweeping entertainment clubs 
and damaging alcoholic beverages should be appreciated because it is part of religious 
tenets” (“MUI Lampung” 2001). Some supported FPI in indirect ways, such as showing 
their neutrality between FPI and its rival groups or victims, but at the same time 
defending what FPI did. For example, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Suryadharma 
Ali argued: “If the radical group [FPI] was sanctioned because of violating the law but 
the actors of immorality did not receive any sanctions, it was not just. A violence 
perpetrated by members of a group cannot be arbitrarily connected to the group, such as 
the incident of Monas by FPI members.”   
This FPI significant support from several Indonesian elites indicates that the new 
democracy of Indonesia have split people in the governments. In turn, this support might 
have undermined the legitimacy of some elites in the government, such as the former 
president Abdurrahman Wahid, who wanted to crack down FPI or to fully suppress FPI 
violent activities.    
 
Low State Capacity 
As described by Tilly (2008), the state capacity is about the extent to which a 
state controls resources, activities and citizens. Similar to non-democracy, low state 
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capacity also promotes violence. The state capacity can be measured in many ways. One 
of them is by looking at to what extent the state has responded to FPI’s violent activities. 
Even though several cases of FPI violence were responded to well by the state, 
such as by bringing those cases to the court and jailing perpetrators and FPI leaders, 
most violent cases by FPI were not handled well by the state, in terms of anticipating the 
potential violence, responding to violence that was occurring and following a violent 
incident up. 
For example, in the case of the Ketapang incident, the state failed to respond to 
the initial conflict between several residents of Ketapang and the bodyguards of the Kino 
nightclub; the state failed to detect and respond to the deployment of approximately 300 
Ambones bodyguards to Ketapang and the movements of thousands of people from 
around Jakarta to Ketapang. Therefore, the conflict escalated and turned into a bloody 
incident.  
In the case of FPI attacks on Komnas HAM (the National Commission of Human 
Rights) office and the Catholic School of Sekolah Sang Timur, the police tended to be 
passive and did not stop the violence which was occurring. Similarly, in the case of 
FPI’s campaigns of anti-immorality, or the so-called safari anti-ma`siyat, the state, 
especially the police and intelligence agency, failed to respond to these violence-prone 
activities. Almost every year, FPI conducted the campaign of anti-immorality; most of 
them resulted in violence. However, the state always failed to deal with these regular 
violence-prone activities.  
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In short, these all indicate that the state capacity is low. This low capacity of the 
state might have also prompted FPI’s engagement in violence-prone activities to become 
real violence. 
      
Conclusion 
In summary, the combinations of the above factors have created enough 
conditions for FPI to adopt violent means and to continue to use them.  The belief 
system of Islam within Indonesian settings also provided cultural resources for FPI to 
gather and mobilize large numbers of its members. In turn, this huge number of 
members participating in the collective actions was able to transform the violence-prone 
settings into real violence. The Islamic beliefs also helped to create a sharp divider 
between “we versus you,” so that the division between FPI members and the target 
groups became clear in the eyes of FPI; and they also helped to justify FPI violent 
actions. In addition, the low state capacity created more opportunity of violence to occur. 
These conditions might have neutralized the other factors or conditions that 
should have inhibited or deterred future violence, such as law enforcement and social 
pressure towards FPI. For example, based on the data from media coverage, at least 150 
FPI activists were arrested by the police and/or the attorney general. Even some of its 
leaders, like Syihab, were arrested several times. However, the law enforcement in 
deterring collective violence might have been neutralized by some of the factors 
discussed earlier.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Summary 
Since the collapse of the Suharto military authoritarian regime in mid 1998, 
Indonesia has experienced a new phase of democracy. The fundamental rights of 
democracy, such as the freedom to speak and to form an association have become 
available since that time. Individuals and groups have been able to express their views 
without being scrutinized by the government. Benefitting this opportunity, number of 
political and social movements emerged and reemerged. Most of these movements used 
conventional nonviolent means to pursue their goals because democracy is inherently 
nonviolent, which allows movements to use a number of reasonable tactics. 
Ironically, in the new Indonesian democracy, an Islamist movement, FPI (Front 
Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders’ Front) also emerged and adopted disruptive and 
violent strategies to pursue their goals. Using the language of Islam, justice and 
democracy, FPI committed at least 64 cases of conspicuous violent collective actions 
from 1998 to 2010.  Additionally, FPI committed approximately 51 cases of collective 
action, which were close to becoming violent. These include about 33 cases of collective 
action with physical threat and 18 cases of collective action with verbal threat made to 
the targets of FPI actions. Therefore, FPI was often considered as the most visible social 
movement that committed violence during the democratic era of Indonesia.    
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FPI’s violence is more associated with religious issues, namely anti-immorality 
and blasphemy. FPI mostly attacked the targets that appeared to violate religious norms 
and state regulations, such as night clubs and brothels. The violence was most likely to 
occur when the targets were places of immoral entertainment, or what FPI considered as 
places of maksiyat (immorality). 
In addition, these violent actions were mostly nonrandom and patterned. The 
violence appeared to be planned and, therefore, it could be expected. What was done by 
the central office of FPI was also adopted by other local branches of FPI. Prior to these 
violent actions, FPI usually performed a process of negotiation or requested permission 
for collective action from the government and police; FPI sometimes also informed its 
plans to the target groups. Lastly, for the most part, FPI also did not target people, even 
though they also sometimes did injure innocent people. 
Again, the patterns and intensity of FPI’s violent collective actions occurred in 
the democratic context of Indonesia from 1998 to 2010, or when state repression of 
social movements no longer existed and the previous Islamist movements had de-
radicalized.  Therefore, state repression, which is often understood as a major aspect of 
the social environment that lead to making of violent movements, can no longer be used 
to explain FPI’s adoption of violence. Consequently, this study tried to examine at 
different factors, including social environments other than state repression, to explain 
FPI’s adoption of violent means.  
There are three levels of analysis being used in order to investigate these aspects, 
namely the level of organization, individual characters and FPI’s violent actions. 
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Combining these three levels of analysis, this study found that the making of the violent 
Islamist movement (FPI) is complex. It involves multifaceted aspects from the history of 
Islamist movements in Indonesia, organizational ideology, activists’ characteristics and 
the nature of FPI’s violent actions; all of which seem to be interconnected.  
Rather than arguing that there is a dominant factor in the making of FPI’s 
adoption of violence, this study contends that the combination of those factors has made 
FPI’s violence plausible in terms of why FPI adopted violent means and kept using them 
to pursue its organizational goals.  Those interrelated factors can be summarized as 
follows.  
1. Historical Context and FPI as an Islamist movement 
First, for about 53 years (1945-1998), the position of Islamists, or Islamist 
movements, in Indonesia was always marginal and in opposition to the nationalist 
government. They mostly existed as underground rebellious movements and/or radical 
movements. Therefore, when FPI declared its organization as a shari`ah-oriented 
movement (an Islamist movement), FPI actually positioned itself closer to violence 
because FPI indirectly associated itself with the previous Islamist movements, which 
mostly adopted violent means. At the same time, because FPI was Islamist, the new 
government (post Suharto) that was also nationalist, became more difficult to co-opt FPI, 
especially in comparison to other new movement that did not embrace Islamic ideology 
(Islamism). In fact, government’s failure to co-opt marginal movements often results in 
the radicalization of those movements.  
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2. Religious Timing, a Cultural Resource 
As many other cases of religious violence, most of FPI’s violence  took place 
during the holy days of Islam, such as the month of Ramadan, the birthday of 
Muhammad and the first day of the Islamic calendar (1 Muharram). It is commonly 
understood that religious and political violence are often symbolic, that is why timing is 
so important and becomes part of violent action. However, in the case of FPI’s violence, 
the holy days of Islam are better understood as cultural resources for FPI’s mobilization, 
which enable FPI to gather anywhere between hundreds to thousands of participations. 
In turn, this can make violence-prone activities become potentially more violent, or turn 
into real violence. 
In Indonesia, a country with the Muslim majority, most of the holy days of Islam 
are also the official state holidays.  Muslims usually gather during these sacred days, 
especially in mosques, in order to celebrate them. Many Islamic groups often organize 
these kinds of religious celebrations because at these times it is usually easier to 
mobilize people. During the “holidays” people have more free time, and during the “holy 
days” people are more likely to engage in religious activities.  
FPI used these moments to conduct some activities, including the activities of 
sweeping night clubs, brothels and other immoral places. Because of the nature of these 
holy days of Islam in Indonesia, FPI was often able to gather from hundreds to 
thousands of people. Consequently, this huge number of people made FPI’s collective 
activities, which were also prone to violence, become real violence. In short, the holy 
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days of Islam (religion) have provided cultural resources for FPI to mobilize its members 
and launch its collective actions in more massive ways. 
3. Encountering Legitimate Violence 
Even though most FPI violent actions are nonrandom, initially it was involved in 
collective violence by accident, namely in the Ketapang incident in 1998. In this 
incident, FPI may not have expected that its involvement in this incident would cause 
destruction. At the beginning, FPI’s members who came to Ketapang were aimed at 
celebrating the day of Isra’ Mi`raj, which was led by the top leader of FPI, Habib Rizieq 
Syihab. However, at the same time, the conflict that was occurring in Ketapang, Jakarta, 
forced FPI become involved in this conflict. As a result, FPI along with thousands of 
Muslims around Ketapang caused destruction; several Ambones bodyguards were killed, 
and some churches, night clubs and several other buildings were damaged. However, 
FPI received no significant legal response from the state authorities; in fact, FPI received 
sympathy and support from members of Muslim community around Jakarta, so that the 
incident appeared to be legitimate and justified.  
In short, the Ketapang incident introduced FPI to the use of violent means, and 
exposed them to the so-called “justified violence.” Eventually, this may have affected 
how FPI looked at violent means as an effective strategy for pursuing its goals. 
4. The character of Individual: Fundamentalism 
Despite their similarities, every social movement in Indonesia has its own 
characteristics that make it different from other movements. In relation to the political 
violence, generally, the previous studies suggest that individual characteristics that can 
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be used to differentiate a violent group from a nonviolent group are the levels of 
fundamentalism, trust in government, and the interaction between trust in government 
and political efficacy. 
However, the current study confirms that fundamentalism is the only factor that 
can differentiate FPI from other nonviolent groups, such as Muhammadiyah and NU 
(Nahdlatul Ulama). FPI activists tend to show fundamentalist attitudes, rather than 
moderate attitudes.  Therefore, FPI activists demonstrate their support of the use of 
violent means. In short, only the aspect of fundamentalism shed light on FPI’s adoption 
of violent means.  
 Nevertheless, this does not necessarily confirm the previous research that found 
the same relationship between fundamentalism and violent attitudes (Altemeyer and 
Hunsberger 1992 and 2004; Moaddel and Karabenich 2008). The measurement of 
fundamentalism in this study is somewhat different from the previous studies that 
measure fundamentalism, which merely focus on the aspect of beliefs. This current study 
takes into account both aspects of belief and its manifestation in social and political life, 
which are based on the theoretical concept developed by Marty and Appleby (1993), 
Almound et al. (2003) and Frey (2007). 
5. The Character of Action: Violence-prone Activities  
FPI identifies itself as an AMNM (Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar ) movement. In 
general, AMNM is meant to be calling Muslims to implement all Islamic teachings in 
total and to prevent them from any activities that can destroy the morals and beliefs of 
Islam. In FPI, AMNM is then translated into actions, which enforced religious and moral 
  
180 
180 
 
values in society, such as raiding night clubs, discotheques and brothels with any means 
necessary (Syihab 2008).   
Considering the nature of these actions, AMNM activities are by themselves 
prone to violence. It was because these activities always involved two oppositional 
groups, FPI and target groups. Therefore, the activities that took place always created 
tensions and direct confrontational circumstances between these two groups. In these 
circumstances, FPI usually involved anywhere between hundreds to thousands people 
and target groups, such as nightclubs and brothels, were always shielded by bodyguards. 
Therefore, regardless of other factors, FPI’s choice to engage in these violent prone 
activities has led them to use violent means.   
6. Framing Factor 
Without sound framing, a social movement may not be able to launch its actions, 
especially the violent action that is usually avoided. Leaders or activists need to 
convince their members or bystanders that violence is needed, legitimate and sensible. 
Therefore, the assumption is that without good framing, FPI might not be able to launch 
a violent action and continue to use it.  
In relation to the framing, there are at least three key organizational ideologies of 
FPI that can be understood as FPI’s framing of its violent actions. They are the concepts 
of shari`ah, AMNM (amar ma`ruf nahi munkar) and jihad. These three concepts seem to 
fulfill three framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framings. 
The shari`ah has shaped FPI on how it identify the problems of the society and 
who are responsible for the problems (similar to diagnostic framing). FPI’s 
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understanding of the shari`ah lead to its perception that the Indonesian’s constitution, 
night clubs and prostitution are sources of the problems. AMNM provides FPI with a 
view of looking at how to solve such problems, including the sending of letters to the 
government and the owner of immoral places and/or directly attacking the immoral 
places (prognostic framing). Lastly, FPI’s concept of jihad and martyrdom provide 
religious encouragement and rationale for FPI members to engage in AMNM 
(motivational framing). Finally, by combining these three framing tasks, the violent 
collective actions have become more feasible, relevant, legitimate and rational for FPI. 
Therefore, it continues to adopt violent means in its collective actions. In addition, this 
FPI’s framing of violence shows that a radicalization of religious discourse may occur 
without prior repression, such as from the state.   
7. Social Support 
 FPI has been condemned and threatened with termination because of its continue 
to adopt violent means. However, not all elements of the Indonesian society disagreed 
with FPI’s violent actions. In almost every action, FPI received significant support from 
various elements of the society, ranging from elite politicians to religious leaders and 
many Islamic groups.  
For example, in the case of FPI’s attack on the central office of the National 
Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM), many influential elites directly and 
indirectly supported FPI’s cause, including Munir (a famous human right activist), 
several members of the legislative institutions (DPR-MPR), and the chief of HMI (the 
Association of Muslim Students).  
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In relation to the support from Islamic groups, FPI did not only gain support from 
the Islamist movement (such as the PUI and HTI), but also from many moderate groups, 
and even from the organizational wings of  NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the group that was 
often in confrontation with FPI. For example, in Pekanbaru Riau the provincial branch of 
NU, Pagar Nusa Riau (the paramilitary wing of NU) and GP Ansor (the youth wing of 
NU) of Pekanbaru declared their support for FPI’s cause in the case of tMonas incident 
that victimized several NU activists. 
In relation to the state, there were at least four institutions that often supported 
FPI, namely MUI (Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars), PKS (Party of Justice), 
PBB (Party of Moon-Stars), and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, especially during the 
periods of two ministers of  Religious Affairs: Maftuh Basyuni (2004-2009) and Surya 
Dharma Ali (2009-now). In short, the support from many elements of the society, such 
as from Muslim leaders and elites, may have made FPI believed that its violent actions 
were socially justified, and, therefore, FPI continued to adopt violent means during the 
period from 1998 to 2010.  
In addition, this support from several Indonesian elites indicates that the new 
democracy of Indonesia have divided people in the governments. In turn, this support 
might have undermined the legitimacy of some elites in the government –such as, the 
former president Abdurrahman Wahid– who wanted to crack down FPI or fully suppress 
FPI violent activities. 
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8. Low State Capacity 
According to Tilly (2008), state capacity is the extent to which the government or 
the state controls resources, activities and citizens. Low capacity of the state tends to 
promote violence. In this study, the state capacity was analyzed through how well the 
state responded to FPI’s violent actions.  
Even though several cases of FPI violence were responded to well by the state, 
such as by bringing those cases to the court and jailing perpetrators and FPI leaders, 
most violent instances performed by FPI were not handled well by the state in terms of 
anticipating the potential violence, responding to violence that was occurring and 
following up a violent incident. 
For example, in the case of the Ketapang incident, the state failed to respond to 
the initial conflict between several residents of Ketapang and the bodyguards of the Kino 
nightclub; the state failed to detect and respond to the deployment of approximately 300 
Ambones bodyguards to Ketapang and the movements of thousands of people from 
around Jakarta to Ketapang. Therefore, the conflict escalated and turned into a bloody 
incident.  
In the case of FPI attacks on Komnas HAM (the National Commission of Human 
Rights) office and the Catholic School of Sekolah Sang Timur, the police tended to be 
passive and did not stop the violence which was occurring. Similarly, in the case of 
FPI’s anti-immorality campaigns, or the so-called safari anti-ma`siyat, the state, 
especially the police and intelligence agency, failed to respond to these violence-prone 
activities. Almost every year, FPI conducted a campaign of anti-immorality; most of 
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them resulted in violence. However, the state always failed to deal with these regular 
violence-prone activities. In short, these all indicate that the state capacity is low. This 
low capacity might have also prompted FPI’s engagement in violence-prone activities to 
become real violence.      
In summary, the factors that explain FPI adoption of violence can be divided into 
two categories: social environments and individual-organizational characters.  First, 
there are at least four social environments that have led FPI to the adoption of violent 
means. They are the historical context of Islamist movements in Indonesia (1945-1998), 
the timing of violence by FPI, social support for FPI’s violent actions and low capacity 
of the state.  Second, there are at least four factors that relate to individuals and 
organization of FPI. They are FPI’s encounter with the so-called justified violence, FPI’s 
engagement in violence-prone activities, fundamentalism and FPI’s framing of its 
violent actions.   
To simplify the answers of why FPI adopted violent means to achieve its goals 
and continued to use them in the democratic context of Indonesia, they are because 1) 
FPI chose to engage in violence-prone activities and 2) at the same time, the state 
capacity was low. The combination of these factors is by itself can produce a collective 
violence. 3) FPI as an Islamist movement and the history of Islamist movement in 
Indonesia, 4) FPI’s involvement in the Ketapang incident and 5) the characters of FPI’s 
activists who have a high scale of fundamentalism are important factors that make FPI 
more prone to violence. In addition, 6) FPI’s framing of violence, 7) the timing of 
violence and 8) social support for FPI violence are also significant factors that lead FPI 
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to continue to use violent means in its activities.  Finally, the combination and 
interaction of these factors have led to the making of FPI into a violent Islamist 
movement in the new democratic context of Indonesia. 
 
Recommendations 
Being limited by the data, time and scope, this study tried to investigate the 
puzzle of why a religious movement, FPI, adopted violent means in the new democratic 
context of Indonesia. Therefore, there are some important concerns that need to be 
addressed in relation to this study and future studies that will discuss a similar topic and 
use a similar method. 
First, in relation to the survey, this study initially targeted activists from three 
Islamic groups, namely a violent Islamist group (FPI), moderate Islamic groups 
(Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama) and nonviolent Islamist groups (HTI and MMI).  
In doing so, it was expected that the survey could represent a diverse variety of Islamic 
movements in Indonesia.  However, in the middle of the data collection, both the 
nonviolent Islamist groups (HTI and MMI) declined to participate in the study.  
Consequently, this study only compares a violent group and moderate groups. Therefore, 
a future study that conducts a similar survey should try to include nonviolent Islamist 
group in order to give a stronger support or a more comprehensive explanation about the 
relationship between fundamentalism and violence. 
Second, in relation to the design of the survey questionnaire, this study dropped 
variables measuring trust in government’s work due to low reliability. This might have 
  
186 
186 
 
been caused by an inaccurate design of the seven questions that measured trust in the 
government’s work.  For the first four questions the answers’ choices indicate that 
“lower scores” mean “higher trust,” but for the last three questions, the answers indicate 
that “lower scores” mean “lower trust.” Many respondents may have been confused by 
the directional shift in the answers to these questions. Therefore, there might be many 
answers of the last three questions that are not valid. This problem was not detected 
during my pre-test study because the respondents were relatively young and highly 
educated.  Consequently, despite its advantages, the future researchers need to be careful 
in designing such questions with differing manners of answering these questions, 
especially, if the questions are relatively long and not easily understood. This is also 
important because conducting a survey is expensive, and, therefore, researchers should 
attempt to eliminate this kind of survey error. 
Third, in relation to the categories of FPI collective actions (nonviolence, 
nonviolence with verbal threat, nonviolence with physical threat and violence), the 
analysis in this study was based on newspapers, such as Antara, Kompas and Republika. 
In general, newspaper data have many advantages, such as the news is usually obtained 
from the first sources or parties involved in the incident and the validity of news can be 
easily checked by comparing newspapers with one another.  However, the problem is 
that “bad news is good news.” This general rule means that FPI nonviolent activities 
might have been ignored in this study because of undercover. For example, FPI 
humanitarian missions for tsunami victims of Aceh in 2004 and victims of the Merapi 
eruption in Central Java were not reported by those newspapers. Consequently, this 
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should be considered when reading the description of FPI collective action because there 
might be a number of FPI social activities that were ignored by the media.   
Fourth, the present study found that fundamentalism sheds light on FPI’s 
adoption of violent means.  Fundamentalism is positively associated with violence, and 
this association is also stronger for FPI’s activists than the activists of moderate groups 
(Muhammadiyah and NU). However, this study was designed only to statistically test 
this relationship in the context of FPI and other Islamic groups in Indonesia; it does not 
elaborate on the social process of the relationship between fundamentalism and FPI’s 
adoption of violent means. Therefore, one of the future studies that can be performed is 
by investigating the social process of the relationship between fundamentalism and 
violence in the context of FPI.  
Lastly, future studies that will investigate political violence in the context of 
democracy, especially new democracy, should look first at the level of state capacity, 
possible violence-prone situations and their combination. Second, if violence occurs at 
regular basis, researchers should also look the framing process of violence and to what 
extent groups adopting violent strategies receive support from the society.  Third, 
researcher also need to look at other factors –even other factors that by themselves 
seems to be not associated with violence–  that increase the likelihood of violence to 
occur, for example  the timing of violence. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH VERSION) 
 
 
 
1. Which of the following groups are you involved in? 
a. The FPI (Front Pembela Islam)  b. The HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) 
c. The MMI (Majlis  Mujahidin Indonesia) d. Muhammadiyah 
e. The NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) 
 
2. How long have you been active in that group? …….. years 
 
3. What is your position in your organization?................................................ 
  
4. What level is your above position?  
 a. National/Central (Pusat) b. Provincial (Propinsi)  
c. District (Kab/Kota)                 d. Local (Kec/Desa) 
Mention ……………………………………………………..  
 
5. Are you also in other Social Islamic organizations (Ormas Islam)? Yes or No, if Yes please mention: 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………  
 
6. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The Quran        
a. We do need to reinterpret al-
Quran because it is a complete 
flawless guide that fits all times and 
places (all contexts). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Whenever current 
knowledge/science and al-Quran 
conflict, science should be wrong; 
and we do not need to compromise 
between them. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Threats to the Muslim Ummah        
c. Currently the activities of 
Christianization targeting Muslim 
in Indonesia have become a serious 
threat to our Muslim community. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d.The Islamic liberal groups, like JIL 
(Jaringan Islam Liberal) has gone too 
far from the real tenets of Islam and 
potentially harm the true beliefs of 
Muslim community of Indonesia. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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6. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
e. Muslims of Indonesia is in a state 
of serious danger because of the 
widespread of corruptions, 
pornography, prostitutions, and other 
immoralities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Currently, I feel that I am obliged 
to do something to protect 
Islam/Muslim society from such 
immorality because many Muslims 
tend to ignore such problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
g. To deal with these problems, the 
government should prioritize to solve 
moral problems rather than other 
problems because immorality (the 
moral problem) is the source of all 
problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Woman Leadership        
h. According to Islam, a woman 
cannot be a leader, such as 
president, governor and mayor. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. According to Islam, a woman 
cannot be a judge. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. A Muslim should not vote for 
female candidates for president or 
governor. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Apocalyptical Views        
k. The Israeli occupation of 
Jerusalem, the US military 
intervention in Afghanistan and the 
widespread of immorality are signs 
about the closeness of the end of the 
world. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
l. I believe that the president of the 
USA or the prime minister Israel are 
today Dajjal. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Islam and State; Secular vs 
Religious         
m. Indonesia is a secular state 
because its constitution is not based 
on a religion (Islam or the Quran and 
Hadith). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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6. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
n. Muslims make up the majority of 
the Indonesian population. 
Therefore, state constitutions should 
be based on Islam/Shari`ah 
principles (al-Quran and al-Sunnah). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
7. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
a. The government is pretty much 
run by a few big interests looking 
out for themselves or that it is run 
for the benefit of all the people. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. People in the government 
waste a lot of the money. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Almost all of the people 
running the government don't 
seem to know what they are 
doing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Many people running the 
government are a little crooked. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. The government can deal with 
the problem of morality, like 
pornography and prostitution. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. The government has effectively 
combated the problem of 
corruptions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. The government/court will be 
fair in dealing with the case of 
Bibit-Chandra versus Anggodo 
(two officers of corruption watch 
versus the businessman). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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8. Please indicate how much of the time you can trust the following institutions. 
 
Strongly Disagree Mostly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
a. SBY Administration 0 1 2 3 4 
b. Your Provincial Government  0 1 2 3 4 
c. Your City Government 0 1 2 3 4 
d. The Police 0 1 2 3 4 
e. The Courts (Pengadilan) 0 1 2 3 4 
f. Prosecutor General (Kejaksaan) 0 1 2 3 4 
g. People’s Representative and 
Consultative Assembly of 
Republic of Indonesia (MPR and 
DPR RI)/ People of Congress 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
9. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
a. I consider myself well-
qualified to participate in 
politics. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. I feel that I have a pretty 
good understanding of the 
important political issues facing 
our country. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Other people seem to have an 
easier time understanding 
complicated issues than I do. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. I feel that I could do as good 
a job in public office as most 
other people. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. I often don't feel sure of 
myself when talking with other 
people about politics and 
government. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. I think that I am as well-
informed about politics and 
government as most people. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Sometimes politics and 
government seem so 
complicated that a person like 
me can't really understand 
what's going on. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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10. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
a. The Gay and Lesbian 
groups have publicly tried to 
conduct some activities like 
seminars and beauty contest 
for gay people. Therefore, it is 
normal for society to use force 
or any violent means in order 
to stop their activities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Any Muslims who bluntly 
declare that there is a prophet 
after Muhammad are 
considered to be 
infidels/apostates and the 
enemy of Islam; their blood is 
allowed to be shed. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. There have been some 
churches built without legal 
consent. Therefore, it is okay 
if some people force those 
churches to close, including 
with some necessary violent 
means.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Prostitution has been 
legalized and localized in 
many cities. We have no other 
way out to stop prostitutions, 
but to stop them with the use 
of force, including some 
necessary violent actions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. The problems of gambling 
and drinking have been 
growing in Indonesian society. 
We have no other way out to 
stop them except with the use 
of force, including some 
necessary violent actions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
11. How old are you?.....................years old 
 
12. What is the highest educational  level you have achieved? 
a. Junior High School (SMP)    b. Senior High School 
c. Undergraduate (S1) Major in……………………. d. Master (S2) Major in………….. 
e. Doctoral (S3) Major in………………………….. e. Informal Islamic School (Pesantren) 
 
13. In your daily life, how do you identify yourself (the highest priority)?  
a. An Indonesian b. A Muslim c. By profession…………… d. By Ethnicity 
d. By ethnicity………..  e By organization groups………………    
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APPENDIX B 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE OBSERVED VARIABLES  
MEASURING TRUST IN GOVERNMENT’S WORK 
 
 
 Q7a Q7b Q7c Q7d Q7e Q7f Q7g 
Q7a 1.000       
Q7b .559 1.000      
Q7c .470 .604 1.000     
Q7d .432 .582 .531 1.000    
Q7e -.020 .061 .156 .088 1.000   
Q7f -.066 .092 .095 .102 .477 1.000  
Q7g -.131 .069 .109 .072 .464 .672 1.000 
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APPENDIX C 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE OBSERVED VARIABLES 
 
 Q6a Q6b Q6c Q6d Q6e Q6f Q6g Q6h Q6i Q6j Q6k Q6l Q6m Q6n Q8a Q8b Q8c Q8d Q8e Q8f Q8g Q9a Q9b Q9c Q9d Q9e Q9f Q10a Q10b Q10c Q10d Q10e Q10f Group 
Q6a 1.000                                  
Q6b .675 1.000                                 
Q6c .492 .456 1.000                                
Q6d .499 .472 .656 1.000                               
Q6e .224 .175 .435 .348 1.000                              
Q6f .238 .232 .320 .264 .400 1.000                             
Q6g .323 .289 .306 .245 .295 .229 1.000                            
Q6h .596 .536 .441 .498 .188 .350 .247 1.000                           
Q6i .544 .473 .535 .479 .177 .322 .207 .830 1.000                          
Q6j .649 .564 .458 .493 .118 .246 .238 .863 .775 1.000                         
Q6k .481 .489 .531 .515 .243 .313 .236 .592 .630 .628 1.000                        
Q6l .502 .443 .451 .498 .194 .319 .225 .582 .514 .648 .623 1.000                       
Q6m .350 .471 .355 .255 .175 .157 .132 .541 .521 .559 .451 .451 1.000                      
Q6n .637 .598 .462 .522 .264 .291 .408 .716 .630 .727 .576 .630 .537 1.000                     
Q8a -.010 .032 .098 .153 .124 .091 .006 -.076 .021 -.052 .136 -.053 -.043 -.119 1.000                    
Q8b -.122 .006 .118 .045 .143 .189 .003 -.116 -.137 -.089 .108 -.053 -.109 -.153 .429 1.000                   
Q8c -.141 -.074 .096 .027 .177 .182 .013 -.218 -.136 -.203 .070 -.123 -.154 -.178 .462 .653 1.000                  
Q8d -.264 -.162 -.045 .022 .058 .111 -.077 -.101 -.097 -.123 .048 .159 -.124 -.096 .166 .254 .322 1.000                 
Q8e -.261 -.151 .024 .045 .132 .172 -.028 -.042 -.091 -.118 .047 .098 -.100 -.043 .119 .343 .391 .697 1.000                
Q8f -.241 -.117 -.014 .070 .104 .136 -.010 .012 -.037 -.040 .064 .155 -.074 -.009 .088 .298 .355 .741 .847 1.000               
Q8g .126 .083 -.007 .074 .025 .249 .153 .240 .234 .218 .158 .154 .115 .164 .198 .146 .049 .110 .203 .206 1.000              
Q9a -.149 -.107 -.231 -.257 -.108 -.059 .002 -.126 -.113 -.149 -.149 -.248 -.030 -.109 .002 -.060 -.021 -.194 -.135 -.167 .252 1.000             
Q9b .062 .047 -.086 -.034 -.011 .115 .036 .058 .066 .087 .027 .086 .100 .054 .043 -.094 .003 .050 -.027 -.025 .078 .397 1.000            
Q9c .135 .066 -.163 -.080 .001 .128 .082 .102 .065 .089 -.019 .076 .073 .069 -.098 -.155 -.087 -.132 -.127 -.146 .098 .461 .676 1.000           
Q9d -.332 -.247 -.237 -.295 -.026 -.114 -.283 -.312 -.329 -.349 -.263 -.238 -.242 -.452 .029 .166 .054 .196 .043 .043 -.178 .027 .135 .037 1.000          
Q9e -.153 -.110 -.310 -.257 -.126 -.035 .016 -.122 -.108 -.106 -.152 -.134 -.003 -.081 .028 -.095 -.046 -.024 -.107 -.137 .149 .675 .519 .496 .160 1.000         
Q9f -.341 -.449 -.334 -.353 -.256 -.141 -.309 -.374 -.283 -.354 -.304 -.304 -.334 -.459 -.053 -.116 -.002 -.011 -.129 -.071 -.127 .224 .138 .156 .358 .250 1.000        
Q10a .537 .465 .427 .427 .150 .214 .301 .610 .548 .647 .426 .519 .386 .653 -.142 -.136 -.198 -.216 -.139 -.158 .098 -.032 .110 .163 -.338 .013 -.305 1.000       
Q10b .571 .476 .447 .445 .168 .251 .319 .591 .546 .651 .465 .451 .319 .601 -.014 -.081 -.165 -.191 -.112 -.133 .168 -.103 .023 .081 -.330 -.110 -.341 .712 1.000      
Q10c .590 .530 .493 .503 .253 .305 .277 .632 .577 .649 .505 .527 .337 .618 -.023 -.035 -.084 -.054 .026 -.009 .090 -.147 .065 .086 -.247 -.130 -.323 .736 .740 1.000     
Q10d .556 .473 .429 .444 .097 .212 .290 .640 .548 .667 .467 .505 .366 .614 -.150 -.179 -.229 -.241 -.157 -.165 .155 -.001 .088 .126 -.337 .016 -.227 .806 .686 .761 1.000    
Q10e .547 .451 .396 .389 .086 .190 .303 .631 .549 .671 .458 .495 .399 .611 -.105 -.207 -.223 -.201 -.142 -.155 .139 .002 .068 .143 -.336 .052 -.199 .752 .660 .693 .832 1.000   
Q10f .551 .498 .366 .361 -.001 .166 .281 .611 .530 .684 .426 .507 .419 .650 -.166 -.185 -.249 -.256 -.168 -.171 .131 -.032 .036 .144 -.364 .015 -.245 .762 .683 .692 .773 .817 1.000  
Group .507 .398 .237 .218 .097 .197 .197 .517 .490 .586 .341 .402 .423 .548 -.169 -.176 -.228 -.206 -.187 -.142 .141 -.149 .038 .171 -.301 -.079 -.236 .545 .519 .477 .518 .532 .629 1.000 
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APPENDIX D 
COVARIANCE MATRIX OF THE OBSERVED VARIABLES 
 
Variables 
Q6a Q6b Q6c Q6d Q6e Q6f Q6g Q6h Q6i Q6j Q6k Q6l Q6m Q6n Q8a Q8b Q8c Q8d Q8e Q8f Q8g Q9a Q9b Q9c Q9d Q9e Q9f Q10a Q10b Q10c Q10d Q10e Q10f Group 
Q6a 3.90                                  
Q6b 2.34 3.09                                 
Q6c 1.55 1.28 2.57                                
Q6d 1.62 1.37 1.73 2.70                               
Q6e .47 .33 .74 .61 1.14                              
Q6f .50 .43 .55 .46 .46 1.14                             
Q6g .78 .62 .60 .49 .39 .30 1.51                            
Q6h 2.28 1.83 1.37 1.57 .39 .72 .59 3.75                           
Q6i 1.98 1.53 1.58 1.45 .35 .63 .47 2.961 3.39                          
Q6j 2.46 1.91 1.41 1.55 .24 .50 .56 3.21 2.73 3.69                         
Q6k 1.54 1.39 1.38 1.37 .42 .54 .47 1.86 1.88 1.95 2.62                        
Q6l 1.69 1.33 1.23 1.40 .35 .58 .47 1.93 1.62 2.12 1.72 2.91                       
Q6m 1.16 1.39 .95 .70 .313 .28 .27 1.76 1.61 1.80 1.22 1.29 2.80                      
Q6n 2.24 1.88 1.32 1.53 .503 .55 .89 2.48 2.07 2.49 1.66 1.92 1.61 3.18                     
Q8a -.01 .03 .08 .13 .07 .05 .00 -.074 .02 -.05 .11 -.05 -.04 -.11 .25                    
Q8b -.14 .01 .11 .04 .09 .12 .00 -.130 -.15 -.10 .10 -.05 -.11 -.16 .12 .33                   
Q8c -.16 -.08 .09 .03 .11 .11 .01 -.249 -.15 -.23 .07 -.12 -.15 -.19 .14 .22 .35                  
Q8d -.28 -.15 -.04 .02 .03 .06 -.05 -.106 -.10 -.13 .04 .15 -.11 -.09 .04 .08 .10 .29                 
Q8e -.30 -.16 .02 .04 .08 .11 -.02 -.048 -.10 -.13 .04 .10 -.10 -.04 .03 .12 .13 .22 .35                
Q8f -.26 -.11 -.01 .06 .06 .08 -.01 .013 -.04 -.04 .06 .14 -.07 -.01 .02 .09 .11 .22 .27 .29               
Q8g .12 .07 -.01 .06 .01 .13 .09 .230 .21 .21 .13 .13 .09 .14 .05 .04 .01 .03 .06 .05 .24              
Q9a -.46 -.30 -.58 -.66 -.18 -.10 .00 -.38 -.33 -.45 -.38 -.67 -.08 -.31 .00 -.05 -.02 -.16 -.12 -.14 .20 2.48             
Q9b .15 .10 -.17 -.07 -.01 .15 .05 .14 .15 .21 .05 .18 .21 .12 .03 -.07 .00 .03 -.02 -.02 .05 .77 1.54            
Q9c .31 .13 -.30 -.15 .00 .16 .11 .23 .14 .19 -.03 .15 .14 .14 -.06 -.10 -.06 -.08 -.08 -.09 .05 .83 .96 1.31           
Q9d -.86 -.57 -.50 -.64 -.04 -.16 -.46 -.79 -.78 -.88 -.56 -.53 -.53 -1.06 .02 .13 .04 .14 .034 .03 -.11 .06 .22 .06 1.727          
Q9e -.41 -.26 -.67 -.57 -.18 -.05 .03 -.32 -.27 -.27 -.33 -.31 -.01 -.19 .02 -.07 -.04 -.02 -.08 -.10 .10 1.43 .87 .76 .28 1.82         
Q9f -.99 -1.16 -.79 -.85 -.40 -.22 -.56 -1.06 -.77 -1.00 -.72 -.76 -.82 -1.20 -.04 -.10 -.00 -.01 -.11 -.06 -.09 .52 .25 .26 .69 .49 2.16        
Q10a 1.90 1.47 1.23 1.26 .29 .41 .66 2.12 1.81 2.23 1.24 1.59 1.16 2.09 -.13 -.14 -.21 -.21 -.15 -.15 .09 -.09 .24 .34 -.80 .03 -.80 3.23       
Q10b 2.13 1.58 1.36 1.38 .34 .51 .74 2.17 1.90 2.37 1.42 1.46 1.01 2.03 -.01 -.09 -.18 -.19 -.12 -.14 .16 -.31 .05 .17 -.82 -.28 -.95 2.42 3.58      
Q10c 1.91 1.53 1.30 1.36 .44 .53 .56 2.01 1.74 2.04 1.34 1.48 .93 1.81 -.02 -.03 -.08 -.05 .03 -.01 .07 -.38 .13 .16 -.53 -.29 -.78 2.17 2.30 2.69     
Q10d 1.87 1.42 1.17 1.24 .18 .39 .61 2.12 1.72 2.19 1.29 1.47 1.05 1.87 -.13 -.18 -.23 -.22 -.16 -.15 .13 -.00 .19 .25 -.76 .04 -.57 2.47 2.22 2.13 2.91    
Q10e 1.83 1.34 1.07 1.08 .16 .34 .63 2.07 1.71 2.18 1.25 1.43 1.13 1.84 -.09 -.20 -.22 -.18 -.14 -.14 .12 .01 .14 .28 -.75 .12 -.49 2.29 2.11 1.93 2.40 2.87   
Q10f 1.98 1.59 1.07 1.08 -.00 .32 .63 2.16 1.78 2.39 1.26 1.57 1.28 2.11 -.15 -.19 -.27 -.25 -.18 -.17 .12 -.09 .08 .30 -.87 .04 -.66 2.49 2.35 2.07 2.40 2.52 3.31  
Group .50 .35 .19 .18 .05 .10 .12 .50 .45 .56 .27 .34 .35 .49 -.04 -.05 -.07 -.05 -.05 -.04 .03 -.12 .02 .10 -.20 -.05 -.17 .49 .49 .39 .44 .45 .57 .24 
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